Observational selection effects and probability. by Bostrom, Nick
Observational Selection Effects and Probability
Nick Bostrom
Doctoral d issertation 
Subm itted at the  D epartm ent of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method 
London School of Econom ics
A pproved by the  exam iners:
P rofessor Elliott S o b er and P ro fesso r P e te r  Milne 
On July 3rd, 2000
Copyright
Email: nick@ nickbostrom .com  
P ersonal hom epage: nickbostrom .com  
This work is available at: anthropic-principle.com
1
UMI Number: U615591
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS  
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com plete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, th ese  will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U615591
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
%%
L l l l
A
A B STR A C T
This thesis develops a theory o f how to reason when our evidence has been subjected to 
observational selection effects. It has applications in cosmology, evolutionary biology, 
thermodynamics and the problem o f  time’s arrow, game theoretic problems with 
imperfect recall, the philosophical evaluation o f the many-worlds and many-minds 
interpretations o f quantum mechanics and David Lewis’ modal realism, and even for 
traffic planning.
After refuting several popular doctrines about the implications o f cosmological 
fine-tuning, we present an informal model o f the observational selection effects involved. 
Next, we evaluate attempts that have been made to codify the correct way o f reasoning 
about such effects -  in the form o f so-called “anthropic principles” -  and find them 
wanting. A new principle is proposed to replace them, the Self-Sampling Assumption 
(SSA).
A  series o f thought experiments are presented showing that SSA should be used in 
a wide range o f  contexts. We also show that SSA gives better methodological guidance 
than rival principles in a number o f scientific fields. We then explain how SSA can lead 
to the infamous Doomsday argument. Identifying what additional assumptions are 
required to derive this consequence, we suggest alternative conclusions. We refute several 
objections against the Doomsday argument and show that SSA does not give rise to 
paradoxical “observer-relative chances” as has been alleged. However, we discover new  
consequences o f SSA that are more counterintuitive than the Doomsday argument.
Using these results, we construct a version o f SSA that avoids the paradoxes and 
does not lead to the Doomsday argument but caters to legitimate methodological needs. 
This modified principle is used as the basis for the first mathematically explicit theory o f  
reasoning under observational selection effects. This observation theory resolves the 
range o f conundrums associated with anthropic reasoning and provides a general 
framework for evaluating theories about the large-scale structure o f the world and the 
distribution o f observers within it.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Anthropic reasoning is a philosophical gold mine. Few philosophical subject matters are 
as rich in important empirical implications, touch on as many fascinating scientific 
questions, or contain such generous quantities o f conceptual and methodological 
confusion that needs to be sorted out.
Anthropic principles are used by contemporary cosmologists to derive 
observational predictions from theories like stochastic inflation which entail the existence 
o f  an ensemble o f universes. Anthropic coincidences are used by some theists to argue for 
the existence o f a Creator. Others point to anthropic reasoning as providing a 
counterargument to the cosmological argument for God’s existence. Anthropic constraints 
have been used to predict how many critical steps there were in the evolution o f  
intelligent life on Earth. The Doomsday argument, using a form o f anthropic reasoning, 
purports to show that the risk that the human species will go extinct fairly soon has been 
greatly underestimated. One main objection against the many-worlds interpretation o f  
quantum physics draws its force from an implicit appeal to an anthropic principle, as does 
a common objection against Boltzmann's attempt to explain time’s arrow. There are also 
applications to game theoretic problems involving imperfect recall and even to traffic 
planning.
The anthropic principle has to do with observational selection effects. A simple 
example o f a selection effect is if  you try to catch fish with a net that doesn’t catch fish 
shorter than 20 cm. If you use such a net to catch a hundred fish and they all turn out to be 
2 0  cm or longer, then obviously you are not entitled to take this as evidence that the 
minimum length o f fish in the lake is about 2 0  cm.
In 1936, The Literary Digest took a phone poll to predict the outcome o f  the 
presidential election. A lf Landon was found to be the most popular candidate among 
those consulted, and so it was predicted that he would win. The prediction, however, 
failed to take account o f an important selection effect owing to the fact that many people 
did not have telephones at that time. Especially the poor tended to lack telephones and
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this group also tended to support the rival candidate, Franklin Delano Roosevelt. 
Roosevelt won a landslide victory. A  methodologically more sophisticated approach 
would either have interviewed a more representative sample set from the population or at 
least factored in known selection effects.
Or to take yet another example, suppose you’re a venture capitalist wanting to 
know what is the average growth rate for companies in the first year after they were 
founded. You wouldn’t get a very reliable estimate by extrapolating from the data about a 
hundred companies selected randomly from the Yellow pages in the phone book. It is not 
uncommon for new companies to fold within a few years, and those who do are much less 
likely to be listed in the Yellow pages. The companies you find there are typically several 
years old and can be expected to have performed substantially above average in their first 
year.
In these three examples, a selection effect is introduced by the fact that the 
instrument you use to collect data (a fishing net, a phone poll, the Yellow pages) samples 
only from a proper subset o f the class o f entities you are interested in. No different in 
principle are selection effects introduced not by limitations o f some measurement device 
but by the fact that all observations require the existence o f an appropriately positioned 
observer. The data we have are filtered not only by limitations in our instrumentation but 
also by the prerequisite that somebody is there to “have” the data yielded by the 
instruments (and to build the instruments in the first place).
For instance, we find that intelligent life evolved on Earth. It would be a mistake 
to infer from this that life is likely to evolve on most Earth-like planets. For however 
small the proportion o f all planets that evolved intelligent life, we will find ourselves on a 
planet that did. (Or we will trace our origin to a planet where intelligent life evolved, in 
case w e are born in a space colony.) The data point -  that intelligent life evolved on our 
planet -  is predicted equally by the hypothesis that intelligent life is very improbable even 
on Earth-like planets and by the hypothesis that intelligent life is probable on Earth-like 
planets. This data point therefore does not distinguish between the two hypotheses, 
provided that on both hypotheses intelligent life would have evolved somewhere. (On the 
other hand, if  the “intelligent-life-is-improbable” hypothesis asserted that intelligent life 
was so improbable that is was unlikely to have evolved anywhere in the whole o f cosmos, 
then the datum that intelligent life evolved on Earth would  count against it. For this
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hypothesis would not have predicted our observation. In fact, it would have predicted that 
there would have been no observations at all.)
We don’t have to travel for long on the even path o f common sense before 
entering a territory where observational selection effects give rise to difficult and 
controversial issues. Already in the preceding paragraph we came across a point which is 
contested. We understood the explanandum -  that intelligent life evolved on our planet -  
in a non-rigid sense. Some authors, however, argue that the explanandum should be, why 
did intelligent life evolve on this planet (where “this planet” is used as a rigid designator), 
and that the hypothesis that intelligent life is quite probable on Earth-like planets would 
indeed give a higher probability to this explanandum (White 1999, Hacking 1987, Dowe 
1998). I will show in chapter 2 that this is not the right way to understand the problem.
Notice also that the impermissibility o f  inferring from the fact that intelligent life 
evolved on Earth that intelligent life probably evolved on a large fraction o f  all Earth-like 
planets does not hinge on the evidence in this example consistings o f only one data point. 
Imagine that we had telepathic abilities and could communicate directly with all other 
intelligent life that exists in cosmos. Suppose we ask all the aliens, did intelligent life 
evolve on their planets too? Obviously they would all say: Yes, it did. But equally 
obvious, this would still not give us any reason to think that intelligent life develops 
easily. We only asked about the planets where life did in fact evolve (since those planets 
would be the only ones which would be “theirs” to some alien), and we get no 
information whatever by hearing the aliens confirming that life evolved on those planets. 
An observational selection effect vitiates any attempt to gain information by this 
procedure about how unlikely intelligent life is to evolve. Other considerations would 
have to be brought to bear if  we want to estimate that. (If all the aliens also reported that 
theirs was some Earth-like planet, this would suggest that intelligent life is unlikely to 
develop on planets that are not Earth-like -  for otherwise some aliens would likely have 
developed on non-Earth like planets. But it does not tell us whether the evolution o f  
intelligent life on an Earth-like planet is likely or not.)
One important application and perhaps the earliest one, o f anthropic reasoning is 
to provide a possible (not necessarily the only) explanation o f  why the universe appears 
fine-tuned for intelligent life in the sense that if  any o f various physical constants or initial 
conditions had been even very slightly different then life as we know it would not have
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existed. The basic idea behind the possible explanation which uses anthropic reasoning is 
that the totality o f  spacetime might be very huge and may contain regions in which the 
values o f fundamental constants and other conditions differ in many ways. (We might 
also have independent grounds for thinking that that is true.) If this is the case, then we 
should not be amazed to find that in our own region physical constants and conditions 
appear “fine-tuned”. Owing to an obvious observational selection effect, only such fine- 
tuned regions are observed. Observing a fine-tuned region is precisely what we should 
expect if  this theory is true, and so it can potentially account for available data in a very 
neat and simple way, without having to assume that conditions ju st happened  to be 
“right” through some immensely lucky -  and arguably a priori extremely improbable -  
cosmic coincidence. It also provides an alternative to the hypothesis that our universe was 
deliberately designed with the intention that it be life-containing.
Some skeptics doubt the meaningfulness o f or need for an explanation o f the 
apparent fine-tuning o f our universe. We examine the skeptical arguments in chapter 2 
and consider the counterarguments offered by proponents o f anthropic explanations o f  
fine-tuning. This leads us into a discussion o f the distinction between surprising and 
unsurprising improbable events, and o f what makes a fact cry out for explanation. We 
find that the anthropic theorizers’ replies fail to meet the skeptics’ challenge. However the 
intuitions o f the former are often correct, and by digging deeper we vindicate those 
intuitions. This involves constructing an informal model o f how observational selection 
effects operate in the context o f cosmological fine-tuning. This model is used to draw a 
number o f additional conclusions about the relative strength o f support that various kinds 
o f cosmological theories get from fine-tuning.
While the term “anthropic principle” is less than three decades old, the basic idea 
o f observational selection effects as an important methodological constraint goes back 
much further. For example, some o f  the core elements in Kant’s philosophy about how  
the world o f our experience is conditioned on the forms o f our sensory and intellectual 
faculties are not completely unrelated to modem ideas o f observational selection effects, 
although there are fundamental differences. Certainly in Hume’s Dialogues Concerning 
Natural Religion , one can find early expressions o f some ideas o f  anthropic selection 
effects. However, it is only quite recently, starting with the works o f Brandon Carter (and 
with some earlier intimations by R. H. Dicke) that the more sophisticated and intricate 
applications o f anthropic reasoning are beginning to be discovered. Many o f the most
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important ideas in this field date back only about a decade or less, philosophers and 
physicists deserving about equal shares o f the credit.
Chapter 3 discusses some o f the many attempts that have been made to codify the 
modus operandi o f anthropic reasoning, often in the form o f an “anthropic principle”. All 
o f them are to various degrees flawed or inadequate.
In this area confusion reigns supreme. Over twenty anthropic principles have been 
formulated and many o f them have been defined several times over -  in nonequivalent 
ways -  by different authors. Some reject anthropic reasoning out o f hand as representing 
an obsolete and irrational form o f  anthropocentrism. Some hold that anthropic inferences 
rest on elementary mistakes in probability calculus. Some maintain that at least some o f  
the anthropic principles are tautological and therefore indisputable. Tautological 
principles have been dismissed by some as empty and thus o f no interest or ability to do 
explanatory work. Others have insisted that like some results in mathematics, though 
analytically true, anthropic principles can nonetheless be interesting and illuminating. 
Others still purport to derive empirical predictions from these same principles and regard 
them as testable hypotheses.
One meta-level reason for thinking that there is something to anthropic reasoning 
is that it is used and taken seriously by a range o f leading physicists and cosmologists. It 
would be surprising if  this bunch o f hardheaded scientists were just blowing so much hot 
air. I hope show that if  one peels away extraneous principles, misconceptions, various 
fallacies and misdescriptions, one can indeed find at the core a set o f interesting and 
useful insights.
It is interesting that so many different and opposing things have been marshaled 
under the ‘anthropic’ banner. Partly this is due to the philosophical opaqueness o f its early 
formulations and to unfortunate terminological choices. Partly it is due to muddled 
thinking combined with the well-known capacity o f probability theory to generate results 
that are counterintuitive to some people. But in part it is also due to genuine difficulties 
intrinsic to this kind o f reasoning, some o f which are still unresolved. One advantage o f  
having a theory o f anthropic reasoning is that we shall be able identify which o f  its 
applications uses problematic assumptions and to explicitly state what those assumptions 
are. But although much useful philosophical analysis o f anthropic reasoning has already 
been done, constructing a theory o f observational selection effects cannot be done by
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merely assembling what is already there. Many o f  the arguments and principles needed do 
not yet exist and will have to be invented here as we go along. Also, a number o f  
erroneous doctrines found in the literature need be refuted and corrected.
Chapter 3 ends by proposing what I dub the “Self-Sampling Assumption” as a 
preliminary formulation (to be revised in chapter 9) o f what I take to be the correct basic 
principle for anthropic reasoning. The content o f the Self-Sampling Assumption is 
unpacked and gradually clarified throughout subsequent chapters.
Chapter 4 gives reasons for accepting the Self-Sampling Assumption. The 
arguments are o f two types. The first type takes the form o f thought experiments designed 
to establish, for a wide range o f situations, that it is rational to reason in accordance with 
the Self-Sampling Assumption. The second type argues that a methodological principle is 
needed to enable us to derive probabilistic observational consequences from current 
cosmological theories. I show that while it current rivals fail do this, the Self-Sampling 
Assumption provides a simple and plausible methodology which coincides with scientific 
practice and intuitive judgements o f what counts as evidence for or against cosmological 
theories. Support for the Self-Sampling Assumption is also garnered from its useful 
application in a number o f other fields, including evolutionary biology, thermodynamics 
and even such a mundane activity as traffic planning.
Chapter 5 shows how the Self-Sampling Assumption, when combined with certain 
other premises, leads to the notorious Doomsday argument. Two different versions o f this 
argument are identified, one o f which (the one originated by Richard Gott) is showed to 
be flawed. The other version, which is due to Brandon Carter and John Leslie, is stronger 
but nonetheless inconclusive. We identify the critical assumptions that are needed, in 
addition to the Self-Sampling Assumption, to derive the intended conclusion.
Chapter 6  refutes six recent objections against the Doomsday argument and in the 
process o f doing so throws light on some related issues. Whether the Doomsday argument 
is sound or not, it shouldn’t be dismissed for the wrong reasons. This is especially 
important because when the force o f the Doomsday argument is appreciated, it gives us 
valuable clues as to a more satisfactory theory o f observational selection effects.
Chapter 7 starts by examining a claim by John Leslie that anthropic reasoning 
leads to paradoxical observer-relative chances in some types o f situations. I show that 
Leslie’s argument is fallacious. A different type o f situation in then described where
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anthropic reasoning does lead to chances that are observer-relative in an interesting but 
not paradoxical sense.
While chapters 5-7 to some extent give reassuring messages about the Self- 
Sampling Assumption as originally formulated, chapter 8  discovers some truly 
paradoxical apparent consequences o f an unrestricted use o f that assumption. Among 
these apparent consequences are that it gives us reason to believe in backward causation, 
paranormal causation (e.g. psychokinesis) and that it gives advice which seems radically 
foolish. A careful analysis reveals that the worst o f these prima facie consequences are 
merely apparent. Nonetheless, the fact remains that in some thought experiments the 
unrestricted use o f the Self-Sampling Assumption gives counterintuitive results.
Chapter 9 reexamines the arguments for the Self-Sampling Assumption given in 
chapter 5 and argues for a modified and relativized version that performs the same useful 
functions as the original formulation while avoiding the counterintuitive consequences 
discussed in chapter 8 . Taken together with the results from the preceding chapters, this 
establishes a general framework for modeling reasoning in situations involving 
conditionalization on information having an indexical component or when our evidence 
has been subjected to observational selection effects. The relevant probabilistic relation 
between such evidence and arbitrary hypotheses is given a formal expression in an 
equation (SSSA-R) and constraints are put in place on a key parameter.
Many valuable specific results and ideas relating to anthropic reasoning have been 
obtained by various investigators and are used as building blocks here together with many 
novel ones. This thesis, however, is the first systematic attempt to construct a general and 
formally explicit theory o f reasoning under observational selection effects. It is hoped that 
it will advance our understanding o f the foundational issues in this field and that it will 
move us closer to being able to tackle those “anthropic problems” -  both scientific and 
philosophical -  that still remain mysterious.
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C HAPTER 2: FINE-TUNING ARGUM ENTS IN  
CO SM O LO G Y
The aspect o f anthropic reasoning that has received most attention from philosophers is 
the application in cosmology to explain the apparent fine-tuning o f our universe. “Fine- 
tuning” refers to the supposed fact that there is a set o f cosmological parameters or 
fundamental physical constants which are such that had they been very slightly different 
then the universe would have been void o f intelligent life. For example, in the classical 
big bang model, the early expansion speed seems fine-tuned. Had it been very slightly 
greater, the universe would have expanded too rapidly and no galaxies would have 
formed; there would only have been a very low density hydrogen gas getting more and 
more dispersed over time. In such a universe, presumably, life could not evolve. Had the 
early expansion speed been very slightly less, then the universe would have recollapsed 
within a fraction o f a second, and again there would have been no life. Our universe, 
having just the right conditions for life, appears to be balancing on a knife’s edge (Leslie 
1989). A number o f other parameters seem fine-tuned in the same sense -  e.g. the ratio o f  
the electron mass to the proton mass, the magnitudes o f force strengths, the smoothness o f  
the early universe, the neutron-proton mass difference, even the metric signature o f  
spacetime (Tegmark 1997).
Some philosophers and physicists take fine-tuning to be an explanandum that cries 
out for an explanans. Two possible explanations are usually envisioned: the design 
hypothesis and the ensemble hypothesis. Although these explanations are compatible, 
they tend to be viewed as competing: if  we knew that one o f them were correct, there 
would be less temptation to think that the other obtained.
The design hypothesis is that our universe is the result o f purposeful design. The 
“agent” doing the designing need not be a theistic “God”, although o f course that is one o f  
the archetypal version o f the design hypothesis. Other universe-designers have been 
considered in this context. For example, John Leslie (Leslie 1972, Leslie 1979, Leslie 
1989) discusses the case for a neoplatonist “causally efficacious ethical principle”, which
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he thinks might have been responsible for creating the world and giving physical 
constants and cosmological parameters the numerical values they have. Derek Parfit 
(Parfit 1998) considers various “universe selection principles”, which although they are 
very different from what people have traditionally thought o f as “God” or a “Designer” 
can nevertheless suitably be grouped under the heading o f  design hypotheses for present 
purposes. We can take “purposeful designer” in a very broad sense to refer to any being, 
principle or mechanism external to our universe responsible for selecting its properties, or 
responsible for making it in some sense probable that our universe should be fine-tuned 
for intelligent life. Needless to say, it is possible to doubt the meaningfulness o f many o f  
these design hypotheses. Even if  one agrees that a given design hypothesis represents a 
coherent possibility, one may still think that it should be assigned an extremely low  
degree o f credence. For people who are already convinced that there is a God, however, 
the design hypothesis is apt to be an attractive explanation o f why our universe is fine- 
tuned. And if one is not already convinced about the existence o f a Designer, but thinks 
that it is a coherent possibility, one may be tempted to regard fine-tuning as reason for 
increasing one’s credence in that hypothesis. One prominent champion o f  the fine-tuning 
argument for God’s existence is Richard Swinburne (Swinburne 1991). Several other 
theologians and philosophers also support this position (see e.g. Craig 1997, Craig 1988, 
Ross 1992, Polkinghorne 1986, Manson 1989).
The main rival explanation o f fine-tuning is the ensemble hypothesis, which states 
that the universe we observe is only a small part o f the totality o f physical existence. This 
totality itself needs not be fine-tuned; if  it is sufficiently big and variegated, so that it was 
likely to contain as a proper part the sort o f fine-tuned universe we observe, then an 
observational selection effect can be invoked to explain why we see a fine-tuned universe. 
The usual form o f the ensemble hypothesis is that our universe is but one in a vast 
ensemble o f  actually existing universes, the totality o f  which we can call “the multiverse”, 
adopting recent terminology. What counts as a universe in such a multiverse is a 
somewhat vague matter, but “a large, causally fairly disconnected spacetime region” is 
sufficiently precise for our aims. If the world consists o f  a sufficiently huge number o f  
such universes, and the values o f physical constants vary between these universes 
according to some suitably broad probability distribution, then it may well be the case that 
it was quite probable that a fine-tuned universe like ours would come into existence. The 
actual existence o f such a multiverse -  an ensemble o f “possible universes” would not do
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-  provides the basis on which the observational selection effect operates. The argument 
then goes like this: Even though the vast majority o f the universes are not suitable for 
intelligent life, it is no wonder that we should observe one o f the exceptional universes 
which are fine-tuned; for the other universes contain no observers and hence are not 
observed. To observers in such a multiverse, the world will look as if  it were fine-tuned. 
But that is because they see only a small and unrepresentative part o f  the whole. 
Observers may marvel at the fact that the universe they find themselves in is so 
exquisitely balanced, but once they see the bigger picture they can realize that there is 
really nothing to be astonished by. On the ensemble theory, there had  to be such a 
universe (or at least, it was not so improbable that there would be), and since the other 
universes have no observers in them, a fine-tuned universe is precisely what the observers 
should expect to observe given the existence o f the ensemble. The multiverse itself need 
not be fine-tuned. It can be robust in the sense that a small change in its basic parameters 
would not change the fact that it contains regions where intelligent life exists.
In contrast to some versions o f the design hypothesis, the meaningfulness o f  the 
ensemble hypothesis is not much in question. Only those subscribing to a very strict 
verificationist theory o f meaning would deny that it is possible that the world might 
contain a large set o f causally fairly disconnected spacetime regions with varying physical 
parameters. (And even the most hardcore verificationist would be willing to consider at 
least those ensemble theories according to which other universes are in principle 
physically accessible from our own universe. Such ensemble theories have been 
proposed, although they represent only a special case o f  the general idea.) But there are 
other philosophical perplexities that arise in this context. One can wonder, for example, in 
what sense the suggested anthropic explanation o f fine-tuning (it is “anthropic” because it 
involves the idea o f an observational selection effect) is really explanatory and how it 
would relate to a more directly causal account o f how our universe came to be. Another 
important issue is whether fine-tuning provides some evidence for a multiverse. The first 
question we shall consider, however, is whether fine-tuning stands in any need o f  
explanation at all.
D o e s  fine-tuning n e e d  explain ing?
First a few words about the supposition that our universe is in fact fine-tuned. This is an 
empirical assumption which is not entirely trivial. It is certainly true that our current best
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physical theories, in particular the Grand Unified Theory o f the strong, weak, and 
electromagnetic forces and the big bang theory in cosmology have a number (twenty or 
so) o f free parameters. There is quite strong reason to think at least some o f  these 
parameters are fine-tuned -  the universe would have been inhospitable to life if  their 
values had been slightly different. (A good overview o f the case for fine-tuning is chapter 
2 o f John Leslie’s (Leslie 1989).) While it is true that our knowledge o f exotic life forms 
possible under a different physics than the actual one is very limited (Wilson 1991, Smith 
1985, Feinberg and Shapiro 1980), it does seem quite reasonable to think, for instance, 
that life would not have evolved if  the universe had contained only a highly diluted 
hydrogen gas or if  it had recollapsed within a fraction o f a second after big bang 
(referring to the seeming fine-tuning in the early expansion speed) (Leslie 1985). What 
little direct evidence we have supports this suggestion. Life does not seem to evolve 
easily even in a universe like our own, which presumably has rather favorable conditions 
-  complex chemistry, relatively stable environments, large entropy gradients etc. (Hanson 
1998, Simpson 1964, Carter 1983, Mayr 1985, Raup 1985, Hart 1982, Papagiannis 1978). 
There are as yet no signs that life has evolved in the observable universe anywhere 
outside our own planet (Tipler 1982, Brin 1983).
One should not jump from this to the conclusion that our universe is fine-tuned. 
For it is possible that some future physical theory will be developed that uses fewer free 
parameters or uses only parameters on which life does not sensitively depend. However, 
since the empirical case for fine-tuning is separate from the philosophical problem o f  how 
to react if  our universe really is fine-tuned, we can set these scruples to one side . 1 Let’s 
assume the most favorable case for fine-tuning enthusiasts: that the physics o f  our
1 If we knew that our universe were not fine-tuned, the issue of what fine-tuning would have implied could 
still be philosophically interesting. But in fact, the case for fine-tuning is quite strong. Given what we know, 
it seems reasonable to doubt that that there is a plausible physical theory on which our universe is not fine- 
tuned. Inflation theory, which was originally motivated largely by a desire to avoid the fine-tuning required 
by the ordinary big bang theory regarding the flatness and smoothness of the universe, seems to require 
some fine-tuning of its own to get the inflation potential right. More recent inflation theories may overcome 
this problem, at least partly; but they do so by introducing a multiverse and an observational selection effect 
-  in other words by doing exactly the sort of thing that this chapter will scrutinize. The present best 
candidate for a single-universe theory that could reduce the number of free parameters may be superstring 
theories, but they too seem to require at least some fine-tuning (because there are many possible 
compactification schemes and vacuum states). The theories that currently seem most likely to be able to do 
away with fine-tuned free parameters all imply the existence of a multiverse. On these theories, our 
universe might still be fine-tuned although the multiverse as a whole might not be, or might be fine-tuned 
only to a less degree.
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universe has several independent free parameters which are fine-tuned to an extremely 
high degree. If that is so, is it something that cries out for explanation or should w e be 
happy to accept it as one o f those brute facts that just happen to obtain?
I suggest that there are two parts to the answer to this question, one o f  which is 
fairly unproblematic. This easier part o f the answer is as follows: In general, simplicity is 
one desideratum on plausible scientific theories. Other things equal, we prefer theories 
which make a small number o f simple assumptions to ones that involve a large number o f  
ad hoc stipulations. I see no reason not to apply this methodological principle in 
cosmology. It is used successfully in the rest o f science and indeed has a strong track 
record within cosmology too . 2  Thus, I think one can admit that there is something 
dissatisfactory about a cosmological theory which tells us that the universe contains a 
large number o f fine-tuned constants. Such a theory might be true, but we should not be 
keen to believe that until we have convinced ourselves that there is no simpler theory that 
can account for the data we have. So if  the universe looks fine-tuned, this can be an 
indication that we should look harder to see if  we cannot find a theory which reduces the 
number o f independent assumptions needed. This is one reason for why a universe which 
looks fine-tuned (whether or not it actually is fine-tuned) is crying out for explanation.
We should note two things about this easy part o f the answer. First, there might 
not be an explanation even if  the universe is “crying out” for one in this sense. There is no 
guarantee that there is a simpler theory using fewer free parameters which can account for 
the data. At most, there is a prima facie case for looking for one, and for preferring the 
simpler theory if  one can be found.
Second, the connection to fine-tuning is merely incidental. In this part o f the 
answer, it is not fine-tuning per se, only fine-tuning to the extent that it is coupled to 
having a wide range o f free parameters, that is instigating the search for a better 
explanation. Fine-tuning is neither necessary nor sufficient for this. It is not sufficient, 
because in order for a theory to be fine-tuned for intelligent life, it needs to have but a 
single free parameter. If a theory has a single physical constant on which the existence o f
2 For example, think of the replacement of the complicated Ptolomeian theory of planetary motion by the 
far simpler Keplerian theory. Some people might regard Einstein’s relativity theory as more complicated 
than Newton’s theory of gravitation (although “more difficult” seems a more accurate description in this 
case than “more complicated”). But note that the ceteris paribus includes the presupposition that the two
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intelligent life very sensitively depends, then the theory is fine-tuned. Yet a theory with 
only one free parameter could be eminently simple. If a universe cries out for explanation 
even though such a theory accounts for all available evidence, it must clearly be on some 
other basis than that o f a general preference for simpler theories. Also, fine-tuning is not 
necessary for there to be a cry for explanation. One can imagine a cosmological theory 
which contains a large number o f free parameters but is not fine-tuned because life does 
not sensitively depend on the values assigned to these parameters.
The easy part o f the answer is therefore: Yes, fine-tuning cries out for explanation 
to the extent to which it is correlated with an excess o f  free parameters and a resultant 
lack o f  simplicity . 3 This part o f the answer has been overlooked in discussions o f  fine- 
tuning, yet it is important to separate out this aspect in order to rightly grasp the more 
problematic part to which we shall now turn. The problematic part is to address the 
question o f  whether fine-tuning especially cries out for explanation, beyond the general 
appeal to avoid unnecessary complications and ad hoc assumptions. In other words, is the 
fact, that the universe would have been lifeless if  the values o f fundamental constants had 
been very slightly different (assuming this is a fact) relevant in assessing whether an 
explanation is called for o f why the constants have the values they have? And does it give 
support to the multiverse hypothesis? Or alternatively to the design hypothesis? The rest 
o f this chapter will focus on these questions (though the design hypothesis will be 
discussed only as it touches on the other two questions).
Ian H acking and the Inverse G am bler’s  Fallacy
Can an anthropic argument based on an observational selection effect together with the 
assumption that an ensemble o f universes exists explain the apparent fine-tuning o f our 
universe? Ian Hacking has argued that this depends on the nature o f the ensemble. If the
theories predict known data equally well, so this would not be a counterexample. Newton’s theory does not 
fit the evidence.
3 The simplicity principle I’m using here is not that every phenomenon must have an explanation (which 
would be version of the principle of sufficient reason, which I do not accept). Rather, what I mean is that 
we have an a priori epistemic bias in favor of hypotheses which are compatible with us living in a relatively 
simple w orld. Therefore, if our best account so far of some phenomenon involves very non-simple 
hypotheses (such as that a highly remarkable coincidence happened just by chance), then we may have 
prima facie reason for thinking that there is some better (simpler) explanation of the phenomenon that we 
haven’t yet thought of. In that sense, the phenomenon is crying out for an explanation. Of course, there 
might not be a (simple) explanation. But we shouldn’t be willing to believe in the complicated account until 
we have convinced ourselves that no simple explanation would work.
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ensemble consists o f all possible big-bang universes (a position he ascribes to Brandon 
Carter) then, says Hacking, the anthropic explanation works:
Why do we exist? Because we are a possible universe [sic], and all possible ones 
exist. Why are we in an orderly universe? Because the only universes that we 
could observe are orderly ones that support our form o f life. ...nothing is left to 
chance. Everything in this reasoning is deductive. (Hacking 1987, p. 337)
Hacking contrasts this with a seemingly analogous explanation which seeks to explain 
fine-tuning by supposing that a Wheeler-type multiverse exists. In the Wheeler 
cosmology, there is a never-ending sequence o f universes each o f which begins with a big 
bang and ends with a big crunch which bounces back in a new big bang, and so forth. The 
values o f physical constants are reset in a random fashion in each bounce, so that w e have 
a vast ensemble o f universes with varying properties. The purported anthropic 
explanation o f fine-tuning based on such a Wheeler ensemble notes that given that the 
ensemble is large enough then it could be expected to contain at least one fine-tuned 
universe like ours. An observational selection effect can be invoked to explain why we 
observe a fine-tuned universe rather than one o f the non-tuned ones. On the face o f it, this 
line o f reasoning looks very similar to the anthropic reasoning based on the Carter 
multiverse, o f which Hacking approves. But according to Hacking, there is a crucial 
difference. He thinks that the version using the Wheeler multiverse commits what he dubs 
the “Inverse Gambler’s Fallacy”. This is the fallacy o f  a dim-witted gambler who thinks 
that the apparently improbable outcome he currently observes is made more probable if  
there have been many trials preceding the present one.
[A gambler] enters the room as a roll is about to be made. The kibitzer asks, ‘Is
this the first role o f the dice, do you think, or have we made many a one earlier 
tonight?... slyly, he says ‘Can I wait until I see how this roll comes out, before I 
lay my bet with you on the number o f  past plays made tonight?’ The kibitzer... 
agrees. The roll is a double six. The gambler foolishly says, ‘Ha, that makes a
difference -  I think there have been quite a few rolls.’ (Hacking 1987, p. 333)
The gambler in this example is clearly making a mistake. But it is almost equally clear 
that Hacking is making a mistake in thinking that the situation is analogous to the one
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regarding fine-tuning. As was pointed out by three independent authors (Whitaker 1988, 
McGrath 1988, Leslie 1988) replying to Hacking’s paper, there is no observational 
selection effect in his example -  an essential ingredient in the purported anthropic 
explanation o f fine-tuning.
One way o f introducing an observational selection effect in Hacking’s example is 
by supposing that the gambler has to wait outside the room until a double six is rolled. 
Knowing that this is the setup, the gambler does obtain some reason upon entering the 
room and seeing the double six for thinking that there have probably been quite a few  
rolls already. This is a closer analogy to the fine-tuning case. The gambler can only 
observe certain outcomes -  we can think o f  these as the “fine-tuned” ones -  and upon 
observing a fine-tuned outcome he obtains reason to think that there have been several 
trials. Observing a double six would be surprising on the hypothesis that there were only 
one roll, but it would be expected on the hypothesis that there were very many. Moreover, 
a kind o f explanation o f  why the gambler is seeing a double six is provided by pointing 
out that there were many rolls and the gambler would be let in to observe the outcome 
only upon rolling a double six. When we make the example more similar to the fine- 
tuning situation, we find that it supports, rather than refutes, the analogous reasoning 
based on the Wheeler cosmology.
What makes Hacking’s position especially peculiar is that he thinks that the 
anthropic reasoning works with a Carter multiverse but not in a Wheeler universe. Every 
author I am aware o f who has written about this thinks that Hacking is wrong on this 
point. Many think the anthropic reasoning works in both cases, some think it doesn’t 
work in either case, but Hacking is probably alone in thinking it works in one but not the 
other. The only pertinent difference between the two cases seems to be that in the Carter 
case one deduces the existence o f a universe like ours, whereas in the Wheeler case one 
infers it probabilistically. The Wheeler case can be made to approximate the Carter case 
by having the probability that a universe like ours should be generated in some cycle be 
close to 1. (This is in fact the case in the Wheeler scenario if  there are infinitely many 
cycles and there is a fixed finite probability in each cycle o f a universe like ours 
resulting). It is hard to see the appeal o f  a doctrine that drives a methodological wedge 
between the two cases, asserting that the anthropic explanation works perfectly in one and 
works not at all in the other.
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R obert W hite and Phil D ow e’s  an a ly sis
A more challenging criticism o f the anthropic explanation o f fine-tuning has been 
suggested by Robert White (White 1999) and Phil Dowe (Dowe 1998). They eschew  
Hacking’s doctrine that there is an essential difference between the Wheeler and the 
Carter multiverse as regards the correctness o f corresponding anthropic fine-tuning 
explanation. But they take up another idea o f Hacking’s, namely that what goes wrong in 
the Inverse Gambler’s Fallacy is that the gambler fails to regard the most specific version 
he knows o f the explanandum when making his inference to the best explanation. If all 
the gambler had known were that a  double six had been rolled, then it need not have been 
a fallacy to infer that there probably were quite a few rolls (since that would have made it 
more probable that there would be at least one double six). However, the gambler knows 
that this roll -  the latest one -  was a double six, and this gives him no reason to believe 
there were many rolls (since the probability that that roll would be a double six is one in 
thirty-six independently o f  how many times the dice have been rolled). And, argues 
Hacking, we have to use the most specific explanandum that we have knowledge of:
If F is known, and E is the best explanation o f F, then we are supposed to infer E. 
However, we cannot give this rule carte blanche. If F is known, then FvG is 
known, but E* might be the best explanation o f FvG, and yet knowledge o f F 
gives not the slightest reason to believe E*. (John, an excellent swimmer, drowns 
in Lake Ontario. Therefore he drowns in either Lake Ontario or the Gulf o f  
Mexico. At the time o f his death, a hurricane is ravaging the Gulf. So the best 
explanation o f why he drowned is that he was overtaken by a hurricane, which is 
absurd.) We must insist that F, the fact to be explained, is the most specific 
version o f what is known and not a disjunctive consequence o f what is known. 
(Hacking 1987, p. 335)
Applying this to fine-tuning, Hacking, White and Dowe charge that the purported 
anthropic explanation o f fine-tuning fails to explain the most specific version o f what is 
known. We know not only that some universe is fine-tuned; we know that this universe is 
fine-tuned. Now, if  our explanandum is, Why is this universe fine-tuned? -  where “this 
universe” is understood rigidly-, it would seem that postulating many universes would 
not go anywhere towards explaining this; nor would it make the explanandum more 
probable. For how could the existence o f many other universes make it more likely that 
this universe would be fine-tuned?
23
It is useful at this stage to introduce some abbreviations. In order to focus on the 
point that White and Dowe are making, we can make some simplifying assumptions. 4  Let 
us suppose that there are n possible configurations o f a big bang universe {7), T2, ..., Tn} 
and that they are equally “probable”, P(7i) = 1 In. We assume that Tj is the only 
configuration that permits life to evolve. Let the variable “x” range over the set o f  actual 
universes. We assume that each universe instantiates a unique 7), so that Vx3!/(7jt) . Let 
m < n  be the number o f actually existing universes, and let “ a ” rigidly denote our 
universe. We define
E := T] a  (“ a  is life-permitting.”)
E ’ := 3x(7Jx) (“Some universe is life-permitting.”)
M := m » Q  (“There are many universes.” -  the multiverse hypothesis)
White claims that while there being many universes increases the probability that 
there is a life-permitting universe, P(E’|M) > P(E’|^M), it is not the case that there being 
many universes increases the probability that our universe is life-permitting. That is, 
P(E|M) = P(E|~M) = 1 In. The argument White gives for this is that
the probability o f  [E, i.e. the claim that a  instantiates Tj] is just l/n, regardless o f  
how many other universes there are, since a  ’s initial conditions and constants are 
selected randomly from a set o f n equally probable alternatives, a selection which 
is independent o f the existence o f  other universes. The events which give rise to 
universes are not causally related in such a way that the outcome o f one renders 
the outcome o f another more or less probable. They are like independent rolls o f  a 
die. (White 1999, p. 4)
Since we should conditionalize on the most specific information we have when evaluating 
the support for the multiverse hypothesis, and since E’ is more specific than E, White 
concludes that the our knowledge that our universe permits life to evolve gives us no 
reason to think there are many universes.
This argument has some initial plausibility. Nonetheless, I think it is fallacious.
4 I will adopt White’s formalism to facilitate comparison. The simplifying assumptions are also made by 
White, on whose analysis we focus since it is more detailed than Dowe’s.
24
We get a hint that something has gone wrong if  we pay attention to a certain symmetry o f  
the situation. Let a , /?,, p n_x be the actually existing universes, and for i = a ,  p x,
..., , let Ej be the proposition that if  some universe is life-permitting then /' is life-
permitting. Thus, E is equivalent to the conjunction o f E’ and E a . According to White, 
P(M|E’) > P(M) and P(M|E’ E a ) = P(M|E) = P(M), which implies P(M|E’ E a ) < P(M|E’). 
Because o f the symmetry o f the p . :s, P(M|E’E^ , ) = c, for every p .. This entails that 
P(M|E’ Epj) < P(M|E’) for every /?; . In other words, White is committed to the view that,
given that some universe is life-permitting, then conditionalizing on a  being life- 
permitting decreases the probability o f M, while conditionalizing on any o f  p x, ..., p n_x 
increases the probability o f  M. But this seems wrong. Given that some universe is life- 
permitting, why should the fact it is this universe that is life-permitting, rather than any o f  
the others, lower the probability that there are many universes? If it had been some other 
universe instead o f this one that had been life-permitting, why should that have made the 
multiverse hypothesis any more likely? Clearly, such discrimination could be justified 
only if  there were something special that we knew about this universe that would make 
the fact that it is this universe rather than some other that is life-permitting significant. I 
can’t see what sort o f knowledge that would be. It is true that we are in this universe and 
not in any other -  but that fact presupposes that it is life-permitting. It is not as if  there is 
a remarkable coincidence between our universe being life-permitting and us being in it. 
So it’s hard to see how the fact that we are in this universe could justify treating its being 
life-permitting as giving a lower probability to the multiverse hypothesis than any other 
universe’s being life-permitting would have.
So what, precisely, is wrong in White’s argument? His basic intuition for why 
P(M|E) = P(M) seems to be that “The events which give rise to universes are not causally 
related in such a way that the outcome o f one renders the outcome o f another more or less 
probable.”. But a little reflection reveals that this statement it is highly problematic for 
several reasons.
First, there is no current warrant for making the assertion. Very little is still known 
about the events which give rise to universes. There are models on which the outcomes o f  
some such events causally influence the outcome o f others. To illustrate, in Lee Smolin’s 
(admittedly highly speculative) evolutionary cosmological model (Smolin 1997), 
universes create “baby-universes” whenever a black hole is formed, and these baby-
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universes inherit some o f the properties o f their parents. The outcomes o f chance events 
in one such conception can thus influence the outcomes o f  chance events in the births o f  
other universes. Variations o f the Wheeler oscillating universe model have also been 
suggested where some properties are inherited from one cycle to the next. Andrei Linde 
has speculated about the possibility that advanced civilizations may have the ability to 
create “basement-universes” and transfer some information into them.
Even if  the events which give rise to universes are not causally related in the sense 
that the outcome o f one event causally influences the outcome o f another (as in the above 
examples), that does not mean that one universe may not carry information about another. 
For instance, two universes can have a partial cause in common. This is the case in the 
multiverse models associated with inflation theory (arguably the best current candidates 
for a multiverse cosmology). In a nutshell, the idea is that universes arise from inflating 
fluctuations in some background space. The existence o f this background space and the 
parameters o f the chance mechanism which lead to the creation o f inflating bubbles are at 
least partial causes o f the universes that are produced. The properties o f  the produced 
universes could thus carry information about this background space and the mechanism o f  
bubble creation, and hence indirectly also about other universes that have been produced 
by the same mechanism. The majority o f multiverse models that have actually been 
proposed, including arguably the most plausible one, thus negate White’s categorical 
statement.
Second, we can consider the hypothetical case o f a multiverse model where the 
universes bear no causal relations to one another. But even there, it is not clear that that 
P(M|E) = P(M). We need to make a distinction between objective chance and epistemic 
probability. If there is no causal connection (whether direct or indirect) between the 
universes, then there is no correlation in the physical chances o f  the outcomes o f  the 
events in which these universes are created. It doesn’t follow that the outcomes o f  those 
events are uncorrelated in one’s epistemic probability assignment. Consider this toy 
example:
Suppose you have some background knowledge K and that your prior subjective 
probability function P, conditionalized on K, assigns non-negligible probability to 
only three possible worlds and assigns an equal probability to these: P(wi|K) = 
P(w 2 |K) = P(w3 |K) w l / 3 .  In wi there is one big universe, a, and one small
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universe, d\ in W2  there is one big, b , and one small, e\ and in W3 there is one big, 
c , and one small, e. Now suppose you learn that you are in universe e. This rules 
out w i. It thus gives you information about the big universe -  it is now more likely 
to be either b or c than it was before you learnt that the little universe is e. That is, 
P(“The big universe is b or c”|K&“The little universe is e”) > P(“The big universe 
is b or c”|K).
No assumption is made here about the universes being causally related. White 
presupposes that there is no such subjective probability function P, or that such a 
probability function must be irrational or unreasonable (independently o f the exact nature 
o f the various possible worlds under consideration). But that seems an implausible 
assumption, and no argument is provided for it.
Third, White’s view that P(M|E’) > P(M) seems to commit him to denying this 
assumption. For how could E’ (which says that some universe is life-permitting) be 
probabilistically relevant to M unless the outcome o f one universe-creating event x 
(namely that event, or one o f those events, that created the life-permitting universe(s)) can 
be probabilistically relevant to the outcome o f another >> (namely one o f those events that 
created the universes other than x)? If x gives absolutely no information about y, then 
there is no reason to think that because x resulted in a life-permitting universe, so did 
quite probably y  too. So on this reasoning, we would have P(M|E’) = P(M). (This point 
connects back with the initial observation regarding the symmetry and the implausibility 
o f thinking that because it is our universe that is life-permitting this gives less support for 
the multiverse hypothesis than if  it had been some other universe instead that were life- 
permitting.)
I conclude that White’s argument against the view that fine-tuning lends some 
support to the multiverse hypothesis fails, and so do consequently Phil D ow e’s and Ian 
Hacking’s (the latter failing on additional grounds as well, as described in the preceding 
section).
Surprising vs. unsurprising im probable e v e n ts
If, then, the fact that our universe is life-permitting does give support to the multiverse 
hypothesis, i.e. P(M|E) > P(M), it follows from Bayes’ theorem that P(E|M) > P(E). How  
can the existence o f a multiverse make it more probable that this universe should be life- 
permitting? One may be tempted to say: By making it more likely that this universe
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should exist. The problem with this reply is that it would seem to equally validate the 
inference to many universes from any sort o f universe whatever. For instance, let E* be 
the proposition that a  is a universe that contains nothing but chaotic light rays. It seems 
wrong to think that P(M|E*) > P(M). Yet, if the only reason that P(E|M) > P(E) is that a: 
is more likely to exist if M is true, then an exactly analogous reason would support 
P(E*|M) > P(E*), and hence P(M|E*) > P(M). This presents the anthropic theorizer with a 
puzzle.
Several prominent supporters o f the anthropic argument for the multiverse 
hypothesis have sought to ground their argument in a distinction between events (or facts) 
that are surprising and those that are improbable but not surprising (e.g. John Leslie 
(Leslie 1989) and Peter van Inwagen (van Inwagen 1993)).5 Suppose you toss a coin one 
hundred times and write down the results. Any particular sequence s  is highly improbable 
(P(s) = 2‘100), yet most sequences are not surprising. If s contains roughly equally many 
heads and tails, and no clear pattern, then s  is improbable and unsurprising. By contrast, if  
s  consists o f 100 heads, or o f alternating heads and tails, or some other highly patterned 
outcome, then s  is surprising. Or to take another example, if  x wins a lottery with one 
billion tickets, this is said to be unsurprising (“someone had to win, it could just as well 
be x as anybody else, shrug.”); whereas if  there are three lotteries with a thousand tickets 
each, and x wins all three o f them, this is surprising. We evidently have some intuitive 
concept o f what it is for an outcome to be surprising in cases like these.
The idea, then, is that a fine-tuned universe is surprising in a sense in which a 
particular universe filled with only chaotic electromagnetic radiation would not have 
been. And that’s why we need to look for an explanation o f fine-tuning but would not
5 Some authors who are skeptical about the claim that fine-tuning is evidence for a multiverse still see a 
potential role of an anthropic explanation using the multiverse hypothesis as a way of reducing the 
surprisingness or amazingness of the observed fine-tuning. A good example of this tack is John Earman’s 
paper on the anthropic principle (Earman 1987), in which he criticizes a number of illegitimate claims made 
on behalf of the anthropic principle by various authors (especially concerning those misnamed “anthropic 
principles” that don’t involve any observational selection effects -  more on this in the next chapter). But in 
the conclusion he writes: “There remains a potentially legitimate use of anthropic reasoning to alleviate the 
state of puzzlement into which some people have managed to work themselves over various features of the 
observable portion of our universe. ... But to be legitimate, the anthropic reasoning must be backed by 
substantive reasons for believing in the required [multiverse] structure.” (p. 316). Similar views are 
espoused by Email McMullin (McMullin 1993), Bemulf Karnitscheider (Kanitscheider 1993), and (less 
explicitly) by George Gale (Gale 1996). I agree that anthropic reasoning reduces puzzlement only given the 
existence of a suitable multiverse, but I disagree with the claim that the potential reduction of puzzlement is
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have had any reason to suppose there were an explanation for a light-filled universe. The 
two potential explanations for fine-tuning that typically are considered are the design 
hypothesis and the multiple universe hypothesis. An inference is then made that at least 
one o f these hypotheses is quite likely true in light o f available data, or at least more 
likely true than would have been the case if  this universe had been a “boring” one 
containing only chaotic light. This is similar to the 100 coin flips example: an 
unsurprising outcome does not lead us to search for an explanation, while a run o f  100 
heads does cry out for explanation and gives at least some support to potential 
explanations such as the hypothesis that the coin flipping process was biased. Likewise in 
the lottery example. The same person winning the all three lotteries could make us 
suspect that the lottery had been rigged in the winner’s favor, especially if  there were 
some independent evidence for this.
A key assumption in this argument is that fine-tuning is indeed surprising. Is it? 
Some dismiss the possibility out o f hand. For example, Stephen Jay Gould writes:
Any complex historical outcome -  intelligent life on earth, for example -  
represents a summation o f improbabilities and becomes therefore absurdly 
unlikely. But something has to happen, even if  any particular “something” must 
stun us by its improbability. We could look at any outcome and say, “A in’t it 
amazing. If the laws o f nature had been set up a tad differently, we wouldn’t have 
this kind o f universe at all.” (Gould 1990, p. 183)
Peter van Inwagen mocks that way o f thinking:
Some philosophers have argued that there is nothing in the fact that the universe is 
fine-tuned that should be the occasion for any surprise. After all (the objection 
runs), if  a machine has dials, the dials have to be set some way, and any particular 
setting is as unlikely as any other. Since any setting o f the dial is as unlikely as 
any other, there can be nothing more surprising about the actual setting o f  the 
dials, whatever it may be, than there would be about any possible setting o f the 
dials if that possible setting were the actual setting. ... This reasoning is 
sometimes combined with the point that if  “our” numbers hadn’t been set into the 
cosmic dials, the equally improbable setting that did occur would have differed 
from the actual setting mainly in that there would have been no one there to
no ground whatever for thinking that the multiverse hypothesis is true. My reasons for this will become 
clear as we proceed.
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wonder at its improbability, (van Inwagen 1993, pp. 134-5)
Opining that this “must be one o f the most annoyingly obtuse arguments in the history o f  
philosophy”, van Inwagen asks us to consider the following analogy. Suppose you have to 
draw a straw from a bundle o f  1,048,576 straws o f different length. It has been decreed 
that unless you draw the shortest straw you will be instantly killed so that you don’t have 
time to realize that you didn’t draw the shortest straw. “Reluctantly -  but you have no 
alternative -  you draw a straw and are astonished to find yourself alive and holding the 
shortest straw. What should you conclude?” According to van Inwagen, only one 
conclusion is reasonable: that you did not draw the straw at random but that instead the 
situation was somehow rigged by an unknown benefactor to ensure that you got the 
shortest straw. The following argument to the contrary is dismissed as “silly”:
Look, you had to draw some straw or other. Drawing the shortest was no more 
unlikely than drawing the 256,057th-shortest: the probability in either case was 
.000000954. But your drawing the 256,057th-shortest straw isn’t an outcome that 
would suggest a £set-up’ or would suggest the need for any sort o f  explanation, 
and, therefore, drawing the shortest shouldn’t suggest the need for an explanation 
either. The only real difference between the two cases is that you wouldn’t have 
been around to remark on the unlikelihood o f  drawing the 256,057th-shortest 
straw, (van Inwagen 1993, p. 135)
Given that the rigging hypothesis did not have too low a prior probability and given that 
there was only one straw lottery, it is hard to deny that this argument would indeed be 
silly. What we need to reflect about, though, is whether the example is analogous to our 
epistemic situation regarding fine-tuning.
Erik Carlson and Erik Olsson (Carlson and Olsson 1998), criticizing van 
Inwagen’s argument, argue that there are three points o f  disanalogy between van 
Inwagen’s straw lottery and fine-tuning. First, they note that whether we would be willing 
to accept the “unknown benefactor” explanation after drawing the shortest straw depends 
on our prior probability o f  there being an unknown benefactor with the means to rig the 
lottery. If the prior probability is sufficiently tiny -  given certain background beliefs it 
may be very hard to see how the straw lottery could be rigged -  w e would not end up 
believing in the unknown benefactor hypothesis. Obviously, the same applies to the fine-
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tuning argument: if  the prior probability o f a multiverse is small enough then w e w on’t 
accept that hypothesis even after discovering a high degree o f fine-tuning in our universe. 
I think the multiverse supporter can grant this and argue that the prior probability o f a 
multiverse is not too small. Exactly how small it can be for us still to end up accepting the 
multiverse hypothesis depends on both how extreme the fine-tuning is and what 
alternative explanations are available. If there is plenty o f  fine-tuning, and the only 
alternative explanation on the table is the design hypothesis, and if  that hypothesis is 
assigned a much lower prior probability than the multiverse hypothesis, then the argument 
for the multiverse hypothesis would be vindicated. We don’t need to commit ourselves to 
these assumptions; and in any case, different people might have different prior 
probabilities. What we are primarily concerned with here is to determine whether fine- 
tuning is in a relevant sense a surprising improbable event, and whether taking fine- 
tuning into account should substantially increase our credence in the multiverse 
hypothesis and/or the design hypothesis, not what the absolute magnitude o f  our credence 
in those hypotheses should be. Carlson and Olsson’s first point is granted but it doesn’t 
have any bite, van Inwagen never claimed that his straw lottery example could settle the 
question o f  what the prior probabilities should be.
Carlson and Olsson second point would be more damaging for van Inwagen, if  it 
weren’t incorrect. They claim that there is a fundamental disanalogy in that we 
understand at least roughly what the causal mechanisms are by which intelligent life 
evolved from inorganic matter whereas no such knowledge is assumed regarding the 
causal chain o f  events that led you to draw the shortest straw. To make the lottery more 
closely analogous to the fine-tuning, we should therefore add to the description o f the 
lottery example that at least the proximate causes o f your drawing the shortest straw are 
known. Carlson and Olsson then note that:
In such a straw lottery, our intuitive reluctance to accept the single-drawing-plus- 
chance hypothesis is, we think, considerably diminished. Suppose that w e can 
give a detailed causal explanation o f why you drew the shortest straw, starting 
from the state o f the world twenty-four hours before the drawing. A  crucial link in 
this explanation is the fact that you had exactly two pints o f Guinness on the night 
before the lottery. ... Would you, in light o f this explanation o f your drawing the 
shortest straw, conclude that, unless there have been a great many straw lotteries, 
somebody intentionally caused you to drink two pints o f Guinness in order to 
ensure that you draw the shortest straw? ... To us, this conclusion does not seem
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very reasonable. (Carlson and Olsson 1998, pp. 271-2)
The objection strikes me as unfair. Obviously, if  you knew that your choosing the shortest 
straw depended crucially and sensitively on your precise choice o f beverage the night 
before, you would feel disinclined to accept the rigging hypothesis. That much is right. 
But this disinclination is fully accounted for by the fact that it is tremendously hard to see, 
under such circumstances, how anybody could have rigged the lottery. If w e knew that 
successful rigging required predicting in detail such a long and tenuous causal chain o f  
events, we could well conclude that the prior probability o f rigging was negligible. For 
that reason, surviving the lottery would not make us believe the rigging hypothesis. We 
can see that it is this -  rather than our understanding o f the proximate causes per se -  that 
defeats the argument for rigging, by considering the following variant o f van Inwagen’s 
example. Suppose that the straws are scattered over a vast area. Each straw has one 
railway track leading up to it, all the tracks starting from the same station. When you pick 
the shortest straw, we now have a causal explanation that can stretch far back in time: you 
picked it because it was at the destination point o f a long journey along a track that did 
not branch. How long the track was makes no difference to how willing we are to believe 
in the rigging hypothesis. What matters is only whether we think there is some 
plausibility to the idea that an unknown benefactor could have put us on the right track to 
begin with. So contrary to what Carlson and Olsson imply, what is relevant is not the 
known backward length o f  the causal chain, but whether that chain would have been 
sufficiently predictable by the hypothetical benefactor to give a sufficient prior 
probability to the hypothesis that she rigged the lottery. Needless to say, the designer 
referred to in the deign hypothesis is typically assumed to have superhuman epistemic 
capacities. It is not at all farfetched to suppose that i f  there were a cosmic designer, she 
would have been able to anticipate which boundary conditions o f  the universe were likely 
to lead to the evolution o f life. We should therefore reject Carlson and Olsson’s second 
objection against van Inwagen’s analogy.
The third alleged point o f disanalogy is somewhat subtler. Carlson and Olsson 
discuss it in the context o f refuting certain claims by Arnold Zuboff (Zuboff 1991) and it 
is not clear how much weight they place on it as an objection against van Inwagen. It’s 
nonetheless worth mentioning. The idea, so far as I can make it out, is that the reason why 
your existing after the straw lottery is surprising, is related to the fact that you existed
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before the straw lottery. You could have antecedently contemplated your survival as one 
o f a variety o f possible outcomes. In the case o f fine-tuning, by contrast, your existing (or 
intelligent life existing) is not an outcome which could have been contemplated prior to 
its obtaining.
For conceptual reasons, it is impossible that you know in advance that your 
existence lottery is going to take place. Likewise, it is conceptually impossible 
that you make any ex ante specification o f any possible outcome o f this lottery. ... 
The existence o f a cosmos suitable for life does not seem to be a coincidence for 
anybody; nobody was ever able to specify this outcome o f the cosmos lottery, 
independently o f its actually being the actual outcome. (Carlson and Olsson 1998,
p. 268)
This might look like a token o f the “annoyingly obtuse” reasoning that van Inwagen 
thought to refute through his straw lottery example. All the same, there is a disanalogy 
between the two cases: nobody could have contemplated the existence o f intelligent life 
unless intelligent life existed, whereas someone (even the person immediately involved) 
could have thought about drawing the shortest straw before drawing it. But the question is 
whether this difference is relevant. Again it is useful to cook up a variant o f  van 
Inwagen’s example:
Suppose that in an otherwise lifeless universe there is a big bunch o f straws and a 
simple (non-cognitive, non-conscious) automaton about to randomly select one o f 
the straws. There is also kind of “incubator” in which one person rests in an 
unconscious state; we can suppose she has been unconscious since the beginning 
o f time. The automaton is set up in such a way that the person in the incubator will 
be woken if  and only if  the automaton picks the shortest straw. You wake up in 
the incubator. After examining your surroundings and learning about how the 
experiment was set up, you begin to wonder about whether there were anything 
surprising about the fact that the shortest straw was drawn.
This example shares with the fine-tuning case the feature that nobody would have been 
there to contemplate anything if  the “special” outcome had failed to obtain. So what 
should we say about this case? In order for Carlson and Olsson’s criticism to work, we 
would have to say that the person waking up in the incubator should not think that there is 
anything surprising at all about the shortest straw having been selected, van Inwagen 
would most probably simply deny that that would be the correct attitude. For what it’s
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worth, my intuition in this instance sides with Inwagen, although this case is perhaps less 
obvious than van Inwagen’s original straw lottery where the subject had a life before the 
lottery.
It would be nice to have an independent account o f what makes an event or a fact 
surprising. We could then apply the general account to the straw lotteries or directly to 
fine-tuning, and see what follows. Let us therefore review what efforts have been made to 
develop such an account o f surprisingness. To anticipate the upshot: I will argue that 
these represent a dead end as far as anthropic reasoning is concerned. From this we will 
learn that the strategy o f some anthropic theorizers to base their case on an appeal to what 
is surprising is ultimately o f  very limited utility: the strategy is grounded on intuitions that 
are not any more obvious or secure than the thesis which they are employed to support. 
This may seem disappointing, but in fact it clears the path for a better understanding what 
is required to support anthropic reasoning.
The following remark by F. P. Ramsey is pertinent to the goal o f determining 
what distinguishes surprising improbable events from unsurprising improbable events:
What we mean by an event not being a coincidence, or not being due to chance, is 
that if  we came to know it, it would make us no longer regard our system as 
satisfactory, although on our system the event may be no more improbable than 
any alternative. Thus 1,000 heads running would not be due to chance; i.e. if  we 
observed it we should change our system o f chances for that penny. (Ramsey 
1990, p. 106)
This looks like promising beginning. It seems to fit the other example considered near the 
beginning o f this section: one person winning three lotteries with a thousand tickets could 
make us suspect foul play, whereas one person winning a billion-ticket lottery would not 
in general have any tendency do so. Or ponder the case o f a monkey typing out the 
sequence “Give me a banana!”. This is surprising and it makes us change our belief that 
the monkey types out a random sequence. We would think that maybe the monkey had 
been trained to type that specific sequence, or maybe that the typewriter was rigged; but 
the chance hypothesis is disconfirmed. By contrast, if  the monkey types out 
“r78o479024io; jl;”, this is unsurprising and does not challenge our assumptions about the 
setup. So far so good.
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What Ramsey’s suggestion does not tell us what it is about events such as the 
monkey’s typing a meaningful sentence or the run o f 1000 heads that makes us change 
our mind about the system o f chances. We need to know that if  the suggestion is to throw 
any light on the fine-tuning case. For the problem there is precisely that it is not 
immediately clear -  lest the question be begged -  whether we ought to change our system 
and find some alternative explanation or be satisfied with letting chance pay the bill, that 
is, in Ramsey’s terminology, regarding fine-tuning as a coincidence. Ramsey’s suggestion 
is thus insufficient for the present purpose.
Paul Horwich takes the analysis further. He proposes the following as a necessary 
condition for the truth o f a statement E being surprising:
[T]he truth o f E is surprising only if  the supposed circumstances C, which made E 
seem improbable, are themselves substantially diminished in probability by the 
truth o f E. ..and if  there is some initially implausible (but not widely implausible) 
alternative view K about the circumstances, relative to which E would be highly 
probable. (Horwich 1982, p. 101)
If we combine this with the condition that “our beliefs C are such as to give rise to 
P (E ) «  0 ”, we get what Horwich thinks is a necessary and sufficient condition for the 
truth o f a statement being surprising. We can sum this up by saying that the truth o f  E is 
surprising iff the following holds:
(i) P(E)  »  0
(ii) P ( C \ E ) « P ( C )
(iii) P ( E \ K ) * \
(iv) P(K) is small but not too small
Several authors who think that fine-tuning cries out for explanation endorse views 
that are similar to Horwich’s (Manson 1989). For instance, Peter van Inwagen writes:
Suppose there is a certain fact that has no known explanation; suppose that one 
can think o f a possible explanation of that fact, an explanation that (if only it were 
true) would be a very good  explanation; then it is wrong to say that that event
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stands in no more need o f an explanation than an otherwise similar event for 
which no such explanation is available, (van Inwagen 1993, p. 135)
And John Leslie:
A chief (or the only?) reason for thinking that something stands in [special need 
for explanation], i.e. for justifiable reluctance to dismiss it as how things just 
happen to be, is that one in fact glimpses some tidy way in which it might be 
explained. (Leslie 1989, p. 10)
D.J. Bartholomew also appears to support a similar principle (Bartholomew 1984). 
Horwich’s analysis provides a reasonably good explication o f these ideas.
George Schlesinger (Schlesinger 1991) has criticized Horwich’s analysis, arguing 
that the availability o f  a tidy explanation is not necessary for an event being surprising. 
Schlesinger asks us to consider the case o f a tornado that touches down in three different 
places, destroying one house in each place. We are surprised to learn that these houses 
belonged to the same person and that they are the only buildings that this misfortunate 
capitalist owned. Yet no neat explanation suggests itself. Indeed, it seems to be because 
we can see no tidy explanation (other than the chance hypothesis) that this phenomenon 
would be so surprising. So if  we let E to be the event that the tornado destroys the only 
three buildings that some person owns and destroys nothing else, and C the chance 
hypothesis, then (ii) - (iv) are not satisfied. According to Horwich’s analysis, E is not 
surprising -  which is counterintuitive.
Surprise being ultimately a psychological matter, we should perhaps not expect 
any simple definition to perfectly capture all the cases where w e would feel surprised. But 
maybe Horwich has provided at least a sufficient condition for when w e ought to feel 
surprised? Let’s run with this for a second and see what happens when w e apply his 
analysis to fine-tuning. In order to do this we need to determine the probabilities referred 
to in (i)-(iv). Let’s grant that the prior probability o f fine-tuning (E) is very small, 
P(E)  ~ 0. Further, anthropic theorizers maintain that E makes the chance hypothesis 
substantially less probable than it would have been without conditionalizing E, so let’s
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suppose that P { C \ E ) « P ( C ) 6. Let K be a multiverse hypothesis. In order to have 
P ( E \ K ) «  1, it might be necessary to think o f K as more specific than the proposition that 
there is some multiverse; we may have to define K as the proposition that there is a 
“suitable” multiverse (i.e. one such that P { E \ K ) «  1 is satisfied). But let us suppose that 
even such a strengthened multiverse hypothesis has a prior probability that is not “too 
small”. If we make these assumptions then Horwich’s four conditions are satisfied, and 
the truth o f E would consequently be surprising. This is the result that the anthropic 
theorizer would like to see.
Unfortunately, we can construct a similar line o f assumptions to show that any 
other possible universe would have been equally surprising. Let E# be the proposition that 
a  has some particular boring character. For instance, we can let E# say that a  is a 
universe which consists o f nothing but such-and-such a pattern o f electromagnetic 
radiation. We then have P ( E #) »  0 . We can let K be the same as before. Now, if  we 
suppose that P( C\ E#) «  P(C)  and P ( E U\K) »1  then the truth o f E# will be classified as 
surprising. This is counterintuitive, and if  it were true that every possible universe would 
be just as surprising as any other then fine-tuning being surprising can surely not be what 
legitimizes the inference from fine-tuning to the multiverse hypothesis. We must 
therefore deny either P{C\ E#) «  P ( C ) or P ( E #\K) «  1 (or both). At the same time, if  
the truth o f E is to be surprising, we must maintain that P ( C \ E ) « P(C)  and 
P(E\ K)  ~ 1. This means that the anthropic theorizer wishing to ground her argument in 
an appeal to surprise must treat E# differently from E as regards these conditional 
probabilities. It may be indeed be correct to do that. But what is the justification?
JA
Whatever is it, it cannot be that the truth o f E is surprising whereas the truth o f  E is not. 
For although that might be true, to simply assume that would be to make the argument 
circular.
The appeal to the surprisingness o f E is therefore quite ineffective. In order to give 
the appeal any force, it needs to be backed up by some argument for the claim that: 
P ( C \ E ) « P ( C ) ,  P(E\K)<*\  but not both P ( C \ E * ) « P ( C )  and P ( £ * | .£ ) * l .  But 
suppose we had such an argument. We could then sidestep considerations about
6 This follows from Bayes’ theorem if the probability that C gives to E is so tiny that P(E\C)  «  P ( E) .
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surprisingness altogether. For it follows already from P ( E \ K ) & \ ,  P ( E) &  0, and P(K) 
being “not too small”, that P(K\E)  & \ , i.e. that fine-tuning is strong evidence for the
multiverse hypothesis. (To see this, simply plug the values into Bayes’ formula,
P(K\E)  = P( E\ K) P( K)  / P ( E ) .)
To make progress beyond this point, it is imperative to abandon vague talk o f  
what makes events surprising and focus explicitly on the core issue, which is to determine 
the conditional probability o f  the multiverse hypothesis/chance hypothesis/design 
hypothesis given the evidence we have. If we figure out how to think about these 
conditional probabilities then we can hopefully use this insight to sort out the quandary 
about whether fine-tuning should be regarded as surprising. At any rate, that quandary 
becomes much less important if  we have a direct route to assigning probabilities to the 
relevant hypotheses that skips the detour through the dark netherworld o f amazement and 
surprise. This is what we shall now do.
O bservational se lec tio n  e ffec ts
I suggest that the only way to get a plausible model o f  how to reason from fine-tuning is 
to integrate it into a general theory which takes explicit account o f observational selection 
effects. This section will outline parts o f such a theory. Later chapters will expand and 
support themes that are merely alluded to here. A theory o f observational selection effects 
has applications in many domains. In this section we focus on applications in cosmology.
As before, let “ a  ” rigidly denote our universe. We know some things K about a  
(it’s life-permitting; it contains the Eiffel tower; it’s quite big etc.). Let Iim be the 
multiverse hypothesis; let hu be the design hypothesis; and let he be the chance- 
hypothesis. I suggest that in order to determine what values to assign to the conditional 
probabilities P(1im|K), P(1id|K), and P(hc|K ), we need to take account o f the observational 
selection effects through which our evidence about the world was filtered. Recall the 
example from the introduction -  catching a 20 cm long fish with an apparatus that can 
only catch fish o f precisely that length -  this limitation o f  the sampling apparatus 
obviously needs to be taken into account when trying to guess the size-distribution o f the 
lake’s fish population. Similarly for the pollster who samples from an unrepresentative 
subset o f the electorate, or the economist who seeks to estimate the average growth rate o f  
startups in their first year by looking only at companies listed in the Yellow pages. The
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data obtained through these methods is not necessarily worthless, but w e have to take care 
to correct as best we can for the known selection effects that are involved. A  moment’s 
reflection reveals that analogous selection effects may have biased the data we have about 
the large scale structure o f cosmos. These include observational selection effects: biases 
that are due to the fact that only those parts o f  the whole that have a certain physical 
proximity to parts where observers exist are observed.
We shall now consider how we can model these observational selection effects. 
Suppose that you are an angel. So far nothing physical exists, but six days ago God told 
you that he was going away for a week to create a cosmos. He might create either a single 
universe or a multiverse, and let’s say your prior probabilities for these two hypotheses 
are about 50%. Now a messenger arrives and informs you that God’s work is completed. 
The messenger tells you that universe a  exists but does not say whether there are other 
universes in addition. Should you think that God created a multiverse or only a ?  To 
answer this, we need to know something more about the situation. Consider two possible 
specifications o f what happened:
Case 1. The messenger decided to travel to realm o f physical existence and look at 
the universe or one o f the universes that God had created. This universe was a , 
and this is what he reports to you.
Case 2. The messenger decided to find out whether God created a  . So he travels 
to the realm o f physical existence and looks until he finds a , and reports this back 
to you.
In Case 1, the messenger’s tidings do not in general give you any reason to believe 
hM. He was bound to bring back news about some universe, and the fact that he tells you 
about a  rather than some other universe is not significant, unless a  has some special 
feature F. (More on this proviso shortly.)
In Case 2 on the other hand, the fact that the messenger tells you that a  exists is 
evidence for hM. If the messenger selected a  randomly from the class o f all possible 
universes, or from some sizeable subclass thereof (for example only big bang universes 
with the same laws o f nature as in our universe, or only universes which contain more 
good than evil), then the finding that God created a  suggests that God created many 
universes.
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Our actual epistemic situation is not analogous to the angel’s in Case 2. It is not as 
i f  we first randomly selected a  from a class containing both actual and non-actual 
possible universes and then discovered that -  lo and behold! -  a  actually exists. The fact 
that we know whether a  exists surely has everything to do with it actually existing and 
w e being among its inhabitants. There is an observational selection effect amounting to 
the following: direct observation occurs only o f universes that actually exist. Case 1 
comes closer to modeling our epistemic situation in this respect, since it m irrors this 
selection effect.
However, Case 1 is still an inadequate model because it overlooks another 
observational effect. The messenger could have retrieved information about any o f the 
actual universes, and the angel could have found out about some universe p  that doesn’t 
contain any observers. If there are no angels, gods or heavenly messengers, however, then 
universes that don’t contain observers are not observed. Assuming the absence o f  
extramundane observers, the selection effect restricts what is observed not only to the 
extent that non-actual universes are not observed but actual universes that don’t contain 
any observers are also not observed. This needs to be reflected in our model. If we want 
to continue to use the creation story, we therefore need to modify it as follows:
Case 3. The messenger decided to travel to the realm o f  physical existence and 
look for some universe that contains observers. He found a , and reports this back 
to you.
Does this provide you with any evidence for hM? It depends. If you knew (call this 
Case 3a) that God had set out to create at least one observer-containing universe, then the 
tiding that a  is actual does not give any support to hM (unless you know that a  has some 
special feature). Because then you were guaranteed to learn about the existence o f some 
observer-containing universe or other and learning that it is a  does not give any more 
evidence for hM than if  you had learnt about some other universe instead. The 
messenger’s tidings T contain no relevant new information; the probably you assign to hM 
remains unchanged. In Case 3a, therefore, P(1im|T) =  P(Iim).
But there is second way o f  specifying Case 3. Suppose (Case 3b) that God did not 
set out especially to create at least one observer-containing universe, and that for any 
universe that He created there was a only a fairly small chance that it would be observer-
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containing. In this case, when the messenger reports that God created the observer- 
containing universe a , you get evidence that favors hM- For it is more probable on hM 
than it is on - 1 hM that one or more observer-containing universes should exist (one o f  
which the messenger was then bound to bring you news about). Here, w e therefore have 
P(hM|T) > P(hM).
What is grounding T’s support for hM? I think it is best answered not by saying 
that T makes it more probable that a  should exist, but rather that T makes it more 
probable that at least one observer-containing universe should exist. It is nonetheless true 
that hM makes it more probable that a  should exist. But this is not by itself the reason 
why hM is to be preferred given our knowledge o f the existence o f a . If it were, then 
since the same reason operates in Case 3a, we would have to have concluded that hM were 
favored in that case as well. For even though it was guaranteed in Case 3a that some 
observer-containing universe would exist, it was not guaranteed that it would be a . In 
Case 3a as well as in Case 3b, the existence o f a  was made more likely by hM than by “■ 
hM- If this should not lead us to favor hM in Case 3 a then the fact that the existence o f a  
is made more likely by hM cannot be the whole story about why hM is to be preferred in 
Case 3b.
So what is the whole story about this? This will become clearer as we proceed, but 
we can give at least the outlines now. In subsequent chapters w e shall fill in important 
details and see some arguments for the claims we make here.
In a nutshell: although hM makes it more probable that a  should exist, hM also 
makes it more probable that there are other observer-containing universes. And the 
greater the number o f observer-containing universes, the smaller the probability that we 
should observe any particular one o f them. These two effects balance each other. We can 
get some intuitive grasp o f this if  we consider a two-step procedure. Suppose the 
messenger first tells you that some observer-containing universe x exists. This rules out 
all hypotheses on which there would be no such universes; it counts against hypotheses 
on which it would be very unlikely that there were any observer-containing universes; and 
it favors hypotheses on which it would be very likely or certain that there were one or 
more observer-containing universes. In the second step, the messenger tells you that x -  
a . This would not change your beliefs as to how many observer-containing universes 
there are (assuming you don’t think there is anything special about a  ). One might say
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that if  God were equally likely to create any universe, then the probability that a  should 
exist is proportional to the number o f universes God created. True. But the full evidence 
you have is not only that a  exists but also that the messenger told you about a . If the 
messenger selected the universe he reports randomly from the class o f all actual observer- 
containing universes, then the probability that he would select a , given that a  is an 
actual observer-containing universe, is inversely proportional to the number o f  actual 
observer-containing universes. The messenger’s report therefore does not allow you to 
discriminate between general hypotheses7 that imply that at least one observer-containing 
universe exists. In our actual situation our knowledge is not mediated by a messenger; but 
the suggestion is that the data we get about the world are subjected to observational 
selection effects that mimic the reporting biases present in Case 3.
When stating that the finding that a  exists does not give us reason to think that 
there are many rather than few observer-containing universes, w e have kept inserting the 
proviso that a  not be “special”. This is an essential qualification, for there clearly are 
some features such that if  we know that a  has them then finding that a  exists would  
give support to claim that there are a vast number o f observer-containing universes. For 
instance, if  you know that a  is a universe in which a message is inscribed in every rock, 
in the distribution o f fixed stars seen from any life-bearing planet, and in the 
micro structure o f common crystal lattices, spelling: “God created this universe. He also 
created many other universes.” -  then the fact that the messenger tells you that a  exists 
can obviously give you some reason to think that there are many universes. In our actual 
universe, if  w e were to find inscriptions that we were convinced could only have been 
created by a divine being then this would count as support for whatever these inscriptions 
asserted (the degree o f support being qualified by the strength o f our conviction that the 
deity was being honest). Leaving aside such theological scenarios, there are much more 
humdrum features our universe might have that could make it special in the sense 
intended here. It may be, for example, that the physics o f our universe is such as to 
suggest a physical theory (because it’s the simplest, most elegant theory that fits the facts) 
which entails the existence o f vast numbers o f observer-containing universes.
7 By “general hypotheses” we here mean: hypotheses which don’t entail anything preferentially about Oi . 
For example, a hypothesis which says “There is exactly one life-containing universe and it’s not CL.” will 
obviously be refuted by the messenger’s report. But the point is that there is nothing about the messenger’s
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Fine-tuning may well be a “special” feature. This is so because fine-tuning seems 
to indicate that there is no simple, elegant theory which entails (or gives a high 
probability to) the existence our universe alone but not the existence o f other universes. If 
it were to turn out, present appearances notwithstanding, that there is such a theory then 
our universe is not special. But in that case there would not be any reason to think that our 
universe really is fine-tuned. For if  a simple theory entails that precisely this universe 
should exist, then one could plausibly assert that no other boundary conditions than those 
implied by that theory are physically possible; and hence that physical constants and 
initial conditions could not have been different than they are -  thus no fine-tuning. 
However, assuming that every theory fitting the facts and entailing that there is only one 
universe is a very ad hoc one and involving many free parameters -  as fine-tuning 
advocates argue -  then the fine-tuning o f our universe is a special feature that gives 
support to the hypothesis that there are many universes. There is nothing mysterious 
about this. Preferring simple theories that fit the facts to complicated ad hoc ones is just 
standard scientific practice, and cosmologists that work with multiverse theories are 
presumably pursuing that inquiry because they think that multiverse theories represent a 
promising route forward to neat theories that are empirically adequate.
We can now answer the questions asked at the beginning o f this chapter: Does 
fine-tuning cry out for explanation? Does it give support to the multiverse hypothesis? 
Beginning with the latter question, we should say: Yes, to the extent that multiverse 
theories are simpler, more elegant (and therefore claming a higher prior probability) than 
any rival theories that are compatible with what we observe. In order to be more precise 
about the magnitude o f support, we need to determine the conditional probability that a 
multiverse theory gives to the observations we make. We have said something about how  
such conditional probabilities are determined: The conditional probability is greater -  
ceteris paribus -  the greater the probability that the multiverse theory gives to the 
existence o f a universe exactly like ours; it is smaller -  ceteris paribus -  the greater the 
number o f observer-containing universes it entails. These two factors balance each other 
to the effect that if  we are comparing various multiverse theories then what matters, 
generally speaking, is the likelihood they assign to at least some observer-containing 
universe existing; if  two multiverse theories both do that, then there is no general reason
report that gives reason to favor hypotheses only because they imply a greater number of observer-
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to favor or disfavor the one that entails the larger number o f observer-containing 
universes. All this will become clearer in subsequent chapters where the current hand- 
waving will be replaced by mathematically precise models.
The answer to the question whether fine-tuning cries out for explanation follows 
from this. If something’s “crying out for explanation” means that it would be 
unsatisfactory to leave it unexplained or to dismiss it as a chance event, then fine-tuning 
cries out for explanation at least to the extent that we have reason to believe in some 
theory that would explain it. At the present, multiverse theories may look like reasonably 
promising candidates. For the theologically inclined, the Creator-hypothesis is also a 
candidate. And there remains the possibility that fine-tuning could turn out to be an 
illusion -  if  some neat single-universe theory that fits the data is discovered in the future.8
Finally, we may also ask whether there is anything surprising about our 
observation o f fine-tuning. Let’s assume, as the question presupposes, that the universe 
really is fine-tuned, in the sense that there is no neat single-universe theory that fits the 
data (but not in a sense that excludes our universe being one in an ensemble that is itself 
not fine-tuned). Is such fine-tuning surprising on the chance-hypothesis? It is, per 
assumption, a low-probability event if  the chance-hypothesis is true; and it would tend to 
disconfirm the chance-hypothesis if  there is some other hypothesis with reasonably high 
prior probability that assigns a high conditional probability to fine-tuning. For it to be a 
surprising event then (using Horwich’s analysis) there has to be some alternative to the 
chance-hypothesis that meets conditions (iii) and (iv). Many would hold that the design 
hypothesis satisfies these criteria. But if we rule out the design hypothesis, does the 
multiverse hypothesis fit the bill? We can suppose, for the sake o f the argument at least, 
that the prior probability o f the multiverse hypothesis is not too low, so that (iv) is 
satisfied. The sticky point is condition (iii), which requires that P(E'\hM) » 1 . According 
to the discussion above, the conditional probability o f  us observing a fine-tuned universe 
is greater given a suitable multiverse than given the existence o f a single random 
universe. If the multiverse hypothesis is o f a suitable kind -  such that it entails (or makes 
it highly likely) that at least one observer-containing universe exists -  then the conditional
containing universes, assuming there is nothing special about CC .
8 If there is a sense of “explanation” in which a multiverse theory would not explain why we observe a fine- 
tuned universe, then the prospect of a multiverse theory would not add to the need for explanation in that 
sense.
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probability, given that hypothesis, o f us observing an observer-containing universe should 
be set equal (or very close) to one. It then comes down to whether on this hypothesis 
representative9 observer-containing universes would be fine-tuned.10 If they would, then it 
follows that this multiverse hypothesis should be taken to give a very high likelihood to 
our observing a fine-tuned universe; so Horwich’s condition (iii) would be satisfied, and 
our observing fine-tuning would count as a surprising event. If, on the other hand, 
representative observer-containing universes in the multiverse would not be fine-tuned, 
then condition (iii) would not be satisfied, and the fine-tuning would not qualify as 
surprising.11
Note that in answering the question whether fine-tuning was surprising, we 
focused on E’ (the statement that there is a fine-tuned universe) rather than E (the 
statement that a  is fine-tuned). I suggest that what is primarily surprising is E ’, and E is 
surprising only in the indirect sense o f implying E \  If E is independently surprising, then 
on Horwich’s analysis, it has to be so owing to some other alternative12 to the chance- 
hypothesis than the multiverse hypothesis, since it is not the case that P(E\hM) «  1. But I
9 The meaning of “representative” is not equivalent here to “most numerous type of universes in the 
multiverse” but rather “the type of universes with the greatest expected fraction of all observers”. The 
reason for this will be made clear by the discussion in subsequent chapters.
10 One can easily imagine multiverse theories on which this would not necessarily be the case. A multiverse 
theory could for example include a physics that allowed for two distinct regions in the space of possible 
boundary conditions to be life-containing. One of these regions could be very broad so that universes in that 
region would not be fine-tuned -  they would still have contained life even if the values of their physical 
constants had been slightly different. The other region could be very narrow. Universes in this region would 
be fine-tuned: a slight perturbation of the boundary conditions would move a universe out of the life- 
containing region. If the universes in the two life-containing regions in parameter space are equivalent in 
other respects, this cosmos would be an instance of a multiverse where representative observer-containing 
universes would not be fine-tuned. If a multiverse theory assigns a high probability to the multiverse being 
of this kind, then on the hypothesis that that theory is true, representative observer-containing universes 
would not be fine-tuned.
11 It may intuitively seem as if our observing a fine-tuned universe would be even more surprising if the 
only multiverse theory on the table implied that representative observer-containing universes were not fine- 
tuned, because it would then be even more improbable that we should live in a fine-tune universe. This 
intuition most likely derives from our not accepting the assumptions we made. For instance, the design 
hypothesis (which we ruled out by fiat) might be able to fit the four criteria and thus account for why we 
would find the fine-tuning surprising even in this case. Alternatively, we might think it implausible that we 
w'ould be sufficiently convinced that the only available multiverse hypotheses would be ones in which 
representative universes would not be fine-tuned. So this represents a rather artificial case where our 
intuitions could easily go astray. I discuss it only in order to round out the argument and to more fully 
illustrate how the reasoning w'orks. The point is not important in itself.
12 It’s not clear whether there is an alternative that would work here. There would be if, for instance, one 
assigned a high prior probability to a design hypothesis on which the designer was highly likely to create 
only a  and to make it fine-tuned.
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find it quite intuitive that what would be surprising on the chance-hypothesis is not that 
this universe (understood rigidly) should be fine-tuned but rather that there should be a 
fine-tuned universe at all if  there is only one universe in total and fine-tuning was highly 
improbable.
C o n clu sio n s
It may be useful to summarize the main findings o f this chapter. We set out to investigate 
whether fine-tuning needs explaining and whether it gives support to the multiverse 
hypothesis. We found that:
• There is an easy part o f the answer: Leaving fine-tuning unexplained is 
epistemically unsatisfactory to the extent that it involves accepting complicated, 
inelegant theories with many free parameters. If a neater theory can account for 
available data it is to be preferred. This is just an instance o f  the general 
methodological principle that one should prefer simpler theories, and it has 
nothing to do with fine-tuning as such (i.e. this point is unrelated to the fact that 
observers would not have existed if boundary conditions had been slightly 
different).
• Ian Hacking’s argument that multiverse theories such as Wheeler’s oscillating 
universe model cannot receive any support from fine-tuning data, while multiverse 
theories such as the one Hacking ascribes to Brandon Carter can receive such 
support, is flawed. So are the more recent arguments by Roger White and Phil 
Dowe purporting to show that multiverse theories tout court would not be 
supported by fine-tuning.
• Those who think fine-tuning gives some support to the multiverse hypothesis have 
typically tried to argue for this by appealing to the surprisingness o f fine-tuning. 
We examined van Inwagen’s straw lottery example, refuted some objections by 
Carlson and Olsson, and suggested a variant o f Inwagen’s example that is more 
closely analogous to our epistemic situation regarding fine-tuning. In this variant 
the verdict seems to favor the multiverse advocates, although there appears to be 
room for opposing intuitions. In order to give the idea that an appeal to the 
surprisingness o f fine-tuning could settle the issue a full run for its money, we 
considered Paul Horwich’s analysis o f what makes the truth o f a statement 
surprising. This analysis seems to provide the best available explication o f  what 
multiverse advocates mean when they talk about surprise. It was found, however, 
that applying Horwich’s analysis to the fine-tuning situation did not suffice to 
settle the issue o f whether fine-tuning is surprising. We concluded that in order to 
determine whether fine-tuning cries out for explanation or gives support for the 
multiverse hypothesis, it is not enough to appeal to the surprisingness or 
amazingness o f  fine-tuning. One must to drill deeper.
• What is needed is a way o f  determining the conditional probability P(E|1im). I 
suggested that in order to get this right, it is essential to take into account 
observational selection effects. We created an informal model o f how to think 
about such effects in the context o f fine-tuning. Some o f the preliminary (not yet
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conclusively argued for) results o f this are as follows:
• Fine-tuning favors (other things equal) hypotheses on which it is likely that one or 
more observer-containing universes exist over hypotheses on which it is unlikely 
that even one observer-containing universe should exist.
• If two competing general hypotheses each imply that there is at least some 
observer-containing universe, but one o f them implies a greater number o f  
observer-containing universes, then fine-tuning is not typically a reason to favor 
the latter (other things equal). The number o f observerless universes implied is 
typically also not relevant.
• Although P(E|1im) may be much closer to zero than to one, this conditional 
probability could nonetheless well be large enough (after taking observational 
selection effects into account) for E to favor the multiverse hypothesis.
• The answer to the “tricky part” o f the question about whether fine-tuning needs 
explanation or supports the multiverse hypothesis: Yes, there is something about 
fine-tuning as such that adds to the need for explanation and to the support for the 
multiverse hypothesis over and above the general principle that simplicity is 
epistemically attractive. The reason for this is twofold. First, the availability o f  a 
potential rival explanation for why the universe should be observer-containing. 
The design hypothesis, presumably, can more plausibly be invoked to explain a 
world consisting o f an observer-containing universe than to explain a world 
consisting o f a boring non-observer-containing universe. Second (theology apart), 
the capacity o f the multiverse hypothesis to give a high likelihood to E (and 
thereby in some sense to explain E), and to gain support from E, depends 
essentially on observational selection effects. Fine-tuning is therefore not just like 
any other way in which a theory may require a delicate setting o f  various free 
parameters to fit the data. The presumption that observers would not be so likely 
to exist if the universe were not fine-tuned is essential. For that means that if  a 
multiverse theory implies that there is an ensemble o f  universes, only a few o f  
which are fine-tuned, what the theory predicts that w e should observe is still one 
o f those exceptional fine-tuned universes. The observational selection effect 
enables the theory to give our observing a fine-tuned universe a high conditional 
probability even though such a universe may be very atypical o f  the cosmos as a 
whole. If there were no observational selection effect restricting our observation to 
an atypical proper part o f cosmos then postulating a bigger cosmos would not in 
general incur a greater likelihood o f us observing a particular feature. (It may 
make it more likely that that feature should be instantiated somewhere or other, 
but it would also make it less likely that we should happen to be at any particular 
place where it was instantiated.) Fine-tuning, therefore, involves issues additional 
to the ones common to all forms o f scientific explanation and inference.
• On Horwich’s analysis o f what makes the truth o f a statement surprising, it would 
be surprising against the background o f the chance-hypothesis that only one 
universe existed and it happened to be fine-tuned. By contrast, that this universe 
should be fine-tuned would not contain any additional surprise factor (unless one 
thought that the design hypothesis could furnish an explanation for this datum 
satisfying Horwich’s condition (iii) and (iv)).
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CHAPTER 3: OBSERVATIONAL SELEC TIO N  EF FEC TS  
AN D  THE ANTHROPIC PRINCIPLE
In chapter 2 we have seen how observational selection effects are relevant in assessing the 
implications o f cosmological fine-tuning. We outlined o f a model for how such effects 
modulate the conditional probability o f us making certain observations given certain 
hypotheses about the large-scale structure o f cosmos. The general idea that observational 
selection effects need to be taken into account in cosmological theorizing has been 
recognized by several authors, and there have been many attempts to express this idea 
under the rubric o f “the anthropic principle”. None o f these attempts, however, quite hits 
the mark -  some don’t even seem to know what they are aiming for. The first section o f  
this chapter reviews some o f the more helpful formulations o f the anthropic principle 
found in the literature, and considers how far these can take us. Section two briefly 
discusses a set o f very different “anthropic principles” and explains why they are 
misguided or at least irrelevant for present purposes. There is plenty o f  confusion about 
what the anthropic principle is and about its epistemological status. It is essential to clear 
this up and to distinguish the versions that I am interested in. Since a main thrust o f this 
dissertation is that anthropic reasoning deserves serious attention, I want to be explicit 
about some associated ideas that I’m not endorsing. The third section continues where the 
first section left off. Arguing that formulations found in the literature are inadequate, I 
propose a simple but (as later chapters will show) surprisingly powerful methodological 
principle, which I dub the Self-Sampling Assumption.
T h e  anthropic principle a s  e x p ress in g  an observational se lec tio n  effect
The term “anthropic principle” was coined by Brandon Carter. In a paper o f  1974, he 
defined it as
... what we can expect to observe must be restricted by the conditions necessary
for the our presence as observers. (Carter 1974, p. 126)
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Carter’s concept o f the anthropic principle, as evidenced by the uses to which he put it, is 
appropriate and useful, but his definitions and explanations o f it are rather vague. While 
Carter himself was never in any doubt about how to understand and apply the principle, 
he did not explain it in a philosophically transparent enough manner to enable all his 
readers to do the same.
The trouble starts with the name. Anthropic reasoning has nothing in particular to 
do with Homo sapiens. Calling the principle ‘anthropic’ is therefore misleading and has 
indeed misled some authors (e.g. Gould 1985, Worrall 1996, Gale 1981). Carter regrets 
not using a different name (Carter 1983). He suggests that maybe “the psychocentric 
principle”, “the cognizability principle” or “the observer self-selection principle” would 
have been better. It is probably too late for terminological reform, but emphasizing that 
the anthropic principle concerns intelligent observers in general and not specifically 
human observers should be enough to prevent misunderstandings on this point.
Carter introduced two versions o f the anthropic principle, a strong version (SAP) 
and a weak (WAP). He defined the WAP thus:
... we must be prepared to take account o f the fact that our location in the universe 
is necessarily privileged to the extent o f being compatible with our existence as 
observers, (p. 127)
SAP states that:
... the Universe (and hence the fundamental parameters on which it depends) must 
be such as to admit the creation o f observers within it at some stage, (p. 129)
Carter’s formulations have been attacked for being mere tautologies (and therefore 
incapable o f  doing any interesting explanatory work whatever), and for being widely 
speculative (and lacking any empirical support). Often WAP is accused o f  the former and 
SAP o f the latter. I think we have to admit that both these readings are possible, since 
WAP and SAP as stated are very vague. WAP says that we have to “be prepared to take 
into account” the fact that our location is privileged, but it does not specify how  w e are to 
take account o f that fact. SAP says that the universe “must” admit the creation o f
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observers, but it does not specify the force o f this “must”. We get a very different 
meanings depending how we interpret the “must”. Does it merely serve to underline an 
entailment o f  available data (“the universe must be life-admitting -  present evidence 
about our existence implies that!”)? Or is the “must” instead to be understood in some 
stronger sense, for example as alleging some kind o f prior metaphysical or theological 
necessity? On the former alternative, the principle is indisputably true; but then the 
difficulty is to explain how this trivial statement can be useful or important. On the 
second alternative, we can see how it could be contentful (provided we an make sense o f  
the intended notion o f necessity), the difficulty being to provide some reason for why we 
should believe it.
John Leslie (Leslie 1989) argues that AP, WAP and SAP can all be understood as 
tautologies and that the difference between them is often purely verbal. In Leslie’s 
explication, AP simply says that:
Any intelligent living beings that there are can f in d  themselves only where 
intelligent life is possible. (Leslie 1989, p. 128)
WAP then says that, within a universe, observers find themselves only at spatiotemporal 
locations where observers are possible. SAP states that observers find themselves only in 
universes that allow observers to exist. “Universes” means roughly: huge spacetime 
regions that might be more or less causally disconnected from other spacetime regions. 
Since the definition o f a universe is not sharp, nor is the distinction between WAP and 
SAP. WAP talks about where within a life-permitting universe we should expect to find 
ourselves, while SAP talks about in what kind o f universe in an ensemble o f  universes we 
should expect to find ourselves. On this interpretation the two principles are 
fundamentally similar, differing only in scope.
For completeness, we may also mention Leslie’s (Leslie 1989) “Superweak 
Anthropic Principle”, which states that:
I f  intelligent life's emergence, NO MATTER HOW  HOSPITABLE THE 
ENVIRONMENT, always involves very improbable happenings, then any 
intelligent living beings that there are evolved where such improbable happenings 
happened. ” (Leslie 1989, p. 132; emphasis and capitals as in the original).
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The implication, as Michael Hart (Hart 1982) has stressed, is that we shouldn’t assume 
that the evolution o f life on an earth-like planet might not well be very extremely 
improbable. Provided there are enough Earth-like planets, as there may well be in an 
infinite universe, then even a chance lower than 1 in lO3,000 would be enough to ensure 
(i.e. give an arbitrarily great probability to the proposition) that life would evolve 
somewhere13. Naturally, what we would observe would be one o f the rare planets were 
such an improbable chance-event had occurred. The Superweak Anthropic Principle can 
be seen as one particular application o f WAP. It doesn’t add anything to what is already 
contained in Carter’s principles.
The question that immediately arises is: hasn’t Leslie trivialized anthropic 
reasoning with this definition o f AP? -  Not necessarily. Whereas the principles he defines 
are tautologies, the invocation o f them to do explanatory work is dependent on nontrivial 
assumptions about the world. Rather than the truth o f AP being problematic, its 
applicability is problematic. That is, it is problematic whether the world is such that AP 
can play a part in interesting explanations and predictions. For example, the anthropic 
explanation o f fine-tuning requires the existence o f  an ensemble o f  universes differing in 
a wide range o f  parameters and boundary conditions. Without the assumption that such an 
ensemble actually exists, the explanation doesn’t get off the ground. SAP, as Leslie 
defines it, would be true even if  there is no other universe than our own, but it would then 
be unable to help explain the fine-tuning. Writes Leslie:
It is often complained that the anthropic principle is a tautology, so can explain 
nothing. The answer to this is that while tautologies cannot by themselves explain 
anything, they can enter into explanations. The tautology that three fours make 
twelve can help explaining why it is risky to visit the wood when three sets o f  four 
lions entered it and only eleven exited. (Leslie 1996, pp. 170-1)
13 The figure 1 in i o 3 000 is Hart’s most optimistic estimate of how likely it is that the right molecules would 
just happen to bump into each other to form a short DNA string capable of self-replication. As Hart himself 
recognizes, it is possible that there exists some as yet unknown abiotic process that could bridge the gap 
between amino acids (which we know can form spontaneously in suitable environments) and DNA-based 
self-replicating organisms. Such a bridging process could dramatically improve the odds of life evolving. 
There are suggestions for what these processes could be -  for example, self-replicating clay structures, or 
maybe something related to Stuart Kaufmann’s autocatalytic sets -  but we are still very much in the dark 
about how life got started on Earth or what the odds are of it happening on a random Earth-like planet.
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I would add that there is a lot more to anthropic reasoning than the anthropic principle. 
We discussed some o f the non-trivial issues in anthropic reasoning in chapter 2, and in 
subsequent chapters we shall encounter even greater conundrums. Anyhow, I shall argue 
shortly that the above anthropic principles are too weak to do the job they are supposed to 
do. They are best seen as special cases o f a more general principle, the Self-Sampling 
Assumption, which itself seems to have a methodological or epistemological status 
(somewhat resembling David Lewis’ Principal Principle) rather than that o f a tautology 
pure and simple.
Anthropic h o d g e p o d g e
I have counted over thirty different “anthropic principles” in the literature. They can be 
divided into three categories: those that express a purported observational selection effect; 
those that state some speculative empirical hypothesis; and those that are too muddled or 
ambiguous to make any clear sense at all. The principles discussed in the previous section 
are in the first category. Here we will briefly review some members o f  the other two 
categories.
Among the better-known definitions are those o f  physicists John Barrow and 
Frank Tipler, whose influential 700-pages monograph o f 1986 has served to introduce 
anthropic reasoning to a wide audience. Their formulation o f WAP is as follows:
(W APb&t) The observed values o f all physical and cosmological quantities are not 
equally probable but they take on values restricted by the requirement that there 
exist sites where carbon-based life can evolve and by the requirement that the 
Universe be old enough for it to have already done so. (Barrow and Tipler 1986,
p. 16)14
The reference to ‘carbon-based life’ does not appear in Carter’s original definition. 
Indeed, Carter has explicitly stated that he intended the principle to be applicable “not 
only by our human civilization, but also by any extraterrestrial (or non-human future-
14 A similar definition was given by Barrow in 1983:
[The] observed values of physical variables are not arbitrary but take values V(x, t) restricted by the 
spatial requirement that x e  L, where L is the set of sites able to sustain life; and by the temporal 
constraint that t is bound by time scales for biological and cosmological evolution of living 
organisms and life-supporting environments. (Barrow 1983, p. 147)
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terrestrial) civilization that may exist.” (Carter 1989, p. 18). It seems infelicitous to 
introduce a restriction to carbon-based life, and misleading to give the resulting 
formulation the same name as Carter’s.
Restricting the principle to carbon-based life forms is a bad idea for another 
reason as well: it robs the principle o f its tautological status and renders Barrow and 
Tipler’s position inconsistent, since they claim that WAP is a tautology. To see that WAP 
as defined by Barrow and Tipler is not a tautology, it is sufficient to note that it is not a 
tautology that all observers are carbon-based. It is no contradiction to suppose that there 
are observers that are implemented on some other chemical elements, and thus that there 
may be observed values o f physical and cosmological constants that are not restricted by 
the requirement that carbon-based life evolves.15
Realizing that the anthropic principle must not be restricted to carbon-based 
creatures is not a mere logical nicety. It is essential if  we want to apply anthropic 
reasoning to hypotheses about other possible life forms that may exist or come to exist in 
cosmos. For example, when considering the Doomsday argument in chapter 5 this 
becomes crucial.
Limiting the principle to carbon-based life has the side effect o f encouraging a 
common type o f misunderstanding o f what anthropic reasoning is all about. It makes it 
look as if  it were part o f a project to restore Homo sapiens to its glorious role as the Pivot 
o f Creation. For example, Stephen Jay Gould’s 1985-criticism (Gould 1985) o f  the 
anthropic principle is based on this misconception. It is ironic that anthropic reasoning 
should have been attacked from this angle. Anthropic reasoning is a/?ft-theological and 
a«//-teleological. It holds up the prospect o f an alternative explanation for the appearance 
o f fine-tuning -  the puzzlement that forms the basis for the modern version o f the 
teleological argument for the existence o f a Creator. The presence o f such radical 
confusion is symptomatic o f the primitive state o f anthropic methodology, although there 
has been progress since Gould made his remarks.
Barrow and Tipler also provide a new formulation o f SAP:
(SAPb&t) The Universe must have those properties which allow life to develop
15 There is also no contradiction involved in supposing that we might discover that we are not carbon-based.
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within it at some stage in its history. (Barrow and Tipler 1986, p. 21)
On the face o f  it, this is rather similar to Carter’s SAP. The two definitions differ in one 
obvious but minor respect. Barrow and Tipler’s formulation refers to the development o f  
life. Leslie’s version improves this to intelligent life. But Carter’s definition speaks o f  
observers. “Observers” and “intelligent life” are not the same concept. It seems possible 
that there could be (and might come to be in the future) intelligent, conscious observers 
that are not part o f what we call life -  for example by lacking such properties as being 
self-replicating or having a metabolism etc. For reasons that will become clear later, I 
think that Carter’s formulation is superior in this respect. Not being alive, but being an 
(intelligent) observer is what matters for the purposes o f anthropic reasoning.
Barrow and Tipler have each provided their own personal formulation o f  SAP. 
Their definitions then turn out quite different:
Tipler: ... intelligent life must evolve somewhere in any physically realistic
universe. (Tipler 1982, p. 37)
Barrow: The Universe must contain life. (Barrow 1983, p. 149)
These definitions state that life must exist, which implies that life exists. The other 
formulations o f SAP we looked at, by Carter, Barrow & Tipler, and Leslie, all stated that 
the universe must allow  or admit the creation o f life (or observers). This is most naturally 
read as saying only that the laws and parameters o f the universe must be compatible with 
life -  which does not imply that life exists. The propositions are clearly inequivalent.
We are also faced with the problem o f  how to understand the “must”. What is its 
modal force? Is it logical, metaphysical, epistemological or nomological? Or even 
theological or ethical? The definitions remain highly ambiguous until this is specified.
Barrow and Tipler list three possible interpretations o f SAPb&t in their 
monograph:
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(A) There exists one possible Universe ‘designed’ with the goal o f generating and 
sustaining ‘observers’.
(B) Observers are necessary to bring the Universe into being.
(C) An ensemble o f  other different universes is necessary for the existence o f our 
Universe.
Since none o f these are directly related to Carter’s idea about observational selection 
effects, I shall not discuss them further except for some brief remarks relegated to this 
footnote.16
A “Final Anthropic Principle” (FAP) has been defined by Tipler (Tipler 1982), 
Barrow (Barrow 1983) and Barrow & Tipler (Barrow and Tipler 1986) as follows:
16 (A) points to the teleological idea that the universe was designed with the goal of generating observers 
(spiced up with the added requirement that the “designed” universe be the only possible one). Yet, 
anthropic reasoning is counter-teleological in the sense described above; taking it into account diminishes 
the probability that a teleological explanation of the nature of the universe is correct. And it is hard to know 
what to make of the requirement that the universe be the only possible one. This is definitely not part of 
anything that follows from Carter’s original exposition.
(B) is identical to what John Wheeler had earlier branded the Participatory Anthropic Principle (PAP) 
(Wheeler 1975; Wheeler 1977). It echoes Berkelian idealism, but Barrow and Tipler want to invest it with 
physical significance by considering it in the context of quantum mechanics. Operating within the 
framework of quantum cosmology and the many-worlds interpretation of quantum physics, they state that, 
at least in its version (B), SAP imposes a boundary condition on the universal wave function. For example, 
all branches of the universal wave function have zero amplitude if they represent closed universes that 
suffer a big crunch before life has had a chance to evolve. That is, such short-lived universes do not exist. 
“SAP requires a universe branch which does not contain intelligent life to be non-existent; that is, branches 
without intelligent life cannot appear in the Universal wave function.” (Barrow and Tipler 1986, p. 503). As 
far as I can see. this speculation is totally unrelated to anything Carter had in mind when he introduced the 
anthropic principle, and PAP is irrelevant to the issues we shall discuss in this dissertation. (For a critical 
discussion of PAP, see e.g. (Earman 1987)).
Barrow and Tipler think that statement (C) receives support from the many-worlds interpretation and 
the sum-over-histories approach to quantum gravity “because they must unavoidably recognize the 
existence of a whole class of real ‘other worlds’ from which ours is selected by an optimizing principle.” 
(Barrow and Tipler 1986, p. 22). (Notice, by the way, that what Barrow and Tipler say about (B) and (C) 
indicates that the necessity to which these formulations refer should be understood in the nomological 
sense, as physical necessity.) Again, this seems to have little do to with observational selection effects. It is 
true that there is a connection between SAP and the existence of multiple worlds. From the standpoint of 
Leslie’s explication, this connection can be stated as follows: SAP is applicable (non-vacuously) only if 
there is a suitable world ensemble; only then can SAP be involved in doing explanatory work. But in no 
w'ay does anthropic reasoning presuppose that our universe could not have existed in the absence of 
whatever other universes there might be.
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Intelligent information-processing must come into existence in the universe, and,
once it comes into existence, it will never die out.
Martin Gardner charges that FAP is more accurately named CRAP, the Completely 
Ridiculous Anthropic Principle. (Gardner 1986). The spirit o f  FAP is antithetic to Carter’s 
anthropic principle (Carter 1989, Leslie 1985). FAP can lay no claim to any special 
methodological status; it is pure speculation. The appearance to the contrary, created by 
affording it the honorary title o f a “Principle”, is presumably what prompts Gardner’s 
mockery.
It may be possible to interpret FAP simply as a scientific hypothesis, and that is 
indeed what Barrow and Tipler set out to do. In a later book (Tipler 1994), Tipler 
considers the implications o f FAP in more detail. He proposes what he calls the “Omega 
Point Theory”. This theory assumes that our universe is closed, so that at some point in 
the future it will recollapse in a big crunch. Tipler tries to show that it is physically 
possible to perform an infinite number o f computations during this big crunch by using 
the shear energy o f the collapsing universe, and that the speed o f a computer in the final 
moments can be made to diverge to infinity. Thus there could be an infinity o f  subjective 
time for beings that were running as simulations on such a computer. This idea can be 
empirically tested, and if  present data suggesting that our universe is open are confirmed, 
then the Omega Point Theory will indeed have been falsified (as Tipler himself 
acknowledges).17 The point I want to emphasize here is only that FAP is not in any way 
an application or a consequence o f anthropic reasoning. (This is not to deny that anthropic 
reasoning may have a bearing on how evidence for speculations such as FAP should be 
evaluated; for example via the Doomsday argument.)
In order to treat FAP as an empirical hypothesis, it helps if  one charitably strikes 
out about the first part o f the definition, the part which says that intelligent information 
processing must come into existence. I plead guilty to having done my bit to worsen 
inflation o f  anthropic principles by introducing (with my partner-in-crime, Milan C. 
Cirkovic) this explication -  the “Final Anthropic Hypothesis” (FAH), which is the
17 For further critique of Tipler’s theory, see a paper by Lawrence Sklar (Sklar 1989).
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proposition that intelligent information processing will never cease (Cirkovic and 
Bostrom 2000). There is no particular reason to think that this proposition is true, but it 
may be interesting to consider what evidence there is for or against it. We find, for 
instance, that recent evidence for a large cosmological constant18 (Perlmutter, Aldering et 
al. 1998, Reiss, Filippenko et al. 1998) only makes the situation worse for Tipler’s Omega 
Point Theory. There are however some other possible ways in which FAH may be true 
which cannot be ruled out at the present, involving poorly understood mechanisms in 
quantum cosmology. There are also question marks regarding which o f these possible 
scenarios would be probabilistically acceptable in view o f anthropic constraints. Studying 
FAH is a legitimate research objective in my view, not because there is any particular a 
priori or methodological reason to think that FAH is true, but because it just seems an 
interesting question whether intelligent observers will in fact exist for an infinitely long 
time in the actual world.
In ad eq u acy  of earlier form ulations
For the purposes o f this dissertation, the relevant anthropic principles are those describing 
observational selection effects. All the formulations mentioned in this chapter’s first 
section are in this category. Yet, they are insufficient. They cover only a set o f very 
special cases and fail to give an adequate expression o f  the idea underlying many o f  the 
most important applications o f anthropic reasoning.
One paradigmatic use o f anthropic reasoning is in providing a potential 
explanation o f fine-tuning. A satisfactory formulation o f the anthropic principle should at 
a minimum be able to cater at least for this application. I will argue that what w e’ve got 
so far cannot do that.
Let’s assume that the empirical precondition for the anthropic explanation o f fine- 
tuning is satisfied, that is, that there is an ensemble o f actually existing universes that 
differ in suitable ways with respect to their boundary conditions and physical constants. 
What the anthropic theorizer would then like to say is that since observers exist only in
18 A non-zero cosmological constant has been considered desirable from several points of view in recent 
years, because it would be capable of solving the cosmological age problem and because it would arise 
naturally from quantum field processes (see e.g. Klapdor and Grotz 1986, Singh 1995, Martel, Shapiro et 
al. 1998). A universe with a cosmological density parameter H  «  1 and a cosmological constant of about 
the suggested magnitude A ~ 0.7 would allow the formation of galaxies (Weinberg 1987, Efstathiou 1995) 
and would last long enough for life to have a chance to develop.
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the subset o f universes which are fine-tuned, the theory that there is this multiverse 
predicts that we should expect to observe a fine-tuned universe; and thus that the theory is 
supported (to some extent) by available data. Chapter 2 argued that this line o f  reasoning 
can be defended against various methodological objections. The argument still doesn’t 
deliver the intended conclusion, however, for it rests on the claim that intelligent life 
exists only in the subset o f universes that are fine-tuned. But that need not be the case. In 
a sufficiently huge multiverse, there will also be some observers in non-tuned universes. 
For example, Hawking radiation from evaporating black holes is completely random in 
such a way that there is a finite chance that any object -  such as an intelligent observer -  
will pop into existence outside a black hole. This finite chance is astronomically small, 
but never mind. If the multiverse contains a sufficient number o f black holes then it is 
highly likely that some observers will come into existence in this manner. For such 
multiverses, then, one crucial premiss is false and the suggested anthropic argument 
consequently unsound.
If the only relevant observational selection effect were the one expressed by SAP 
(much less the ones expressed by WAP or the Super-weak Anthropic Principle) then such 
a multiverse theory could not support an anthropic explanation o f fine-tuning. It isn’t true 
that we couldn’t have observed a universe that weren’t fine-tuned for life -  w e could!
It is not farfetched that a multiverse should be sufficiently large to make it 
probable that intelligent observers are generated from Hawking radiation or other random 
phenomena, such as thermal motion. Since thermal motion, Hawking radiation and other 
quantum fluctuations can occur also in non-tuned universes (ones, say, where constants 
don’t generally favor formation o f stars or complex chemistry etc.), observers will be 
generated also within non-tuned universes in the multiverse. Almost all multiverse 
theories that have been proposed share that feature. Many multiverse theories postulate an 
infinite ensemble o f  universes. Even those that contain only a finite number might still 
contain sufficiently many. And even a mulitverse theory that only postulated a moderate 
number o f different universes would still be covered by this objection, if  some o f  the 
universes in it were spatially infinite, or finite but big enough. Considering that current 
evidence strongly suggests that our own universe is spatially infinite19, this is a very
19 Evidence favors the hypothesis that our universe is open. On the simplest topology (which is usually 
assumed in big bang theory) an open or flat universe is spatially infinite at every point in time -  containing 
infinitely many galaxies, stars, planets etc. (Martin 1995). The observable universe is finite, but only a
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plausible contingency.
The SAP-explanation o f the apparent fine-tuning, therefore, does not work for real 
multiverse theories that have been proposed. It uses the assumption that there are no 
observers in non-tuned universes, which is false in nearly all realistic multiverse theories.
This may appear to be a relatively superficial objection, based on the technical 
point that a few freak observers will probably arise in non-tuned universes. It could be 
thought that this shouldn’t really matter, because it will still be true that the overwhelming 
majority o f all observers in the multiverse will live in fine-tuned universes and will have 
evolved through more ordinary processes that can only take place under special 
conditions (fine-tuning). So if  only we modify SAP slightly, to allow for a small 
proportion o f all observers living in non-tuned universes, we could make the explanation 
go through.
I suggest that this is precisely on the right line! The presence o f the odd observer 
in a non-tuned universe changes nothing essential. And SAP should be modified or 
strengthened to make this clear. The idea would be that as long as the vast majority o f  
observers are in fine-tuned universes, the ones in non-tuned universes forming a small 
minority, then what the multiverse theory predicts is that we should (with overwhelming 
probability) find ourselves in one o f  the fine-tuned universes. That we observe such a 
universe would thus be what such a multiverse theory predicts and would thus tend to 
confirm that theory to some degree. A multiverse theory o f the right kind coupled with 
this ramified version o f the anthropic principle could potentially account for the apparent 
fine-tuning o f our universe.
A step in the right direction has been taken by astrophysicist Richard Gott ID, who 
formulated the “Copernican anthropic principle”:
small region of the whole is observable. It is quite common to encounter misconceptions on this point, even 
amongst people who are otherwise quite knowledgeable about the big bang theory. One fallacious intuition 
that may underlie the belief that an open universe is spatially finite at any point in time and only becomes 
infinite in the temporal limit, is that the universe came into existence at some spatial point in the big bang. 
A better way of picturing things is to imagine space as an infinite rubber sheet, which stars being buttons 
glued on to it. As we move forward in time, the sheet is stretched in all directions and the separation 
between the stars increases (except when they are parts of the same gravitationally bound grouping, such as 
a galaxy). Going backwards in time, we imagine the buttons coming closer together until, at “time zero”, 
the density of the (still spatially infinite) universe becomes infinite everywhere.
59
[T]he location o f your birth in space and time in the Universe is privileged (or 
special) only to the extent implied by the fact that you are an intelligent observer, 
that your location among intelligent observers is not special but rather picked at 
random from the set o f all intelligent observers (past, present and future) any one 
o f whom you could have been. (Gott 1993, p. 316)
This definition comes closer to giving an adequate expression o f the idea behind 
anthropic reasoning than any o f  the others we have examined. It introduces an idea o f  
randomness that can be applied to the multiverse examples under consideration: Yes, you 
could have lived in a non-tuned universe, but if  the vast majority o f  observers live in fine- 
tuned universes then the multiverse theory predicts that you should (very probably) find 
yourself in a fine-tuned universe.
One problem with Gott’s definition is that it makes some problematic claims 
which may not be essential to anthropic reasoning. It says that your location was “picked 
at random”. But who or what did the picking? Maybe that is too naive a reading. Yet the 
expression does suggest that there is some kind o f physical randomization mechanism o f  
at work, which so to speak selects a position for you to be born at. One could imagine a 
possible world where this would be a good description o f  what was going on. Suppose 
God, after having created a multiverse, posts a world-map on the wall o f  His celestial 
abode, takes a few steps back and starts throwing darts at the map, creating bodies 
wherever they hit, and sends down souls to inhabit these bodies. Alternatively, maybe one 
could imagine some sort o f physical apparatus, perhaps involving a time travel machine 
that could move about in spacetime and distribute observers in a truly random fashion. 
But what evidence is there that any such randomization mechanism exists? None, as far as 
I can see. Perhaps some subtler and less farfetched scenario could be conceived that 
would lead to the same result, but anthropic reasoning would be tenuous indeed had it to 
rely on such suppositions. As we shall see, however, that isn’t the case.
Also, the assertion that “you could have been” any o f these intelligent observers 
that will ever have existed is problematic. We may ultimately have to confront this 
problem, but it can be nice to have a definition that does not preempt that debate.
Both these points are relatively minor quibbles. One could reasonably explicate 
Gott’s definition so that it comes out right in these regards. There is, however, a much 
more serious problem with Gott’s approach which we will discuss when examining the 
Doomsday argument in chapter 5. We shall therefore work with a different principle
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which sidesteps these difficulties.
T h e Self-Sam pling  A ssum ption
The preferred explication o f the anthropic principle that we shall use as a starting point 
for the subsequent investigation is the following, which may be called the Self-Sampling 
Assumption:
(SSA) Every observer should reason as if  they were a random sample drawn from
the set o f all observers.
We will elaborate as we go along on what this means and how it is indented to be used, 
but some clarifications can be made right away. I use “observer” here as a technical term 
for whatever sort o f entity is such that one should reason as if  one were randomly selected 
from the class o f  all those entities. What this class is, is a topic for later discussions. It is 
intended to include at least you and me and other beings that are “like us” in relevant 
ways. We shall call the class o f all observers that will ever have existed the “reference 
class”. (We will revise this terminology in chapter 9, where we introduce an important 
modification to SSA and allow reference classes that consists o f only a subset o f all 
observers. The motivation for those changes will become understandable only after we 
have thoroughly investigated the implications o f  SSA as formulated above. So meanwhile 
we can think o f the reference class as the class o f all observers and observers as those 
entities from which to reason as if  you were a random sample.)
The above statement o f SSA is vague in at least two important respects: What 
counts as an observer? And what is the sampling density with which you have been 
sampled? The resolution o f  these areas o f vagueness matters a lot for what empirical 
predictions you get from applying SSA in concrete applications. However, while it is 
important to examine these issues (which we shall do in later chapters), many interesting 
philosophical problems in anthropic reasoning do not hinge on them. We can sidestep the 
potentially problematic areas o f vagueness by making the following simplifying 
assumptions:
Consider an imaginary world where we have no borderline cases o f  what counts 
as an observer and where the observers are sufficiently similar to each other to justify 
using a uniform sampling density (rather then one, say, where long-lived observers get a 
proportionately greater weight). Thus let’s suppose (merely for the sake o f  illustration)
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that the only observers are human beings on the planet Earth, that we have no 
evolutionary ancestors, that all humans are fully self-aware and are knowledgeable about 
probability theory and anthropic reasoning, etc., that we all have identical life spans and 
that we are equal in any other arguably relevant respect. Assume furthermore that each
where R  and N  are random variables: N  representing the total number o f  people that will 
have lived, and R the birth rank o f the particular person doing the reasoning. I call this 
expression “D” because, as we shall see later, it is used in the derivation o f the Doomsday 
argument.
The other observational selection principles discussed above are special cases o f  
SSA. Take first WAP (in Carter and Leslie’s rendition). If a theory T  says that there is 
only one universe and some regions o f it contain no observers, then WAP says that T 
predicts that we don’t observe one o f those observerless regions. (That is, that w e don’t 
observe them “from the inside”. If the region is observable from a region where there are 
observers, then obviously it could be observable by those observers.) SSA yields the same 
result, since if there is no observer in a region, then there is zero probability that a sample 
taken from the set o f all observers will be in that region, and hence zero probability that 
you should observe that region given the truth o f T.
Similarly, if  T says there are multiple universes, only some o f which contains 
observers, then SAP (again in Carter and Leslie’s sense) says that T predicts that what 
you should observe is one o f the universes that contain observers. SSA says the same, 
since it assigns zero sampling density to being an observer in an observerless universe.
In the next chapter we shall consider ways o f generalizing D. SSA and its 
corollaries are to be understood as methodological prescriptions, stating how probabilistic
20 We are also assuming here that the Self-Indication Assumption (which we will define and discuss in a 
later chapter) is false.
human has a unique birth rank, denoting her temporal position in the human species20, 
and that the total number o f humans that will ever have lived is finite.
Under these assumptions, we get as a Corollary from the SSA that
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inferences are to be made in certain cases.21 We will provide several arguments for 
adopting SSA. However, it is not a major concern for our purposes whether SSA is 
strictly a “requirement o f rationality”. It suffices if  many intelligent people do in fact -  on 
reflection -  have a subjective prior probability function that satisfies SSA. If that is 
acknowledged, it follows that investigating surprising consequences for important matters 
that flow from SSA will be worth the effort.
21 As will appear from subsequent discussion, SSA does not seem to be in any straightforward sense a 
restricted version of the principle of indifference.
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CHAPTER 4: WHY A C C E P T THE SELF-SAMPLING  
ASSUM PTION?
This chapter gives reasons for accepting SSA. In the process o f so doing, it also illustrates 
some aspects o f the principle’s intended meaning and begins to develop a theory o f  how 
SSA can be used in concrete scientific contexts.
The case for accepting SSA can be divided into two parts. One part focuses on the 
application. I will argue that some methodological rule is needed to derive observational 
consequences in cosmology; that other candidate rules that have been proposed are 
inadequate; and that SSA provides the services we require. SSA also gives 
methodological guidance for some types o f inferences in other fields, including 
thermodynamics, evolutionary biology, and traffic planning. The other part presents a 
series o f  thought experiments designed to demonstrate that it is reasonable to reason in 
accordance with SSA in a wide range o f circumstance. If the application-part can be 
likened to field observations, the thought experiments are more like laboratory research 
where w e have full control over all relevant variables and can stipulate away inessential 
complications and hopefully get a finer measurement o f our intuitions and epistemic 
convictions regarding SSA. We begin by presenting this latter part o f the case for SSA, 
returning to the application-based argument towards the end o f this chapter.
Prison
Our first gedanken is Prison:
Imagine a world that consists o f a prison with one hundred cells. In each cell there 
is one person. Ninety o f the cells are painted blue on the outside and the other ten 
are painted red. Each person is asked to guess whether she is in a blue or a red 
cell. (And everybody knows all this.) Suppose you find yourself in one o f  these 
cells. What color should you think it has? -  Answer. You should think that with 
90% probability it is blue.
Since 90% o f all people are in blue cells, and as you don’t have any other relevant
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information, it seems you should think, in agreement with SSA, that with 90% probability 
you are in a blue cell. Most people the author has talked to agree that this is the intuitively 
correct answer. Since the example does not depend on the particular numbers involved, 
we thus have a large class o f cases where SSA provides plausible guidance for what to 
believe.22 Some o f our subsequent investigations in this chapter will consider arguments 
for extending this class in various ways. It may nonetheless be worthwhile reflecting on 
whether it is possible to push the argument further to try to convince a hypothetical 
skeptic who isn’t immediately persuaded to set her credence equal to 90% in Prison.
Consider the following argument. Suppose everyone accepts SSA and everyone 
has to bet on whether they are in a blue or a red cell. Then 90% o f all prisoners will win 
their bets and 10% will lose. Suppose, on the other hand, that SSA is rejected and people 
think that one is no more likely to be in a blue cell; so they bet by flipping a coin. Then, 
on average, 50% of the persons will win and 50% will lose. It seems better that SSA be 
accepted.
This argument is incomplete as it stands. Just because one pattern A o f  betting 
leads more people to win their bets than another pattern B, we shouldn’t think that it is 
rational for anybody to bet in accordance with pattern A rather than B. In Prison, consider 
the betting pattern A which specifies that “If you are Harry Smith, bet you are in a red 
cell; if  you are Helena Singh, bet that you are in a blue cell; . . .” -  such that for each 
person in the experiment, A gives the advice that will lead him or her to be right. 
Adopting rule A will lead to more people winning their bets (100%) than any other rule. 
In particular, it outperforms SSA which has a mere 90% success rate.
Intuitively it is clear that rules like A are cheating. This is maybe best seen if  we 
put A in the context o f its rival permutations A ’, A ”, A ” ’ etc., which map the captives’ 
names to recommendations about betting red or blue in other ways than does A. Most o f  
these permutations do rather badly. On average they give no better advice than would 
flipping a coin, which we saw was inferior to accepting SSA. Only if  the people in the
22 This does not rule out that there could be other principles of assigning probabilities that would also 
provide plausible guidance in Prison, provided their advice coincide with that of SSA. For example, a 
relatively innocuous version of the Principle of Indifference, formulated as “Assign the same credence to 
any hvo hypotheses if  you don’t have any reason to prefer one to the o t h e r would also do the trick in 
Prison. But subsequent gedanken impose additional constraints, and for reasons that will become clear, it 
doesn’t seem that any straightforward principle of indifference would suffice to express the needed 
methodological rule.
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cells could pick the rights-permutation would they benefit. In Prison they don’t have any 
information enabling them to do this. If they picked A and consequently benefited, it 
would be pure luck.
What allows the people in Prison to do better than chance is that they have a 
relevant piece o f empirical information regarding the distribution o f observers over the 
two types o f cells. They have been informed that 90% o f them are in blue cells, and it 
would be irrational o f  them not to take this information into account. We can imagine a 
series o f thought experiments where an increasingly large fraction o f  observers are in blue 
cells -  91%, 92%, ..., 99%. The situation gradually degenerates into the 100%-case 
where they are told, “You are all in blue cells.”, from which each can deductively infer 
that she is in a blue cell. As the situation approaches this limiting case, it is plausible to 
require that the strength o f participants’ beliefs about being in a blue cell should gradually 
approach probability 1. SSA has this property.
One may notice that while it is true if  the detainees adopt SSA then 90% o f them 
win their bets, yet there are even simpler methods that produce the same result. For 
instance: “Set your probability o f being in a blue cell equal to 1 if  most people are in blue 
cells; and to 0 otherwise.” Using this epistemic rule will also result in 90% o f the people 
winning their bets. Such a rule would not be attractive however. First, when the 
participants step out o f their cells, some o f them will find that they were in red cells. Yet 
i f  their prior probability o f that were zero, they could never learn that by Bayesian belief 
updating. The second and more generic point is that when we consider rational betting 
quotients, rules like this are revealed to be inferior. A person whose probability for 
finding herself in a blue cell was 1 would be willing to bet on that hypothesis at any 
odds23. The people following this simplified rule would thus risk losing arbitrarily great 
sums o f money for an arbitrarily small and uncertain gain -  an uninviting strategy. 
Moreover, collectively, they would be guaranteed to lose an arbitrarily large sum.
Suppose we agree that all the participants should assign the same probability to 
being in a blue cell (which is quite plausible since their evidence does not differ in any 
relevant way). It is then easy to show that out o f all possible probabilities they could 
assign to finding themselves in blue cells, a probability o f 90% is the only one which
23 Setting aside, as is customary in contexts like this, any risk aversion or aversion against gambling, or 
computational limitations that the person might have.
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would make it impossible to bet against them in such a way that they were collectively 
guaranteed to lose money. And in general, if  we vary the numbers o f the example, their 
degree o f  belief would in each case have to be what SSA prescribes in order to save them 
from being a collective sucker.
On an individual level, if  we imagine the experiment repeated many times, the 
only way a given participant could avoid having a negative expected outcome when 
betting repeatedly against a shrewd outsider would be by setting her odds in accordance 
with SSA.
All these considerations support what seems to be most persons’ initial intuition 
about Prison: that it is a situation where one should reason in accordance with SSA. Any 
plausible principle o f the epistemology o f information with an indexical component 
would have to agree with SSA’s verdicts in this particular case.
One important thing to notice in Prison is that it was not specified how the 
hundred inmates came to be in the cells they are in. That doesn’t matter so long as the 
inmates don’t know anything about it which gives them evidence about what color cell 
they are in. Thus, they may have been allocated to their respective cells through some 
objectively random mechanism such as drawing tickets from a lottery urn, then being 
blindfolded and led to their designated locations. Or they may have been allowed to 
choose cells for themselves, and a random mechanism subsequently activated to 
determine which cells should be painted. But the thought experiment does not depend on 
there being a well-defined randomization mechanism. One may just as well imagine that 
prisoners have been in their cells since their birth, or since the beginning o f the universe. 
If there is a possible world where the laws o f nature directly specify which individuals are 
to appear in which cells, without any appeal to initial conditions, the persons in the 
experiment would still be rational to follow SSA provided that they did not have 
knowledge o f the laws or were incapable o f deducing what the laws implied about their 
own situation. Objective chance, therefore, is not a necessary ingredient in the gedanken. 
The fuel is subjective uncertainty.
E m eralds
We shall now look at an argument for extending the range o f cases where SSA can be 
applied. We shall see that the synchronous nature o f Prison is an inessential feature: you
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can in some contexts legitimately reason as if  you were a random sample from a reference 
class that includes observers that exist at different times. Also, we will find that one and 
the same reference class can contain observers that differ in many respects, including 
their genes and gender. To this effect, consider an example due to John Leslie:
Imagine an experiment planned as follows. At some point in time, three humans 
would each be given an emerald. Several centuries afterwards, when a completely 
different set o f humans was alive, five thousand humans would each be given an 
emerald. Imagine next that you have yourself been given an emerald in the 
experiment. You have no knowledge, however, o f whether your century is the 
earlier century in which just three people were to be in this situation, or in the later 
century in which five thousand were to be in it. ...
Suppose you in fact betted that you lived [in the earlier century]. If every emerald- 
getter in the experiment betted in this way, there would be five thousand losers 
and only three winners. The sensible bet, therefore, is that yours is instead the later 
century o f the two. (Leslie 1996, p. 20)
For reasons which need not concern us here (but will be discussed in a later chapter), it is 
convenient to focus on a slightly modified version o f Leslie’s example, one where the two 
batches o f people are the only observers ever to exist. One could invent a fairy tale about 
how the intervening generations had their brains sucked out and replaced with clever 
clockworks by an evil mollusk, but we skip the fluff.
The same arguments that were made for SSA in Prison can be made for SSA in 
Emeralds. Leslie makes the point about more people being right if  everyone bets that they 
are in the later o f the two centuries. As we saw in the previous section, this point needs to 
be supplemented by additional arguments before it yields support for SSA. (Leslie gives 
the emeralds example as a response to one objection against the Doomsday argument. He 
never formulates SSA, but parts o f his arguments in defense o f the Doomsday argument 
and parts o f his account o f anthropic reasoning in cosmology are directly relevant to 
evaluating SSA.)
Tw o B a tc h e s
As Leslie notes, we can learn a second lesson if  we consider a variant o f the emeralds 
example:
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A firm plan was formed to rear humans in two batches: the first batch to be o f  
three humans o f one sex, the second o f five thousand o f  the other sex. The plan 
called for rearing the first batch in one century. Many centuries later, the five 
thousand humans o f  the other sex would be reared. Imagine that you learn you’re 
one o f the humans in question. You don’t know which centuries the plan 
specified, but you are aware o f being female. You very reasonably conclude that 
the large batch was to be female, almost certainly. If adopted by every human in 
the experiment, the policy o f  betting that the large batch was o f  the same sex as 
oneself would yield only three failures and five thousand successes. ... [Y]ou 
mustn’t say: ‘M y genes are female, so I have to observe myself to be female, no 
matter whether the female batch was to be small or large. Hence I can have no 
special reason for believing it was to be large.’ (pp. 222-3)
If we accept this, we can conclude that members o f both genders can be in the same 
reference class. In a similar fashion, one can argue for the irrelevance o f short or tall, 
black or white, rich or poor, famous or obscure, fierce or meek etc. If analogous 
arguments with two batches o f people with any o f  those property pairs are accepted, then 
we have quite a broad reference class already. We shall return in a moment to consider 
what limits there might be to how wide the reference class can be, but first w e want to 
look at another dimension in which one may seek to extend the applicability o f  SSA.
G od ’s  Coin T o s s
All the examples so far have been o f situations where all the competing hypotheses entail 
the same number o f observers in existence. A very important new element is introduced 
in cases where the total number o f observers is different depending on which hypothesis 
is true. Here is a simple gedanken where this happens.
G o d ’s Coin Toss, version one (G l). God24 starts by tossing a fair coin. If the coin 
falls tails then He creates one room and a man with a black beard inside it. If the 
coin falls heads then He creates two rooms, one with a man with a black beard and 
one with a man with a red beard. Apart from this, the world is empty, and 
everyone knows all the above. You find yourself in a room and you know that you 
have black beard. Question: What should be your credence that the coin fell 
heads?
Consider the following three models o f what probability you should rationally assign to
24 God is not supposed to count as an observer. We may imagine an automaton instead of God in this and 
subsequent examples.
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the proposition that the coin fell heads:
Model 1 (Naive). There are two possibilities, Heads or Tails; the coin is known to 
be fair; both possibilities are perfectly compatible with what you know.
P (Heads) = P(-Heads) = 1/2.
Therefore, your credence o f  Heads should be 1/2.
Model 2 (SSA). If you had had red beard, you could have inferred that there were 
two rooms, which entails Heads. Knowing that you have black beard does not 
allow you to rule out either possibility but it is still relevant information. This can 
be seen by the following argument. The prior probability o f Heads is one half, 
since the coin was fair. If the coin fell Heads then the only observer in existence 
has a black beard; hence by SSA the conditional probability o f having a black 
beard given Heads is one. If the coin fell Tails then one out o f  two observers has a 
black beard; hence, also by SSA, the conditional probability o f black beard given 
Tails is one half. That is, we have
P(Heads) = P(-Heads) = 1/2
P(Black | Heads) = 1/2
P(Black | “Heads) = 1
By Bayes’ theorem, the posterior probability o f Heads, after conditionalizing on 
Black, is
P(Heads | Black)
= ______________ P(Black | Heads)P(Heads)_______________
P(Black | Heads)P(Heads) + P(Black | ^Heads)P(^Heads)
Therefore, your credence o f  Heads should be 1/3.
M odel 3 (SSA&SIA). It is twice as likely that you should exist if  two observers 
exist than if  only one observer exists. This follows if  we make the Self-Indication 
Assumption (SIA), to be explained shortly. The prior probability o f  Heads should 
therefore be 2/3, and o f Tails 1/3. As in Model 2, the conditional probability o f  
black beard given Heads is 1 and the conditional probability o f  black beard given 
Tails is 1/2.
P(Heads) = 2/3
P(“Heads) = 1/3
P(Black | Heads) = 1/2
P(Black | “Tfeads) = 1
By Bayes’ theorem, we get
P(Heads | Black) = 1/2.
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Therefore, your credence o f Heads should he 1/2.
The last model uses something that we can dub the Self-Indication Assumption, according 
to which you should conclude from the fact that you came into existence that probably 
quite a few observers did:
(SIA) Given the fact that you exist, you should (other things equal) favor 
hypotheses according to which many observers exist over hypotheses on which 
few observers exist.
SIA may seem prim a facie  implausible, and I shall argue in chapter 6 that it is no less 
implausible ultimo facie. Yet some o f  the more profound criticisms o f specific anthropic 
inferences rely implicitly on SIA. In particular, adopting SIA annihilates the Doomsday 
argument. It is therefore good to put it on the table so we can consider what reasons there 
are for accepting or rejecting it. To give SIA the best chance it can get, we postpone this 
evaluation until we have discussed the Doomsday argument and have seen why a range o f  
more straightforward objections against the Doomsday argument fail. The fact that SIA 
could seem to be the only coherent way o f resisting the Doomsday argument is possibly 
the strongest argument that can be made in its favor.
For the time being, we put SIA to one side (i.e. we assume that it is false) and 
focus on comparing Model 1 and Model 2. The difference between these models is that 
Model 2 uses SSA and Model 1 doesn’t. By determining which o f these models is correct, 
w e get a test o f whether SSA should be applied in epistemic situations where hypotheses 
implying different numbers o f observers are entertained. If we find that Model 2 (or, for 
that matter, Model 3) is correct, we have extended the applicability o f  SSA beyond what 
was established in the previous sections, where the number o f observers did not vary 
between the hypotheses under consideration.
In Model 1 we are told to consider the objective chance o f 50% o f the coin falling 
heads. Since you know about this chance, you should according to Model 1 set your 
subjective credence equal to it.
The step from knowing about the objective chance to setting your credence equal
71
to it follows from the so-called Principal Principle25. This is not the place to delve into 
the details o f the debates surrounding this principle and the connection between chance 
and credence (Bigelow, Collins et al. 1993, Sturgeon 1998, Black 1998, Bostrom 1999, 
Hall 1994, Hoefer 1997, Hoefer 1999, Vranas 1998, Thau 1994, Strevens 1995, Halpin 
1994, Kyburg(Jr.) 1981, Skyrms 1980). Suffice it to point out that the Principal Principle 
does not say that you should always set your credence equal to the corresponding 
objective chance if  you know it. Instead, it says that you should do this unless you have 
other relevant information that should be taken into account. There is some controversy 
about how to specify what types o f such additional information will modify reasonable 
credence when the objective chance is known, and what types o f additional information 
leave the identity intact. But there is general agreement that the proviso is needed. For 
example, no matter how objectively chancy a process is, and no matter how well you 
know the chance, if  you have actually seen what the outcome was then your credence in 
that observed outcome should o f course be one (or extremely close to one) and your 
credence in any other outcome the process could have had should be (very close to) zero; 
and this is so quite independently o f  what the objective chance was. None o f  this is 
controversial.
Now the point is that in God’s Coin Toss you have such extra relevant information 
that you need to take into account, and Model 1 fails to do that. The extra information is 
that you have black beard. This information is relevant because it bears probabilistically 
on whether the coin fell heads or tails. We can see this as follows. Suppose you are in a 
room but you don’t know what color your beard is. You are just about to look in the 
mirror. If the information that you have black beard weren’t probabilistically relevant to 
how the coin fell, then there would be no need for you to change your credence about the 
outcome after looking in the mirror. But this is an incoherent position. For there are two 
things you may find when looking in the mirror: that you have black beard or that you 
have red beard. Before you peek in the mirror, you know that if  you find that you have 
red beard then you will have conclusively refuted the hypothesis that the coin fell tails. So 
the mirror might give you information that would increase your credence o f  Heads (to 1). 
But that entails that making the other possible finding (that you have black beard) must 
decrease your credence in Heads. In other words, your conditional credence o f  Heads
25 David Lewis (Lewis 1986, Lewis 1994); a similar principle had earlier been formulated by Hugh Mellor 
(Mellor 1971).
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given Black beard must be less than your unconditional credence o f Heads.
If your conditional probability o f  Heads given black beard were not lower than the 
probability you assign to Heads, while also your conditional probability o f  Heads given 
red beard is one, then you would be incoherent. This is easily shown by a standard Dutch 
book argument, or more simply by the following little calculation:
Write h for the hypothesis that the coin fell heads, and e for the evidence that you 
have black beard. We can assume that Pr(e|h) < 1. Then we have
Pr(Ale) = M
Pr(e)
and
Pr(^ | e) = l£(£h^£(^0
Pr(e)
Dividing these two equations and using Pr(e| -ih) -  1, we get 
Pr(/j|e) _  Vv(e\h)Vx{h) Pr(/*)
Pr(— Pr(—1/2) Pr(-i/z)
So the quotients between the probabilities o f h and is less after e is known than 
before. In other words, learning e decreases the probability o f h and increases the 
probability o f  ~^ h.
So the observation that you have black beard gives you relevant information that 
you need to take into account and it should lower your credence o f Tails to below your 
unconditional credence o f Tails, which (provided we reject SIA) is 50%. Model 1, which 
fails to do this, is therefore wrong.
Model 2 does take the information about your beard color into account and sets 
your posterior credence o f Heads to 1/3, lower than it would have been had you not seen 
your beard. This is a consequence o f  SSA. The exact figure depends on the assumption 
that your conditional probability o f  Black beard equals that o f Red beard, given  Heads. If 
you knew that the coin landed heads but you hadn’t yet looked in the mirror, you would 
know that there was one man with red beard and one with black, and provided these men 
were sufficiently similar in other respects (so that from your present position o f  ignorance 
about your beard color you didn’t have any evidence as to which one o f  them you are) 
these conditional credences should both be 50% according to SSA.
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If we agree that Model 2 is the correct one for God’s Coin Toss then we have seen 
how SSA can be applied to problems where the total number o f observers in existence is 
not known. In chapter 9, we will reexamine God’s Coin Toss and argue for adoption o f a 
fourth model, which conflicts with Model 2 in subtle but important ways. The motivation 
for doing this, however, will become clear only after detailed investigations into the 
consequences o f accepting Model 2. So for the time being, we will adopt Model 2 as our 
working assumption in order to explore the implications o f the way o f  thinking it 
embodies.
If we combine this with the lessons o f the previous gedanken, we now have a very 
wide class o f problems where SSA can be applied. In particular, we can apply it to 
reference classes that contain observers that live at different times; that are different in 
many substantial ways including genes and gender; and that may be o f different sizes 
depending on which hypothesis under consideration is true.
One may wonder if  there are any limits at all to how much we can include in the 
reference class. There are. We shall now see why.
T h e referen ce  c la s s  problem
The reference class, remember, was preliminarily defined to consist o f all observers that 
will ever have existed. But what, precisely, counts as an observer? “Observer” was 
introduced as a technical term and its exact meaning has yet to be determined. We have 
seen examples o f things that must be included in the reference class. In order to complete 
the definition, we also have to specify what things must be excluded. The problem o f  the 
reference class is to define what counts as an observer for the purposes o f SSA.
In many cases where the total number o f observers is the same on any o f  the 
hypotheses assigned non-zero probability, the problem of the reference class does not 
seem to be relevant. For instance, take Prison and suppose that in ten o f  the blue cells 
there is a polar bear instead o f a human observer. Now, whether the polar bears count as 
observers makes no difference. Whether they do or not, you know you are not one o f  
them. And you thus know that you are not in one o f the ten cells they occupy. You 
therefore recalculate the probability o f being in a blue cell to be 80/90, since 80 out o f  the 
90 observers that you -  for all you know -  might be, are in blue cells. Here you have 
simply eliminated the ten ice-bear cells from the calculation. But this does not rely on the
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assumption that polar bears don’t count as observers. The calculation would come out 
exactly the same if the bears were replaced with human observers who were very much 
like yourself provided you knew you were not one of them. Maybe you are told that ten 
people who have a birthmark on their right calves are in blue cells. After verifying that 
you yourself don’t have such a birthmark, you adjust your probability o f being in a blue 
cell to 80/90. This is in agreement with SSA. According to SSA, Pr(Blue cell | Setup) = 
90/100. But also by SSA, Pr(Blue cell | Setup & Ten o f the people in blue cells have birth 
marks o f a type you don’t have) = 80/90.
One place where the reference class problem becomes crucial is where the total 
number o f observers is unknown. Consider the following variant o f God’s Coin Toss. 
There are two rooms. Whatever way the coin falls, a person with a black beard is created 
in room one. If and only if it falls heads, then one other thing x is created in room two. 
You find yourself in one o f the rooms and you are informed that it is room number one. 
We can now ask, for various choices o f x, what your credence should be that the coin fell 
heads.
The original version (G l) was one where x is a man with red beard:
Room 1
Tails
Room 1 Room 2
Heads
Figure 1: God's Coin Toss, original version (Gl)
As we saw above, on Model 2 (“SSA and not SIA”), your credence of Heads in this case 
is 1/3 But now consider a second case (G2) where we let x be a stone:
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Room 1
Tai
Room 1 Room 2
Heads
Figure 2: God's Coin Toss, variant (G2)
In G2, when you find that you are the man in room one, it seems clear that your credence 
o f heads should be 1/2. The conditional probability o f you observing what you are 
observing (i.e. your being the man in room one) is 1 on both Heads and Tails in this case, 
because you couldn’t possibly have found yourself observing being in room two. (We are 
assuming that the stone does not have a soul or a mind of course.) Notice that the 
arguments used to argue for SSA in the previous examples cannot be used in G2. A stone 
cannot bet, or be wrong, so the fraction of observers who are right or would win their bets 
here is not improved by adopting SSA. Moreover, it seems impossible to conceive o f a 
situation where you would be ignorant as to whether you were the man in room one or the 
stone in room two.
If this is right then the probability you should assign to Heads depends on what 
you know would be in room two if the coin fell heads, even though you know that you are 
in room one. The reference class problem can be relevant in cases like this, where the 
total number o f observers vary depending on which hypothesis is true, because what you 
should believe depends on whether the object x that would be in room two would be in 
the reference class or not. It makes a difference to your rational credence whether x is 
stone or an observer like yourself.
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Stones, consequently, are not in the reference class. In a similar vein w e can rule 
out tables, planets, books, plants, bacteria and other such non-observer entities. It gets 
trickier when we consider possible borderline cases such as a gifted chimpanzee, a 
Neanderthal or a mentally handicapped human. It is not immediately obvious whether the 
earlier arguments for including things in the reference class could be used to argue that 
these entities should be allowed in. Can a severely mentally handicapped person bet? 
Could you have found yourself as such a person? (Although anybody could o f course in 
one sense become severely mentally disabled, it could be argued that the being that results
from such a process would not in any real sense still be “you” if  the damage is sufficiently
\26severe.)
Intellectual insufficiency is not the only prima facie source o f  vagueness or 
indeterminacy o f the reference class. Here is a list o f possible borderlines:
• Insufficient intellectual abilities (e.g. chimpanzees; mentally handicapped persons; 
Neanderthals; persons who can’t understand SSA and the probabilistic reasoning 
involved in using it in the application in question)
• Insufficient information (e.g. persons who don’t know about the experimental 
setup)
• Lack o f  some occurrent thoughts (e.g. persons who, as it happens, don’t think o f  
applying SSA to the situation in question, although they have the capacity to do 
so)
• Exotic mentality (e.g. angels; superintelligent computers; posthumans)
I don’t want to make any claim as to whether the reference class should be delimited in 
such a way that vagueness can arise in all o f these four zones. For instance, maybe it is 
not possible to disqualify an intellect for being too intelligent. I only want to note that the
26 That these questions arise seems to suggest that what is involved is something more than any 
straightforward version of the principle of indifference (see e.g. Strevens 1998, Castell 1998). The principle 
of indifference concerns primarily what your credence should be when you are ignorant of certain facts, 
while SSA purports to determine the conditional probability of an observation given the truth of an 
hypothesis and is intended to apply even when you were never ignorant of what the observation tells you. 
(An additional problem with the principle of indifference is that it balances dangerously between vacuity 
and inconsistency. Starting from the generic formulation suggested earlier, “Assign equal credence to any 
(wo hypotheses if  you don’t have any reason to prefer one to the other”, one can make it go either way 
depending on how a strong an interpretation one gives of “reason”. If “reasons” can include any subjective 
inclination, the principle loses most if not all of its content. But if having a “reason” requires one to have 
objectively significant statistical data, then the principle can be shown to be inconsistent.)
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exact way of delimiting the reference class has not yet been settled, and in order to do so 
one would have to address these four points. We will return to the reference class problem 
in the next chapter, where I will show that an attempted solution by John Leslie fails.
T h e  s a m p l i n g  d e n s i t y
Closely related to the reference class problem is the problem o f selecting the sampling 
density that you should reason as if you had been sampled with from the reference class. 
(The reference class problem can be seen as a special case o f this: the problem o f which 
objects should be assigned zero sampling density.) We have seen examples where all 
observers are similar in all respects that could plausibly be thought to make a difference 
to their sampling density and where consequently a uniform sampling density over all the 
objects in the reference class is justified, in accordance with expression D (chapter 3). In 
most real-world applications, however, observers differ in many respects, including ones 
which may be thought relevant to their sampling density.
To begin with, we can consider some easy cases which are covered by what has 
already been said. Modify God’s Coin Toss so that now there are two observers in room 
one (independently o f how the coin fell):
Room 1
Tails
Room 1 Room 2
Heads
Figure 3: God’s Coin Toss, variant with two observers 
in Room 1
This changes the odds as follows:
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P (Heads) = P(-Heads) = 1/2
P(Black | Heads) = 2/3
P(Black | ^Heads) = 1, 
which gives
P(Heads | Black) = 2/5.
The result is o f course the same if  the two persons in room one are Siamese twins 
and share the same body. As long as it is only a matter o f the number o f  observers 
changing, the case will be covered by the preceding discussion. But what happens if  we 
keep the number o f observers constant while varying their nature? Can different choices 
o f  x (the potential content o f room two) lead to different values o f the credence you 
should assign to Heads, even when x ranges only over different types o f  observers'?
We can take a first step towards specifying the sampling density by substituting 
“observer-moments” for “observers”. Different observers may live differently long lives, 
be awake different amounts o f time, spend different amounts o f  time engaging in 
anthropic reasoning etc. If we chop up the stretch o f time an observer exists into discrete 
observer-moments then we have a natural way o f weighing in these differences. We can 
redefine the reference class to consist o f all observer-moments that will ever have existed. 
That is, we can upgrade SSA to something we can call the Strong Self-Sampling 
Assumption'.
(SSSA) Every observer at every moment should reason as if  their present observer-
moment were randomly sampled from the set o f all observer-moments.
Just as we previously could assume a uniform sampling density over the set o f  all 
observers in case they were identical in every relevant respect, as expressed by D, w e can 
now formulate a stronger version o f D by adding that the sampling density should be 
uniform over all observer-moments provided they are identical in all relevant respects:
(SD)
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where N  now represents the total number o f observer-moments and R  the rank o f your 
present observer-moment.
SSSA is a strengthening of SSA (and SD is a strengthening o f D). In the special 
case where all observers in existence each consists o f the same number o f observer- 
moments, SSSA (and SD) can be derived from SSA (and D). But in the more general case 
where the number of observer-moments is not equal for all observers then SSSA may 
yield a definite sampling density (provided only that the observer-moments are relevantly 
similar) where SSA would not (since the observers are not relevantly similar).
It could be thought that there is some arbitrariness as to how long a period o f an 
observer we count as an observer-moment. So long as the observer-moments are short 
compared to the typical duration of an observer, however, that does not matter provided 
we partition all observers into segments of equal length. To illustrate this point, consider 
the following gedanken:
Room 1 Room 2
/
o
\
XX
/
o
\
Figure 4: One observer spending different amounts of time in 
two rooms
Only one observer exists. This observer is first in room one where he stays for two 
hours. Then he is given a drug that induces retrograde amnesia (causing him to 
forget that he has been in room one), and he is transported into room two where he 
spends one hour, whereupon he is terminated. (In each room he is informed about 
the general setup o f the experiment, so he always knows that.)
If we adopt SSSA then at each point in time this observer should believe with probability 
2/3 that he is currently in Room 1 and with probability 1/3 that he is currently in Room 2. 
This is so because he knows that two thirds o f all observer-moments are in Room 1 and 
only one third in Room 2, and he does not have any means of determining which o f these 
observer-moments is his present one. And it is easy to see that this holds whether we
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stipulate that an observer-moment is one second or five minutes long.
The calculation is exactly the same if instead o f one observer being transported 
from one room to the other we have two different observers that each exist in one o f the 
rooms for two hours and one hour, respectively:
Room
XX Room 2
Figure 5: Two observers spending different amounts of time in 
two rooms
In this case too. by the same reasoning, both observers should at each time se t:27
P(I am currently in Room 1) = 2/3, and 
P(I am currently in Room 2) = 1/3.
Cases where the total number o f observer-moments may differ depending on which 
hypothesis is true (such as in a temporal version of God’s Coin Toss) are handled in 
similar manner as before -  just replace “observer” with “observer-moments” .
When using SSSA, it may be appropriate to segment observers into segments o f 
equal subjective time. If one observer thinks twice as many thoughts and has twice the 
number o f experiences in a given time interval as another observer, it seems quite 
plausible to associate twice as many observer-moments to the former observer as to the 
latter observer during the interval. Thus, for instance, if two similar observers are 
implemented on two distinct pieces o f silicon hardware, and we run one o f the computers 
at a faster clock rate, then on this line of reasoning that should result in more observer- 
moments being produced per second in the faster computer.
2 Of course, if there are mirrors in the rooms so that the observers can see what color beard they have, they 
get extra information which, when factored in, changes their credence to 1: they can then deduce which 
room their present observer-moment is in.
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The fact that subjective time seems the appropriate measure o f the duration o f  
observer-moments may indicate that the still more fundamental entity in the reference 
class should be (some types of) thoughts, or occurrent ideas. Just as longer-lived 
observers get a higher sampling density by virtue o f containing more observer-moments, 
so should perhaps also observer-periods o f equal objective duration get a higher sampling 
density by virtue o f containing a greater number o f occurrent thoughts 28
We shall leave this discussion without having tied up all the ends 29 The various 
strengthening o f SSA will not be assumed in what follows, except in the traffic planning 
example later in this chapter and in chapter 9 where we will discuss some ideas that 
presuppose SSSA. These are intriguing issues however, which may be further explored to 
develop a more complete theory o f how to reason in epistemic situations involving 
observational selection effects or indexical uncertainty. Developing such a more complete 
theory is important for three reasons. First, it may potentially increase the range o f  
practical applications. Second, it may affect radically the results in some applications, e.g. 
where we use SSA on a reference class o f observers that are not quite equal in all relevant 
ways. And third, it would boost our confidence in the methodological soundness o f  
anthropic reasoning if  we had a neat and plausible solution to the problem o f  the reference 
class. (Conversely, it would somewhat undermine our confidence if  it turned out that 
there were no such solution but instead a vast wasteland o f indeterminacy and 
arbitrariness.)
S S A  in co sm o lo g y
We now turn to consider the application-based arguments for SSA. I shall argue that SSA  
codifies and legitimates certain plausible epistemological practices and that there are
28 That is what I mean by “subjective time” -  not how long the observer thinks the interval is, but how 
much cognition takes place in it.
29 Even using occurrent thoughts (of suitable type) as the basic entity of the reference class does not seem to 
go all the way to determining the sampling density. For example, occurrent thoughts come in different 
degrees of clarity, intensity and focus. Should these be assigned different weights? Correspondingly, 
assuming SSA, should we say that if there are equally many deep and clear as there are muddled and 
superficial thinkers about anthropic reasoning (which is certainly not the case!) then one should, other 
tilings equal, expect to find oneself as one of the clear thinkers? Should highly intense observer-moments be 
given more weight than torpid half-conscious ones? (... And if one thinks one spends a lot more time 
thinking about these issue than the average observer, could one perhaps use that as an ad hominem 
argument for thinking that it is observer-moments spent thinking this kind of thoughts that count? This 
definition of the reference class would entail a much higher probability of observing what I am observing 
than if 1 take the reference class to consist of all observer-moments.)
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elements in scientific methodology which seem rely on an implicit appeal to SSA.
Let’s begin with cosmology. We need a rule for how to derive observational 
consequences from the multiverse theories. Such theories are popular in contemporary 
cosmology. But without some idea o f what such a theory predicts that we should observe, 
we would have no way o f testing it empirically. It would be scientifically unfruitful to 
construe multiverse theories in a manner such that they yielded no observational 
implications. It would go against scientific practice; for cosmologists discussing 
multiverse theories are constantly evaluating those theories in light o f new data, 
occasionally modifying them accordingly. So there is some connection to observation. 
The question is, what is this connection and how can it be analyzed? I shall assume that 
the connection is probabilistic in nature, for astronomic evidence typically counts more or 
less strongly in favor or against some multiverse theory but does not usually falsify or 
refute it conclusively. What is needed is thus some methodological principle or account o f  
how probabilistic observational consequences are to be derived from a multiverse theory.
One such principle that has been proposed is SAP (which w e take here in Leslie’s 
sense). A multiverse theory combined with SAP yields observational consequences in 
some cases. SAP has gained quite widespread implicit or explicit acceptance among those 
trying to frame anthropic explanations for the apparent fine-tuning o f our universe. 
However, I argued in chapter 3 that SAP is inadequate and gives an incorrect account o f  
anthropic reasoning. In particular, SAP fails to take into account that different universes 
may contain vastly different numbers o f observers and that a multiverse theory should not 
be thought to imply that we should probably observe that we are, say, black hole 
phenomena, at least not if the theory implies that the vast majority o f all observers do not 
observe that they are black hole phenomena (even if  the majority o f  universes only have 
observers that do observe that). SAP therefore does not supply the methodological rule 
we are looking for.
Instead we formulated another principle, SSA, and suggested that it provides a 
more plausible account o f anthropic reasoning. SSA gives what seems like the right result 
in the freak-observers-from-black-holes example, namely that if  such a multiverse theory 
is true then we should not expect to be black hole phenomena although there is some 
astronomically tiny probability that we would observe that. More generally: If, according 
to some multiverse theory T, almost all observers are in one particular type K  o f  universe,
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then according to SSA, T predicts that we probably observe a type-K  universe. Observing 
that w e are not in a type-AT universe would be evidence against T, whilst observing that 
we are in a type-AT universe would tend to confirm T  at least slightly -  how much depends 
on what probability plausible rival theories to T assign to us being in a type-A  ^universe.
SSA also works to our advantage in single-universe cosmologies. If w e live in a 
sufficiently large universe then there are lots o f freak observers from black holes in our 
universe. But this obviously does not entail that it is anything other than extremely 
unlikely that we are such observers, because only a tiny minority30 o f all observers are 
freak observers. WAP (in Carter and Leslie’s sense) says only that a theory should be 
taken to assign zero probability to us making observations which would only be made by 
observers existing in regions where according to the theory there are no observers. But 
that is not enough to explain why we shouldn’t expect to be freak observers. We need the 
stronger principle SSA to be able to derive that result.
S S A  in therm odynam ics, and tim e’s  arrow
In this section we examine Boltzmann’s famous proposal for how to explain why entropy 
is increasing in the forward time-direction. I will show that a popular objection against 
Boltzmann relies on an implicit appeal to SSA. Since this objection is intuitively 
plausible, when it is discovered that SSA is required to underwrite it one can take this to 
give some reason for accepting SSA.
The outlines o f Boltzmann’s31 attempted explanation can be sketched roughly as 
follows. The direction o f time’s arrow appears to be connected to the fact that entropy 
increases in the forward time-direction. Now, if  one assumes, as is commonly done, that 
low entropy corresponds in some sense to low probability, then one can see that if  a 
system starts out in a low-entropy state then it will probably evolve over time into a
30 There is a complication if we consider universes that contain infinitely many observers, for then the usual 
sense of more or less (as different cardinalities of different classes of observers) cannot be used to 
distinguish between the freak observers and the normal observers. We shall set this difficulty aside. 
Infinities are known to cause complications in many areas of probability theory and decision theory 
(Pascal’s wager, St. Petersburg paradox, shooting-room problem etc.). It is important eventually to extend 
any theory of observational selection effects to cover infinite cases, but strategically it seems wise to 
separate out this problem and focus first on getting a theory that works for the finite case, because, first, it 
seems unlikely that we could solve the more general problem involving infinities before understanding how 
observational selection effects operate in the finite case, and second, we there are many interesting 
applications for which a theory dealing with the finite case will prove adequate.
31 Boltzmann attributes the idea to his assistant, Dr. Schuetz. Thank heaven for postdocs.
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higher entropy state, which after all is a more probable state o f the system. The problem 
o f explaining why entropy is increasing is thus reduced to the problem o f explaining why 
entropy is currently so low. This would appear to be a priori improbable. However, 
Boltzmann points out that in a sufficiently large system -  and the universe may be such a 
system if  it extends very far beyond the range o f  current telescopes, as it may well do -  
there are (with high probability) local regions o f the system, let’s call them “subsystems”, 
which are in low-entropy states even if  the system as a whole is in high-entropy state. 
(Think o f it like this: in a sufficiently large container o f gas, there will be some places 
where all the gas molecules in that local region are lumped together in a small cube or 
some other neat pattern. That is probabilistically guaranteed by the random motion o f the 
gas molecules in the container and the fact that there are so many o f  them.) Thus, 
Boltzmann argued, in a large enough universe, there will be some regions and some times 
when just by chance the entropy in those regions happens to be exceptionally low. Since 
life can only exist in a region if  it has very low entropy, we would naturally find that in 
our part o f  the universe entropy is very low. Since low-entropy subsystems are very likely 
to move towards higher-entropy states, we thus have an explanation o f why entropy is 
currently low and increasing. An observational selection effect guarantees that we 
observe a region where that is the case, even if  such regions are enormously sparse in the 
bigger picture.
Lawrence Sklar remarks o f Boltzmann’s explanation that it has been “credited by 
many as one o f the most ingenious proposals in the history o f  science, and disparaged by 
others as the last, patently desperate, ad hoc attempt to save an obviously failed theory” 
(Sklar 1993, p. 44). My feeling is that the ingenuity o f  the Boltzmann’s contribution 
should be granted, especially considering that writing this in 1895 he was nearly seventy 
years ahead o f his time in directly considering observational selection effects when 
reasoning about the large-scale structure o f the world. Nonetheless, the idea is flawed.
The standard objection is that Boltzmann’s datum -  that the observable universe is 
a low-entropy subsystem -turns out on a closer look to be in conflict with his explanation. 
It is noted that very large low-entropy regions, such as the one we observe, are very 
sparsely distributed if  the universe as a whole is in a high-entropy state. A  much smaller 
low-entropy region would have sufficed to permit intelligent life to exist. Boltzmann's 
theory fails to account for why the observed low-entropy region is so large and so grossly 
out o f  equilibrium.
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This reasonable objection can be fleshed out in terms o f  SSA. Let us follow  
Boltzmann and suppose that we are living in a very vast (perhaps infinite) universe which 
is in thermal equilibrium and that observers can exist only in low-entropy regions. Let T 
be the theory that asserts this. According to SSA, what T predicts we should observe 
depends on where T says that the bulk o f observers tend to be. Since T is a theory o f  
thermodynamic fluctuations, it implies that smaller fluctuations (i.e. low-entropy regions) 
are vastly more frequent than larger fluctuations, and hence that most observers w ill find 
themselves in rather small fluctuations. This is so because the infrequency o f  larger 
fluctuations increases rapidly enough to make sure that even though a given large 
fluctuation will typically contain more observers than a given small fluctuation, the 
previous sentence nonetheless holds true. By SSA, T assigns a probability to us observing 
what we actually observe that is proportional to the fraction o f  all observers it says would 
make that kind o f observations. Since an extremely small fraction o f  all observers will 
observe a low entropy region as large as ours if  T is true, it follows that T gives an 
extremely small probability to the hypothesis that we should observe such a large low- 
entropy region. Hence T is heavily disfavored by our empirical evidence and should be 
rejected unless its a priori probability was so extremely high as to compensate for its 
empirical implausibility. For instance, if  we compare T with a rival theory T*, which 
asserts that the average entropy in the universe as a whole is about the same as the 
entropy o f the region we observe, then in light o f the preceding argument w e have to 
acknowledge that T* is much more likely to be true, unless our prior probability function 
was severely biased towards T. (The bias would have to be truly extreme. It would not 
suffice, for example, if  one’s prior probabilities where Pr(7) = 99.999999%  and P r^ *) =
0.000001%.) This vindicates the objection against Boltzmann. His anthropic explanation 
is refuted -  probabilistically but with extremely high probability -  by a more careful 
application o f the anthropic principle. His account should therefore be modified or given 
up in favor o f some other explanation.
Sklar thinks that the Boltzmannian has a “reasonable reply” (p.299) to this 
objection, namely that in Boltzmann's picture there will be some large regions where 
entropy is low, so our observations are not really incompatible with his proposal. 
However, while there is no logical incompatibility, the probabilistic incompatibility is o f  
a very high degree. This can for all practical purposes be just as decisive as a logical 
deduction o f a falsified empirical consequence, making it totally unreasonable to accept
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this reply.
Sklar goes on to state what he seems to see as the real problem for Boltzmannians:
The major contemporary objection to Boltzmann’s account is its apparent failure 
to do justice to the observational facts. ... as far as we can tell, the parallel 
direction o f entropic increase o f systems toward what we intuitively take to be the 
future time direction that we encounter in our local world seems to hold 
throughout the universe.” (p. 300)
It is easy to see that this is just a veiled reformulation o f the objection discussed above. If 
there were a “reasonable reply” to the former objection, the same reply would work 
equally well against this reformulated version. The Boltzmannian could simply retort by 
saying “Hey, even on my theory there will be some regions and some observers in those 
regions for whom, as far as they can tell, entropy seems to be on the increase throughout 
the universe -  they see only their local region o f the universe after all. Hence our 
observations are compatible with my theory!”. If we are not impressed by this reply, it is 
because we are willing to take probabilistic entailments seriously. And failing to do so 
would spell methodological disaster for any theory that postulates a sufficiently big 
cosmos, since according to such theories there will always be some observer somewhere 
who observes what we are observing, so the theories would be logically compatible with 
any observation we could make.32 But that is clearly not how such theories work.
S S A  in evolutionary biology
Anthropic reasoning has been applied to estimate probabilistic parameters in evolutionary 
biology. For example, we may put the question how difficult it was for intelligent life to 
evolve on our planet.33 Naively, one may think that since intelligent life evolved on the 
only planet we have closely examined, evolution o f intelligent life seems quite easy. 
Science popularizer Carl Sagan seems to have held this view: “the origin o f life must be a
32 The only observational consequence such theories would have on that view is that we don’t make 
observations that are logically incompatible with the laws of nature which that theory postulates. But that is 
much too weak to be of any use. Any finite string of sensory stimulation we could have seems to be 
logically compatible with the laws of nature, both in the classical mechanics framework used in 
Boltzmann’s time and in a contemporary quantum mechanical setting.
33 One natural way of explicating this is to think of it as asking for what fraction of all Earth-like planets develop 
intelligent life, provided they are left untouched by alien civilization.
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highly probable circumstance; as soon as conditions permit, up it pops!” (Sagan 1995). A  
moment’s reflection reveals that this inference is incorrect, since no matter how unlikely 
it was for intelligent life to develop on any given planet, we should still expect to have 
originated from a planet where such an improbable sequence o f events took place. As we 
saw in chapter 2, only hypotheses according to which the difficulty o f  evolving intelligent 
life is so great that they give a small likelihood to there being even a single planet with 
intelligent life in the whole world are disfavored by the fact that intelligent life exists 
here.
Brandon Carter (Carter 1983, Carter 1989) combines this realization with some 
additional assumptions and argues that the chance that intelligent life will evolve on given 
Earth-like planet is in fact very small. His argument is outlined in this footnote.34 Patrick
34 Define the three time intervals: t  , “the expected average time ... which would be intrinsically most 
likely for the evolution of a system of ‘intelligent observers’, in the form of a scientific civilization such as 
our own” (Carter 1983, p. 353); te, which is the time taken by biological evolution on this planet «  0.4 x
1010 years; and T0, the lifetime of the main sequence of the sun « 1010 years.
The argument in outline runs as follows: Since at the present stage of understanding in biochemistry 
and evolutionary biology we have no way of making even an approximate calculation of how likely the 
evolution of intelligent life is on a planet like ours, we should use a very broad prior probability distribution
for this. We can partition the range of possible values of t  roughly into three regions: t  «  T 0 , t  «  T 0, or
t »  T 0 . Of these three possibilities we can rule out the second one a priori with high probability, 
according to Carter, since it represents a very narrow segment of the total hypothesis space, and since a 
priori there is no reason to suppose that the expected time to evolve intelligent life should be correlated with 
the duration of the main sequence of stars like the sun. But we can also rule out (with great probability) the 
first alternative, since if the expected time to evolve intelligent life were much smaller than T 0 , then we
would expect life to have evolved much earlier than it in fact did. This leaves us with t  »  T 0 , meaning 
that life was very unlikely to evolve as fast as it did, within the lifetime of the main sequence of the sun. 
What drives this conclusion is the near coincidence between te and T 0 where we would a priori have
no reason to suppose that these two quantities would be within an order of magnitude (or even within a 
factor of about two) from each other. This fact is combined with an observational selection effect to yield 
the prediction that the evolution of intelligent life is very unlikely to happen on a given planet within the 
main sequence of its star. The contribution that the observational selection effect makes is that it prevents 
observations of intelligent life taking longer  than T 0 to evolve. Whenever intelligent life evolves on a 
planet we must fmd that it evolved before its srni went extinct. Were it not for the fact that the only 
evolutionary processes that are observed first-hand are those which gave rise to intelligent observers in a 
shorter time than r 0 , then the observation that t e ~  r 0 would have deconfirmed the hypothesis that
t »  T 0 just as much as it deconfirmed l »  r 0. But thanks to this selection effect, t e «  r 0 is precisely 
what one would expect to observe even if the evolutionary process leading to intelligent life were 
intrinsically very unlikely to take place in as short a time as r 0 .
A corollary of Carter’s conclusion is that there very probably aren’t any extraterrestrial civilizations 
anywhere near us, maybe not even in our galaxy.
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Wilson (Wilson 1994) advances some objections against Carter’s reasoning, but as these 
objections do not concern the basic anthropic methodology that Carter uses they don’t 
need to be discussed here.
Carter has also suggested a clever way o f  estimating the number o f  improbable 
“critical” steps in the evolution o f humans. The easiest way to grasp the idea may be 
through a little story. A princess is locked in a tower. Suitors have to pick five 
combination locks to get to her, and they can do this only through random trial and error,
i.e. without memory o f  which combinations they have tried. A  suitor gets one hour to pick 
all five locks. If he doesn’t succeed within the allotted time, he is shot. However, the 
princess’ charms are such that there is an endless string o f suitors lined up and waiting for 
their turn.
After the deaths o f some unknown number o f suitors, one o f them finally passes 
the test and marries the princess. Suppose that the numbers o f  possible combinations in 
the locks are such that the expected time to pick each lock is .01, .1, 1, 10, and 100 hours 
respectively. Suppose that pick-times for the suitor who got through are (in hours) 
{.00583, .0934, .248, .276, .319}. By inspecting this set you could reasonably guess that 
.00583 hour was the pick-time for the easiest lock and .0934 hour the pick-time for the 
second easiest lock. However, you couldn’t really tell which locks the remaining three 
pick-times corresponds to. This is a typical result. When conditioning on success before 
the cut-off (in this case 1 hour), the average completion time o f a step is nearly 
independent o f its expected completion time provided the expected completion time is 
much longer than the cut-off. Thus, for example, even if  the expected pick-time o f  one o f  
the locks had been a million years, you would still find that its average pick-time in 
successful runs is closer to .5 than to 1 hour.
If we don’t know the expected pick-times or the number o f locks that the suitor 
had to break, we can obtain estimates o f these parameters if  we know the time it took him 
to reach the princess. The less time left before the cut-off, the greater the number o f  
difficult locks he had to pick. For example, if  the successful suitor took 59 minutes to get 
to the princess, then that would favor the hypothesis that he had to pick a fairly large 
number o f  locks. If he reached the princess in 35 minutes, that would strongly suggest 
that the number o f difficult locks was quite small. The relation also works the other way 
around so that if  we are not sure what is the maximum allowed time then w e can use
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information about the time left over and the number o f  difficult locks to estimate it. 
Monte Carlo simulations confirming these intuitions can be found in (Hanson 1998), 
which also derives some analytical expressions.
Carter applies these mathematical ideas to evolutionary theory by noting that an 
upper bound on the cut-off time after which intelligent life could not have evolved on 
Earth is given by the duration o f the main sequence o f the sun -  about 10*109 years. It 
took about 4*109 years for intelligent life to develop. From this (together with some other 
assumptions which are problematic but not in ways relevant for our purposes) Carter 
concludes that the number o f critical steps in human evolution is likely very small -  not 
much greater than two.
One potential problem with Carter’s argument is that the duration o f the main 
sequence o f the sun only gives an upper bound on the cut-off; maybe climate change or 
some other type o f event would have made Earth unconducive to evolution o f  higher 
organisms long before the sun becomes a red giant. Recognizing this possibility, Barrow 
and Tipler (Barrow and Tipler 1986) apply Carter’s reasoning in the opposite direction
35and seek to infer the true cut-off time by directly estimating the number o f  critical steps. 
In a recent contribution, Robin Hanson (Hanson 1998) scrutinizes Barrow and Tipler’s 
suggestions for what are the critical steps and argues that their model does not fit the 
evidence very well when considering the relative time the various proposed critical steps 
actually took to complete.
Our concern here is not which estimate is correct or even whether at the current 
state o f biological science enough empirical data or theoretical understanding is available 
to supply the substantive premises needed to derive any specific conclusion from the sort 
o f considerations described in this section.36 My contention, rather, is twofold. Firstly,
35 For example, the step from prokaryotic to eukaryotic life is a candidate for being a critical step, since it 
seems to have happened only once and seems to be necessary for intelligent life to evolve. By contrast, 
there is evidence that the evolution of eyes from an “eye precursor” has occurred independently at least 
forty times, so this step does not seem to be difficult. A good introduction to some of the relevant biology is 
(Schopf(ed.) 1992).
36 There are complex empirical issues that would need to be confronted were one to the seriously pursue an 
investigation into these questions. For instance, if a step takes a very long time to complete, that may 
suggest that the step was very difficult (perhaps requiring simultaneous muli-loci mutations or other rare 
occurrences). But there can be other reasons for a step taking long to complete. For example, oxygen 
breathing took a long time to evolve, but this is not a ground for thinking that it was a difficult step. For 
oxygen breathing became adaptive only after there were significant levels of free oxygen in the atmosphere, 
and it took anaerobic organisms hundreds of millions of years to produce enough oxygen to satiate various
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that if  one wants to argue about or make a claim regarding such things as the 
improbability o f intelligent life evolving, or the probability o f finding extraterrestrial life, 
or the number o f critical steps in human evolution, or the planetary window o f  
opportunity during which evolution o f  intelligent life is possible, then one has to make 
sure that one’s position is coherent. Carter and others’ work in this area reveals subtle 
ways in which some views on these things are probabilistically incoherent. Secondly, that 
underlying the basic constraints appealed to in Carter’s reasoning (and this is quite 
independent o f the specific empirical assumptions he needs to get any concrete results) is 
an application o f SSA. WAP and SAP are inadequate in these applications. SSA makes its 
entree when we realize that in a big cosmos there will be actual evolutionary histories o f  
most any sort. On some planets, life will evolve very quickly; on others it will use up all 
the time available before the cut-off.37 On some planets, difficult steps will be completed 
more quickly than easy steps. Without some probabilistic connection between the 
distribution o f evolutionary histories and our own observed evolutionary past, none o f the 
above considerations would even make sense.
SSA is not the only methodological principle that would establish such a 
connection. For example, we could formulate a principle stating that every civilization 
should reason as if  it were a random sample from the set o f  all civilizations. For the 
purposes o f the above anthropic arguments in evolution theory this principle would 
amount to the same thing as the SSA, provided that all civilizations contained the same 
number o f observers. However, when considering hypotheses on which certain types o f  
evolutionary histories are correlated with the evolved civilizations containing a greater or 
smaller number o f observers, this principle is not valid. We would then have to take 
recourse to the more general principle given by SSA.
oxygen sinks and raise the levels of atmospheric oxygen to the required levels. This process was very slow 
but virtually guaranteed to run to completion eventually, so it would be a mistake to infer that the evolution 
of oxygen breathing and the concomitant Cambrian explosion represent a hugely difficult step in human 
evolution.
37 In the infinite case, intelligent life would also evolve after the “cut-off’. Normally we may feel quite 
confident in slating that intelligent life cannot evolve on Earth after the swelling sun has engulfed the 
planet. But the ffeak-observer argument made in the previous section can of course be extended to show 
that in an infinite universe there would with probability one be some red giants that enclose a region where 
-  because of some ridiculously improbable statistical fluke -  an Earth-like planet continues to exist and 
develop intelligent life. Strictly speaking, it is not impossible but only highly improbable that life will 
evolve on any given planet after its orbit has been swallowed by an expanding red giant.
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S S A  and traffic planning
When driving on the motorway, have you ever wondered about -  or cursed -  the 
phenomenon that cars in the other lane appear to be getting ahead faster than you? 
Although one may be inclined to account for this by invoking Murphy’s Law , a recent 
paper in Nature (Redelmeier and Tibshirani 1999) seeks a deeper explanation.
The authors argue that drivers are prone to change lanes on the motorway more 
often than they ought to because o f various illusions which cause them to believe that the 
other lane is moving faster. For example, “a driver is more likely to glance at the next 
lane for comparison when he is relatively idle while moving slowly”; “Differential 
surveillance can occur because drivers look forwards rather than backwards, so vehicles 
that are overtaken become invisible very quickly, whereas vehicles that overtake the 
index driver remain conspicuous for much longer”; and “human psychology may make 
being overtaken (losing) seem more salient than the corresponding gains”. The authors 
suggest that educating drivers about these effects might encourage them to resist small 
temptations to switch lanes, reducing the risk o f accidents.
While not denying that these illusions might occur (see e.g. (Snowden, Stimpson 
et al. 1998, Walton and Bathurst 1998, Tversky and Kahneman 1981, Tversky and 
Kahneman 1991, Larson 1987, Angrilli, Cherubini et al. 1997, Gilovich, Vallone et al. 
1985, Feller 1966)), I suggest that there is a more straightforward explanation, based on 
SSSA, why the other lane often appears faster. It goes as follows. One cause o f  why a 
lane (or a segment o f a lane) is moving slowly is that there are too many cars in it. Even if  
the ultimate cause is something else (e.g. road works) there will nonetheless typically be a 
negative correlation between the speed o f a lane and how densely packed are vehicles 
driving in it. That implies that a disproportionate fraction o f  drivers’ observer-moments 
are in slow-moving lanes. By SSSA, each observer-moment o f a driver should therefore 
assign a correspondingly large probability to finding themselves in a slow-moving lane. 
In other words, appearances are faithful: more often than not, the “other” lane is faster.
The authors o f the Nature article make a related point:
drivers are responding to an illusion: namely, that the next lane on a congested
38 “If something can go wrong, it will.”
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road appears to be moving faster than the driver’s present lane, even when both 
lanes have the same average speed. This occurs because vehicles spread out when 
moving quickly and pack together when moving slowly. A driver can therefore 
overtake many vehicles in a brief time interval, but it takes much longer for the 
driver to be overtaken by the same vehicles.
What is relevant to a driver who wants to get to her destination as quickly as possible, 
however, is not the average speed o f the lane as a whole, but rather the speed o f  the lane 
in some segment extending maybe a couple o f miles forwards from the driver’s present 
position. SSSA gives reason to think that more often than not, the other lane has a higher 
average speed at this scale than does the driver’s present lane. On average, there would 
therefore be some advantage to changing lanes (which o f course has to be balanced 
against the cost o f  doing so in terms o f increased levels o f  effort and risk).39
Sum m ary
Through a series o f gedanken we argued for reasoning in accordance with SSA in a wide 
range o f  cases. We showed that while the problem o f the reference class is sometimes 
irrelevant when all hypotheses under consideration imply the same number o f  observers, 
the definition o f the reference class becomes crucial when different hypotheses entail 
different numbers o f observers. In those cases, what probabilistic conclusions w e can 
draw depends on what sort o f things are included in the reference class, even if  the 
observer doing the reasoning knows that she is not one o f the contested objects. We 
argued that many types o f entities should be excluded from the reference class (stones, 
bacteria, buildings, plants etc.). We also showed that variations in regard to many quite 
“deep-going” properties (such as gender, genes, social status etc.) are not sufficient 
grounds for discrimination when determining membership in the reference class. 
Observers differing in any o f these respects can at least in some situations belong to the 
same reference class.
A complementary set o f arguments focused on how SSA gives methodological 
guidance in a range o f practical applications. These include:
39 Adopting a systems view-point, it is easy to see that (at least in principle) increasing the “diffusion rate” 
(i.e. the probability of lane-switching) will speed the approach to “equilibrium” (i.e. equal velocities in both
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• Deriving observational predictions from contemporary cosmological models.
• Evaluating a common objection against Boltzmann’s proposed thermodynamic 
explanation o f time’s arrow.
• Identifying probabilistic coherence constraints in evolutionary biology 
relevant when asking questions about the likelihood o f  intelligent life evolving 
on an Earth-like planet, the number o f critical steps in human evolution, the 
existence o f extraterrestrial intelligent life, and the cut-off time after which the 
evolution o f intelligent life would no longer have been possible on Earth.
• Analyzing claims about perceptual illusions among drivers.
• And more.40
Any proposed rival to SSA would have to be checked in all the above thought 
experiments and practical applications. I challenge those who would reject SSA to 
propose a simpler or more plausible method o f connecting such models to observational 
data. Something is clearly needed, since (for instance) big-universe models are so central 
in contemporary science.
We proposed SSSA as a way o f strengthening o f  SSA. Some open ends remain 
and no claim is made that SSSA represents the strongest possible correct rule for 
reasoning under observational selection effects. Yet, already SSA by itself is quite a lot. 
We shall now see that SSA is a very powerful principle that can carry unexpected 
consequences up its sleeve. For example, by making just a few seemingly quite weak 
additional assumptions, SSA leads directly to the Doomsday argument...
lanes), thereby increasing the road’s throughput and the number of vehicles that reach their destinations per 
unit time.
40 For example, one could make a point similar to the one about the drivers regarding finding oneself in a 
slow-moving line in the supermarket. SSA also has direct relevance for game theoretic modeling of 
problems involving imperfect recall, such as the Absent-minded driver’s paradox (Battigalli 1997, Gilboa 
1997, Grove 1997, Halpem 1997, Lipman 1997, Piccione and Rubinstein 1997), the forgetful passenger’s 
paradox (Aumaim, Hart et al. 1997), and tire Sleeping Beauty problem (Piccione and Rubinstein 1997, Elga 
2000), although this lies outside the scope of this dissertation. Yet another area of application, which we 
shall not go into here, is in analyzing the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics, and its variants. The 
inany-worlds and the many-minds interpretations face the problem of how to make sense of the measure 
assigned to various branches of the universal wave function. This problem becomes acute when considered 
in the light of SSA, and any discussion of these issues ought to take SSA into account (see especially 
(Leslie 1996) but also (Papineau 1995, Papineau 1997, Albert 1989, Tegmark 1996, Tegmark 1997)). There 
are also direct connections to the problematic surrounding the so-called Fermi paradox (“Why haven’t we 
seen any signs of extraterrestrial intelligence”) and associated ideas of a possible “Great Filter” in our future 
(“Could it be that nearly all advanced civilizations discover some technology that invariably leads to their 
destruction?”). This is related to the applications to evolutionary biology discussed in the text, but may also
94
have a bearing on evaluating hypotheses about humankind’s future prospects in a way that is completely 
distinct from the Doomsday argument.
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CHAPTER 5: THE DOO M SD AY A R G U M E N T
Introduction
We have seen several examples where SSA gives intuitively plausible results. However, 
when SSA is applied to our actual situation and the future survival prospects o f the human 
species, we get interesting consequences that we might not have anticipated. Coupled 
with a few seemingly quite weak empirical assumptions, SSA generates the Doomsday 
argument (DA), which purports to show that the life expectancy o f the human species is 
less than one previously thought. This finding by itself might not be very startling. What 
makes DA shocking is, first, that this prediction is derived from premises which one 
might have thought too weak to entail such a thing. And second, that under certain not so 
implausible empirical assumptions the reduction in our species’ life expectancy is quite 
dramatic. The majority o f  people who hear about DA at first think there must be 
something wrong with it. A small but significant minority think it is obviously right.41 
What everybody must agree is that if  the argument works then it would be an extremely 
important result. It would have major empirical consequences for an issue that w e care a 
lot about: our survival.
Many attempts have been made to refute DA. So far, such efforts have been 
unsuccessful. The next chapter will analyze in detail some o f  the more recent objections, 
and we shall see why they all fail. In this chapter we shall spell out the Doomsday 
argument, identify its assumptions, and examine various related issues. Looking at how  
the argument has been presented in the literature, we can identify two distinct forms o f it, 
one due to Richard Gott and one to John Leslie (who is building on ideas by Brandon 
Carter). Gott’s version is incorrect. Leslie’s version, while a great improvement on Gott’s, 
also falls short on several points. Correcting these shortcomings does not, however, 
destroy the basic idea o f the argument.
The ranks of distinguished supporters of DA include among others: J.J.C. Smart, Anthony Flew, Michael 
Lockwood, John Leslie, Alan Hajek (philosophers); Werner Israel, Brandon Carter, Stephen Barr, Richard 
Gott, Paul Davis. Frank Tipler, H.B. Nielsen (physicists); and Jean-Paul Delahaye (computer scientist). 
(According to John Leslie, personal communication.)
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DA has been independently discovered many times over. Brandon Carter was 
first, but he has not published on the issue. The credit for being the first person to clearly 
enunciate it in print belongs to John Leslie (Leslie 1989) who had heard rumors o f  
Carter’s discovery from Frank Tipler. Leslie has been by far the most prolific writer on 
the topic with one monograph and over a dozen academic papers. Richard Gott III 
independently discovered and published a version o f DA in 1993 (Gott 1993) 42 The 
argument also appears to have been conceived by H.B. Nielsen (Nielsen 1981 (although 
Nielsen might have been influenced by Tipler), and again more recently by Stephen Barr. 
Saar W ilf (personal communication) has convinced me that he too independently 
discovered the argument a few years ago. Although Leslie has the philosophically most 
sophisticated exposition o f DA, it is instructive to first take a look at the version 
expounded by Gott.
D o o m sd a y  a la Gott
Gott’s version o f DA is set forth in a paper in Nature dating from 1993 (Gott 1993; see 
also the responses Buch 1994, Goodman 1994, Mackay 1994, and Gott’s replies Gott 
1994). A popularized exposition by Gott appeared in New Scientist in (Gott 1997). In the 
original article Gott not only sets forth a version o f DA but he also pursues its 
implications for the search o f extraterrestrial life project and for the prospects o f  space 
travel. Here we focus on what he has to say about DA.
Gott’s version is based on a more general argument type which he calls the “delta 
/ argument”. Notwithstanding its extreme simplicity, Gott reckons it can be used to make 
predictions about most everything in heaven and on earth. It goes as follows.
Suppose we want to estimate how long some series o f  observations (or 
“measurements”) is going to last. Then,
42 Gott is an astrophysicist. Contributors to the literature on anthropic reasoning or DA are distributed 
roughly evenly among philosophers and physicists. Although there has been a healthy interdisciplinary 
exchange, there are still signs of the professional divide and some authors appear to be unaware of what is 
happening on the opposite side. This divide is probably to blame for Gott having had to reinvent DA. More 
recently, a physicist critic of DA, Carlton Caves (Caves 2000), criticizes Gott’s version but seems unaware 
of the work by John Leslie and other philosophers. On the other hand, some philosophers’ objections 
against DA or other forms of anthropic reasoning reveal an insensitivity to the legitimate methodological 
needs of cosmologists for some way of deriving probabilistic observational consequences from multiverse 
or big-universe theories.
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Assuming that whatever we are measuring can be observed only in the interval 
between times t b e g in  and t e n d ,  i f  there is nothing special about tnow w e expect tnow to 
be randomly located in this interval. (Gott 1993, p. 315)
Using this randomness assumption, we can make the estimate
t  future O' end t n o w )  ^past C^riow 1 b e g in )  .
tfature is the estimated value o f how much longer the series will last. This means that we 
make the estimate that the series will continue for as long as it has already lasted when we 
make the random observation. This estimate will overestimate the true value half o f  the 
time and underestimate it half o f  the time. It also follows that a 50% confidence interval is 
given by
-  t <  t <  3 13 past future past 5
and a 95% confidence interval is given by
— t <  t <  3 9 139 past iuture past ■
Gott gives some illustrations o f  how this reasoning can be applied in the real
world:
[In] 1969 I saw for the first time Stonehenge ( t  t »  3,868 years) and the Berlin
Wall ( t  t ~ 8 years). Assuming that I am a random observer o f the Wall, I expect
to be located randomly in the time between t b e g in  and t e n d  ( t e n d  occurs when the 
Wall is destroyed or there are no visitors left to observe it, whichever comes first). 
(Gott 1993, p. 315)
At least in these two cases, the delta t argument seems to have worked! The popular 
exposition in New Scientist article also features an inset inviting the reader to use the 
arrival date o f that issue o f the magazine to predict how long their current romantic
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relationship will last. You can presumably use my dissertation for the same purpose. How  
long has your present relationship lasted? Use that value for tpast and you get your 
prediction from the expressions above, complete with precisely specified confidence 
intervals.
Wacky? Yes, but all this does indeed follow from the assumption that tn0w is 
randomly (and uniformly) sampled from the interval tbegin to tend- Gott admits that this 
imposes some restrictions on the applicability o f  the delta t argument:
[At] a friend’s wedding, you couldn’t use the formula to forecast the marriage’s
future. You are at the wedding precisely to witness its beginning. Neither can you
use it to predict the future o f  the Universe itself -  for intelligent observers
emerged only long after the Big Bang, and so witness only a subset o f  its timeline.
(Gott 1997, p. 39)
Unfortunately, Gott does not discuss in any more detail the all-important question o f  
when, in practice, the delta t argument is applicable. Yet it is clear from his examples that 
he thinks it should be applied in a very broad range o f real-world situations.
In order to apply the delta t argument to estimate the life-expectancy o f  the human 
species, we must measure time on a “population clock” where one unit o f time 
corresponds to the birth o f one human. This modification is necessary because the human 
population is not constant. Thanks to population growth, most humans that have been 
born so far find themselves later rather than earlier in the history o f our species. 
According to SSA, we should consequently assign a higher prior probability to finding 
ourselves at these later times. By measuring time as the number o f humans that have 
come into existence, we obtain a scale where you can assign a uniform sampling density 
to all points o f time.
There has been something like 60 billion humans so far. Using this value as tpast, 
the delta t argument gives the 95% confidence interval
1.5billion < tfuture < 2.3 trillion.
The units are human births. In order to convert this to years, we would have to
99
estimate what the future population figures will be given that a total o f N  humans will 
have existed. In the absence o f  such an estimate, DA leaves room for alternative 
interpretations. If the world population levels out at 12 billion and human life-expectancy 
stabilizes at approximately 80 years then disaster is likely to put an end to our species 
fairly soon (within 1200 years with 75% probability). If population figures rise higher, the 
prognosis is even worse. But if  population decreases drastically or individual human life­
spans get much longer, then the delta t argument would be compatible with survival for 
millions o f years.
The probability o f  space colonization looks dismal in the light o f  Gott’s version o f  
DA. Reasoning via the delta t argument, Gott concludes that the probability that w e will 
colonize the galaxy is about p <  1CT9, because if  we did manage such a feat w e would 
expect there to be at least a billion times more humans in the future than have been born 
to date.
T h e in co rrectn ess  of Gott’s  argum ent
A crucial flaw in Gott’s argument is that it fails to take into account our empirical prior 
probability o f the hypotheses under consideration. Even granting that SSA is applicable to 
all the situations and in the manner that Gott suggests (and we shall argue in a later 
chapter that that is not generally the case, because the “no-outsider requirement” is not 
satisfied), the conclusion would not necessarily be the one intended by Gott once this 
omission is rectified.
And it is quite clear, once we focus our attention on it, that our prior probabilities 
must be considered. It would be foolish when estimating the future duration o f  
Stonehenge or the Berlin wall not to take into account any other information you might 
have. Say you are part o f  a terrorist organization bent on destroying Stonehenge to get 
publicity. Everything has been carefully plotted: the explosives are in the truck, the 
detonators are in your suitcase; tonight at 11 p.m. your two co-conspirators w ill to pick 
you up from King’s Cross St. Pancras... Knowing this, surely the odds o f  Stonehenge 
lasting another year are different from and lower than what a straightforward application 
o f the delta / argument would suggest. In order to save the delta t argument, Gott would 
have to restrict its applicability to situations where we in fact lack other relevant 
information. But then the argument cannot be used to estimate the future longevity o f  the
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human species, because we certainly have plenty o f  extraneous information that is 
relevant to that. So Gott’s version o f DA fails.
That leaves open the question whether the delta t argument might not perhaps 
provide interesting guidance in some other estimation problems. Suppose we are trying to 
guess the future duration o f some phenomenon and that we have a “prior” probability 
distribution (after taking into account all other empirical information available) that is 
uniform for total duration T in the interval 0 < T < T , and is zero for T > Tmax'.
r t
P(T)  = \
71
for  0 < T < T m
0 otherwise
Suppose you make an observation at a time to and find that the phenomenon at that time 
has lasted for {to - 0) (and is still going on). Let us assume further, that there is nothing 
“special” about the time you choose to make the observation. That is, we assume that the 
case is not like using the delta t argument to forecast the prospects o f a friend’s marriage 
at his wedding. We have made quite a few assumptions here, but if  the argument could be 
shown to work under these conditions it might still find considerable practical use. Some 
real-world cases at least approximate this ideal setting.
Even under these conditions, however, the argument is inconclusive because it 
neglects an important observational selection effect. The probability that your observation 
should occur at a time when the phenomenon is still ongoing is greater the longer the 
phenomenon lasts. Imagine that your observation occurs in two steps. First, you discover 
that the phenomenon is still in progress. Second, you discover that it has lasted for {to - 0). 
After the first step, you may conclude that the phenomenon probably lasts longer than 
your prior probability led you to expect; for it is more likely that you should observe it 
still in progress if  it covers a greater time interval. This is true if we assume that your 
observation was made at a random point in a time interval that is longer than the expected 
duration o f the phenomenon. The longer the time interval from which the observation 
point is sampled compared to the prior expected duration o f the phenomenon, the stronger 
the influence that this observational selection effect will have on the posterior probability.
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In particular, it will tend to compensate for the “Doomsday-effecf ’ -  the tendency which 
finding that the phenomenon has lasted only a short time when you make the observation 
has to make you think that the duration o f the phenomenon is relatively short. We will 
show this in more mathematical detail when we study the no-outsider requirement in the 
next chapter. For now, it suffices to note that if  your observation is sampled from a time 
interval that is longer than the minimum guaranteed duration o f the phenomenon -  so that 
you could have made your observation before the phenomenon started or after it had 
ended -  then finding that the phenomenon is still in progress when you make your 
observation gives you some reason to think that the phenomenon probably lasts for a 
relatively long time. The delta t argument fails to take account o f  this effect. The 
argument is hence flawed, unless we make the additional assumption (not made by Gott) 
that your observation point is sampled from a time interval that does not exceed the 
duration o f the phenomenon. And this entails that in order to apply Gott’s method, you 
must be convinced that your observation point’s sampling interval co-varies with 
durations o f the phenomenon. That is to say, you must be convinced that given  the 
phenomenon lasts from ta to h , then your observation point is sampled from the interval 
[ta, /*]; and that given  that the phenomenon lasts from ta* to h  ■, then your observation point 
is sampled from the interval [ta\ h ■]; and similarly for any other start- and end-points that 
you assign a non-zero prior probability. This imposes a strong additional constraint on 
situations where the delta t argument is applicable.43
The failure o f Gott’s approach to take into account the empirical prior 
probabilities and to respect the no-outsider requirement constitute the more serious 
difficulties with the “Copernican Anthropic Principle” alluded to in chapter 3 and are part 
o f  the reason why w e replaced that principle with SSA.
D o o m sd a y  a la L eslie
Leslie’s presentation o f DA differs in several respects from Gott’s. On a stylistic level, 
Leslie makes less use o f mathematics, his writing is informal and his arguments often take 
the form o f analogies. Leslie is much more explicit than Gott about the philosophical 
underpinnings. He places the argument in a Bayesian framework and devotes
43 I made these two points -  that Gott’s argument fails to take into account the empirical prior and that it 
fails to account for the selection effect just described -  in a paper of 1997 (Bostrom 1997). More recently,
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considerable attention to the empirical considerations that determine what the priors are 
as well as to the ethical issues related to seeking to minimize the risk o f human extinction.
Leslie presents DA through a loosely arranged series o f  gedanken and analogies. 
A large part o f the argumentation consists in refuting various objections that could be 
advanced against the proposed line o f reasoning. This makes it difficult to briefly 
summarize Leslie’s version o f DA in a way that does justice to it, but a characteristic 
passage runs as follows:
One might at first expect the human race to survive, no doubt in evolutionary 
much modified form, for millions or even billions o f years, perhaps just on Earth 
but, more plausibly, in huge colonies scattered through the galaxy and maybe even 
through many galaxies. Contemplating the entire history o f the race -  future as 
well as past history -  I should in that case see m yself as a very unusually early 
human. I might well be among the first 0.00001 per cent to live their lives. But 
what if  the race is instead about to die out? I am then a fairly typical human. 
Recent population growth has been so rapid that, o f  all human lives lived to far, 
anything up to about 30 per cent ... are lives which are being lived at this very 
moment. Now, whenever lacking evidence to the contrary one should prefer to 
think o f  one ’s own position as fa irly  typical rather than highly untypical. To 
promote the reasonable aim o f  making it quite ordinary that I exist where I do in 
human history, let me therefore assume that the human race will rapidly die out. 
(Leslie 1990, pp. 65f; emphasis in original.)
Leslie emphasizes the point that DA does not show that doom w ill strike soon. It 
only argues for a probability shift. If we started out being extremely confident that the 
humans species will survive for a long time, we might still be fairly confident after having 
taken DA into account -  though less confident than before. Also, it is possible for us to 
improve our prospects. Leslie hopes that by convincing us that the risks are greater than 
was previously thought w e will become more willing to take steps to diminish the dangers 
-  perhaps by pushing for nuclear disarmament, setting up an early-warning system for 
meteors on collision course with Earth, being careful with future very-high-energy 
particle physics experiments (which could conceivably knock our cosmic region out o f  a 
metaunstable vacuum state and destroy the world), or preparing workable strategies for 
dealing with the coming impact o f molecular nanotechnology (Drexler 1985, Drexler 
1992, Freitas(Jr.) 1999). So Leslie does not see DA as a ground for despair, but rather as a
Carlton Caves has independently rediscovered these two objections and presented them elegantly in (Caves
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call for greater caution and concern about potential species-annihilating disasters.
A major advantage o f Leslie’s version compared to Gott’s is that Leslie explicitly 
stresses that the empirical priors must be taken into account. Bayes’ theorem tells us how 
to do that. Suppose we are entertaining two hypotheses about how many humans there 
will have been in total:
H} \ There will have been a total o f 200 billion humans.
H2. There will have been a total o f 200 trillion humans.
For simplicity, let’s assume that these are the only possibilities. The next step is to assign 
prior probabilities to these hypotheses based on the empirical information available (but 
ignoring, for the moment, information about your birth rank). For example, you might 
think that:
P (Hi) = 5%
P (H2) = 95%
All that remains now is to factor in the information about your birth rank, which, as it
happens, is somewhere in the neighborhood o f  60 billion (R) if  you are alive in the
beginning o f the 21st century.
In this illustration, the prior probability o f Doom soon (Hi) o f  5% is increased to about
P(R\Hl )P ( H x) + P(R\H2) P ( H 2)
.98
2000).
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98% when you take into account your birth rank according to DA. This is how Leslie 
envisions that calculations based on his version are to be made.
Note however that the calculation is not the argument. Rather, the calculation is a 
derivation o f a specific prediction from assumptions which DA seeks to justify. Let’s look 
in more detail at what these assumptions are and whether they can be supported.
T h e a ssu m p tio n s  u se d  in DA, and th e  Old e v id e n c e  problem
Leslie talks o f the principle that, lacking evidence to the contrary, one should think o f  
one’s position as “fairly typical rather than highly untypical”. In chapter 3, w e proposed 
to tidy up this rather imprecise idea by explicating it as SSA. In chapter 4, w e provided 
grounds for adopting SSA in a range o f cases. The crucial question is, can SSA be applied 
in the context o f DA in the way the above calculation presupposes?
Let’s suppose for a moment that it can. What other assumptions does the argument 
use? Well, an assumption was made about the prior probabilities o f Hi  and H 2 . This 
assumption is no doubt incorrect, since there are other hypotheses that we want to assign 
non-zero probability. However, it is clear that choosing different values o f the prior will 
not change the fact that hypotheses which postulate fewer observers will gain probability 
relative to hypotheses which postulate more observers.44 The absolute posterior 
probabilities depend on the precise empirical prior but the fact that there is this 
probability shift does not. Further, (#) is merely a formulation o f  Bayes’ theorem. So once 
we have the empirical priors and the conditional probabilities, the prediction follows 
mathematically.
The premiss that bears the responsibility for the surprising conclusion is the idea 
that SSA can be applied to justify these conditional probabilities. Can it?
Recall that we argued for Model 2 in the first version (G l) o f God’s Coin Toss in 
chapter 4. If DA could be assimilated to this case, it would be justified to the extent that 
we accept Model 2. The cases are in some ways similar, but there are also a number o f  
differences. The question is whether the differences are relevant. This section studies the 
extent to which the arguments that were made in favor o f Model 2 can be adapted to
44 Provided, of course, that the prior probabilities are non-trivial, i.e. not equal to zero for all but one 
hypothesis. But that is surely a very reasonable assumption. The probabilities in questions are subjective
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support DA. We will find that there are significant disanalogies between the two cases. It 
might be possible to bridge these disanalogies, but until that is done the attempt to support 
the assumptions o f DA by assimilating it to something like Model 2 for God’s Coin Toss 
remain inconclusive. This is not to say that the similarities between the two cases can not 
be persuasive for some people. So this section is neither an attack on nor a defense o f DA. 
(On the other hand, in chapter 8 we will find that the reasoning used in Model 2 leads to 
quite strongly counterintuitive results and in chapter 9 we will develop a new way o f  
thinking about cases like God’s Coin Toss which need not lead to DA-like conclusions. 
Those results will suggest that even if  we are persuaded that DA could be assimilated to 
Model 2, we may still not accept DA because we reject Model 2!)
One argument that was used to justify Model 2 for G1 was that if  you had at first 
been ignorant o f the color o f your beard, and you had assigned probabilities to all the 
hypotheses in this state o f ignorance, and you then received information about your beard 
color and updated your beliefs in accordance with Bayes’ theorem, then you would end 
up with the probability assignments that Model 2 prescribes. This line o f reasoning does 
not presuppose that you actually were, at some point in time, ignorant o f your beard color. 
Rather, considering what you would have thought if  you had been once ignorant o f the 
beard color is merely a way o f  clarifying your current conditional probabilities o f  being in 
a certain room given a certain outcome o f God’s coin toss.
I hasten to add that I am not suggesting a counterfactual analysis as a general 
account o f conditional degrees o f belief. That is, I am not saying that P(e|h) should in 
general be defined as the probability you would have assigned to e if  you didn’t know e 
but knew h. A solution o f the so-called old evidence problem (see e.g. (Earman 1992, 
Schlesinger 1991, Achinstein 1993, Howson 1991, Eells 1990) requires something rather 
more subtle than that. However, thinking in terms o f such counterfactuals can in some 
cases be a useful way o f getting clearer about what your subjective probabilities are. Take 
the following case.
Two indistinguishable urns are placed in front o f Mr. Jonas. He is credibly 
informed that one o f them contains ten balls and the other a million balls, but he is 
ignorant as to which is which. He knows the balls in each urn are numbered
probabilities, credences, and I for one am uncertain about how many humans there will have been in total; 
so my prior is smeared out -  non-zero -  over a wide range of possibilities.
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consecutively 1, 2, 3, 4...  and so on. Jonas flips a coin which he is convinced is 
fair, and based on the outcome he selects one o f the urns -  as it happens, the left 
one. He picks a ball at random from this urn. It is ball number 7. Clearly, this is a 
strong indication that the left urn contains only ten balls. If originally the odds 
were fifty-fifty (which is reasonable given that the um was selected randomly), a 
swift application o f Bayes’ theorem gives the posterior probability that the left urn 
is the one with only ten balls: Pr(Left urn contains 10 balls | Sample ball is #7) = 
99.999%.
Mr. Jonas, however, was never a man o f proclivity for intellectual exercises. 
When he picks the ball with number 7 on it and is asked to give his odds for that 
urn being the one with only ten balls, he says: “Umm, fifty-fifty!”
Before Mr. Jonas stakes his w ife’s car on these inclement odds, what can w e say 
to him to help him come to his senses? When we start explaining about conditional 
probabilities, Jonas decides to stick to his guns rather than admit that his initial response 
is incorrect. He accepts Bayes’ theorem, and he accepts that the probability that the ten- 
ball urn would be selected by the coin toss was 50%. What he refuses to accept is that the 
conditional probability o f  selecting ball number 7 is one in ten (one in a million), given 
that the urn contains ten (one million) balls. Instead he thinks that there was a 50% 
probability o f  selecting ball number 7 on each hypothesis about the total number o f balls 
in the urn. Or maybe he declares that he simply doesn’t have any such conditional 
credence.
One way to proceed from here is to ask Jonas, “What probability would you have 
assigned to the sample you have just drawn being number 7 if  you hadn’t yet looked at it 
but you knew that it had been picked from the urn with 10 balls?” Suppose Jonas say, 
“One in ten.” We may then appropriately ask, “So why then does not your conditional 
probability o f picking number 7 given that the urn contains ten balls equal one in ten?”.
There are at least two kinds o f reasons that one could give to justify a divergence 
o f one’s conditional probabilities from what one thinks one would have believed in a 
corresponding counterfactual situation. First, one may think that one would have been 
irrational in the situation in question. What I think I would believe in a counterfactual 
situation where I w'as drugged into a state o f irrationality can usually be ignored for the 
sake o f determining my current conditional probabilities.45 In the case o f  Jonas this 
response is not available, because Jonas does not believe he would have been irrational in
45 One obvious exception is when evaluating hypotheses about how I would behave if  I were drugged etc.
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the counterfactual situation where he hadn’t yet observed the number on the selected ball; 
in fact, let’s suppose, Jonas thinks he would have believed the only thing that would have 
been rational for him to believe.
A second reason for divergence is if  the counterfactual situation (where one 
doesn’t know e) doesn’t exactly “match” the conditional probability P(e|h) being 
assessed. The corresponding counterfactual situation might contain features -  other than 
one’s not knowing e -  that would rationally influence one’s degree o f  belief in h. For 
instance, suppose we add the following feature to the example: Mr. Jonas has been 
credibly informed at the beginning o f the experiment that if  there is a gap in time 
( “D elay ”) between the selection o f the ball and his observing what number it is (so that 
he has the opportunity to be for a while in a state o f ignorance as to the number o f the 
selected ball) then the experiment has been rigged in such a way that he was bound to 
have selected either ball number 6 or 7. Then in the counterfactual situation where Jonas 
is ignorant o f the number on the selected ball, D elay would be true; and Jonas would have 
known that. In the counterfactual situation he would therefore have had the additional 
information that the experiment was rigged (an event to which, we can assume, he 
assigned a low prior probability). Clearly, what he would have thought in that 
counterfactual situation does not determine the value that he should in the actual case 
assign to the conditional probability P(e|/z), since in the actual case (where D elay  is false) 
he does not have that extra piece o f  information. (What he thinks he would have thought 
in the counterfactual situation would rather be relevant to what value he should presently 
give to the conditional probability ¥(e\h&Delay)\ but that is not what he needs to know in 
the present case.)
This second source o f divergence suggests a more general limitation o f  the 
validity o f  the counterfactual-test o f what your current conditional probabilities should be. 
In many cases, there is no clearly defined unique situation that would have obtained if  
you had not known some data that you in fact know. There are many ways o f  not 
knowing something. Take the counterfactual situation, for example, where I don’t know 
whether clouds ever exist. Is that a situation where I don’t know that there is a sky and a 
sun (so that I don’t know whether clouds ever exist because I have never been outdoors 
and looked to the sky)? Is it a situation where I don’t know how water in the air behaves 
when it is cooled down? Or is it perhaps a situation where I am ignorant as to whether the 
fluffy things I see up there are really clouds rather than, say, gods made out o f cotton? Is
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it one where I have never been up in an airplane and thus never seen clouds up close? Or 
one where I have flown but have forgotten about some parts o f  the experience? It seems 
clear that we have not specified the hypothetical state o f “me not knowing whether clouds 
have ever existed” sufficiently to get an unambiguous answer to what else I would or 
would not believe if  I were in that situation.
In some cases, however, the counterfactual situation is sufficiently specified. Take 
the original case with Mr. Jonas again (where there is no complication such as the 
selection potentially being rigged). Is there a counterfactual situation that w e can point to 
as the counterfactual situation that Jonas would be in if  he didn’t know the number on the 
selected ball? It seems there is. Suppose that in the actual course o f the experiment there 
was a one-minute interval o f ignorance between Jonas’ selecting a ball and his looking to 
see what number it was. Suppose that during this minute Jonas contemplated his 
probability assignments to the various hypotheses and reached a reflective equilibrium. 
Then one can plausibly maintain that, at the later stage when Jonas have looked at the ball 
and knows its number, what he would have rationally believed if  he didn’t know its 
number is what he d id  in fact believe a moment earlier before he learnt what the number 
is. Moreover, even if  in fact there never were an interval o f ignorance where Jonas didn’t 
know <?, it can still make sense to ask what he would have thought if  there had  been. At 
least in this kind o f example there can be a suitably definite counterfactual from which we 
can read o ff what conditional probability P(e|h) Jonas was once implicitly committed to.
If this is right, then there are at least some cases where the conditional credence 
V{h\e) can be meaningfully assigned a non-trivial probability even if  there never in fact 
was any time when e was not known. The old evidence problem retains its bite in the 
general case, but in some special cases it can be tamed. This is indeed what one should 
have expected since otherwise the Bayesian method could never be applied except in 
cases where one had in advance contemplated and assigned probabilities to all relevant 
hypotheses and possible evidence. That would fly in the face o f  the fact that w e are often 
able to plausibly model the evidential bearing o f  old evidence on new hypotheses within a 
Bayesian framework.
Returning now to the God’s Coin Toss (Gl)  gedanken, we recall that it was not 
assumed that there actually was a point in time when the people created in the rooms were 
ignorant about the color o f their beards. They popped into existence, we could suppose,
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right in front o f the mirror, and gradually came to form a system o f beliefs as they 
reflected on their circumstances.46 Nonetheless we could use an argument involving a 
counterfactual situation where they were ignorant about their beard color to motivate a 
particular choice o f  conditional probability. Let’s look in more detail at how that could be 
done.
I suggest that the following is the right way to think about this. Let /  be the set o f  
all information that you have received up to the present time. /  can be decomposed in 
various ways. For example, if  I  is logically equivalent to I 1&I2 then /  can be decomposed 
into 11 and /?. You currently have some credence function which specifies your present 
degree o f belief in various hypotheses (conditional or otherwise), and this credence is 
conditionalized on the background information I. Call this credence function Q . 
However, although this is the credence function you have, it may not be the credence 
function you ought to have. You may have failed to understand all the probabilistic 
connections between the facts that you have learnt. Let C*  be a rival credence function, 
conditionalized on the same information /. The task is now to try to determine whether on 
reflection you ought to switch to C / or whether you should stick with Cy.
The relation to DA should be clear. Ci can be thought o f as your credence function 
before you heard about the DA, and C*  the credence function that the proponent o f DA  
(the “doomsayer”) seeks to persuade you to adopt. Both these functions are based on the 
same background information /, which includes everything you have learnt up until now. 
What the doomsayer argues is not that she can teach you some new piece o f  relevant 
information that you didn’t have before, but rather that she can point out a probabilistic 
implication o f information you already have that you hitherto failed to fully realize or 
take into account -  in other words that you have been in error in assessing the 
probabilistic bearing o f your evidence on hypotheses about how long the human species 
will last. How can she go about that? Since presumably you haven’t made any explicit 
calculations to decide what credence to attach to these hypotheses, she cannot point to any 
error you have made in some mathematical derivation. But I want to suggest one method 
she can use:
She can specify some decomposition o f your evidence into /; and h .  She can then
46 That this is possible is not entirely uncontroversial since one could hold a view on which knowledge 
presupposes the right kind of causal origin of the knower and his epistemic faculties. But I think we can set
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ask you what you think you ought to have rationally believed if  all the information you
had were /; (and you didn’t know I2). (This thought operation involves reference to a
counterfactual situation, and as we saw above, whether such a procedure is legitimate
depends on the particulars; sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn’t. Let’s assume for
the moment that it wrorks in the present case.) What she is asking for, thus, is what
credence function C /; you think you ought to have had if  your total information were /;.
In particular, Cu assigns values to certain conditional probabilities o f  the form Cn(*\I2).
This means we can then use Bayes’ theorem to conditionalize on I2 and update the
credence function. If the result o f this updating is C / ,  then she will have shown that you
are committed to revising your present credence function C / and replace it by C*
(provided you choose to adhere to Cn(*\I2) even after realizing that this obligates you to
$
change Cj). For C / and C / are based on the same information, and you have just
acknowledged that you think that if  you were ignorant o f I2 you should set your credence
$
equal to C/;, which results in C/ when conditionalize on I2. One may summarize this, 
roughly, by saying that the order in which you choose to consider the evidence should not 
make any difference to the probability assignment you end up with.47
This method can be applied to the case o f Mr. Jonas. /;  is all the information he 
would have had up to the time when the ball was selected from the urn. I2 is the 
information that this ball is number 7. If Mr. Jonas firmly maintains that what would have 
been rational for him to believe had he not known the number o f  the selected ball (i.e. if  
his information were Ij) is that the conditional probability o f the selected ball being 
number 7 given that the selected urn contains ten balls (a million balls) is one in ten (one 
in a million), then we can show that his present credence function ought to assign a 
99.999% credence to the hypothesis that the left urn, the urn from which the sample was 
taken, contains only ten balls.
In order for the doomsayer to use the same method to convince somebody who 
resists DA on the grounds that the conditional probabilities used in DA do not agree with 
his actual conditional probabilities, she’d have to define some counterfactual situation S 
such that the following holds:
such scruples aside for the purposes of the present investigation.
47 Subject to the obvious restriction that none of the hypotheses under consideration is about the order in 
which you consider the evidence. For instance, the probability you assign to the hypothesis “I have
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(1) In S he does not know his birth rank.
(2) The probabilities assumed in DA are the probabilities he now thinks that it 
would be rational for him to have in S.
(3) His present information is logically equivalent to the information he would 
have in S  conjoined with information about his birth rank (modulo information 
which he thinks is irrelevant to the case at hand).
The probabilities referred to in (2) are o f two sorts. There are the “empirical” probabilities 
that DA uses -  the ordinary kind o f estimates o f the risks o f  germ warfare, asteroid 
impacts, abuse o f military nanotechnology etc. And then there are the conditional 
probabilities o f having a particular birth rank given a particular hypothesis about the total 
number o f humans that will have lived. The conditional probabilities presupposed by DA  
are the ones given by applying SSA to that situation. S should therefore ideally be a 
situation where he possesses all the evidence he actually has which is relevant to 
establishing the empirical prior probabilities, but where he lacks any indication as to what 
his birth rank is.
Can such a situation S  be conceived? That is what is unclear. Consider the 
following initially beguiling but unworkable argument:
An erroneous argument
What if  we in actual fact don’t know our birth ranks, even approximately? What if  
we actually are in this hypothetical state o f partial ignorance which the argument 
for choosing the appropriate conditional probabilities presupposes? “But,” you 
may object, “didn’t you say that our birth ranks are about 60 billion? And if  I 
know that this is (approximately) the truth, how can I be ignorant about my birth 
rank?”
Well, what I said was that your birth rank in the human species is about 60 
billion. Yet that does not imply that your birth rank simpliciter is anywhere near 
60 billion. There could be other intelligent species in the universe, extraterrestrials 
that count as observers, and I presume you would not assert with any confidence 
that your birth rank within this larger group is about 60 billion. You presumably 
agree that you are highly uncertain about your temporal rank in the set o f  all 
observers in cosmos, if  there are many extraterrestrial civilizations out there.
The appropriate reference class to which SSA is applied must include all
considered evidence before I considered evidence e2" is not be independent onf the order in which you 
consider the evidence!
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observers that will ever have existed, and intelligent extraterrestrials -  at least if  
they were not too dissimilar to us in other respects -  should count as observers. 
The arguments o f chapter 4 for adopting SSA work equally well i f  w e include 
extraterrestrials in the reference class. Indeed, the arguments that were based on 
how SSA seems the most plausible way o f deriving observational predictions from 
multiverse theories and o f  making sense o f the objections against Boltzmann’s 
attempted explanation o f the arrow o f time presuppose this! And the arguments 
that were based on the thought experiments can easily be adapted to include 
extraterrestrials -  draw antennas on some o f the people in the illustrations and 
adjust the terminology accordingly, and these arguments go through as before.
We can consequently propose for the consideration o f  Mr. Jonas (who now 
plays the role o f a skeptic about DA) the following hypothetical situation S  (which 
might be a counterfactual situation or a situation that will actually occur in the 
future):
Scientists report that they have obtained evidence that strongly favors the 
disjunction /*, v  h2, where h} is the hypothesis that our species is the only 
intelligent life-form in the world, and /z? is the hypothesis that our species 
is one out o f a total o f one million intelligent species throughout 
spacetime, each o f which is pretty much like our own in terms o f  
constitution and membership numbers. (To avoid the complication that 
infinite population sizes introduces, we may also assume that it is known 
that the total number o f  observers that will have existed in the world is 
bound by some large but finite number.) Mr. Jones knows what his birth 
rank would be given hi, namely about 60 billion; but he does not know 
even approximately what his birth rank would be given /?2 . By considering 
various strings o f additional incoming evidence favoring either hi or h2 we 
can thus probe how he does or does not take into account the information 
about his birth rank in evaluating hypotheses about how long the human 
species will last. Suppose first that evidence comes in strongly favoring hi. 
We then have a situation S  satisfying the three criteria listed above. Mr. 
Jonas acknowledges that he is ignorant about his birth rank, and so he now 
thinks that in this situation it would be rational for him to apply SSA. This 
gives him the conditional probabilities required by DA. The empirical 
priors are, let us assume, not substantially affected by the information 
favoring h2; so they are the same in S  as they are in his actual situation. 
Suppose, finally, that scientists a while later and contrary to expectation 
obtain new evidence that very strongly favors hi. When Jonas learns about 
this, his information set becomes equivalent to the information set he has 
in the actual situation (where we assume that Jonas does not believe there 
are any extraterrestrials). The input that the DA-calculation above needed 
are thus all supplied in this case, and Bayes’ theorem implies what Jonas’ 
posterior probability (after conditionalizing on his birth rank) should be.
It could seem as if  we have described a hypothetical situation S  that satisfies criteria (1) to
(3) and thus verifies DA. Not so. The weakness o f scenario is that although Jonas doesn’t
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know even approximately what his birth rank is in S, he still knows in S  his relative birth 
rank within the human species: he is about the 60 billionth human. Thus he could 
maintain that when he applies SSA, he should assign probabilities that are invariant 
between various specifications o f our species’ position among all the extraterrestrial 
species -  since he is ignorant about that -  but that the probabilities should not be uniform 
over various positions within the human species -  since he is not ignorant about that. For 
example, if  w e suppose that the various species are temporally non-overlapping so that 
they exist one after another, then he might assign a probability close to one that his 
absolute birth rank is either about 60 billion, or about 120 billion, or about 180 billion, 
or... . Suppose this is what he now thinks it would be rational for him to do in S. Then the 
DA-calculation does not get the conditional probabilities it needs to give the intended 
conclusion, and DA fails. For after conditioning on the strong evidence for hi, the 
conditional probability o f  having a birth rank o f  roughly 60 billion will be the same given 
any o f the hypotheses about the total size o f the human species that he might entertain.
It might be possible to construct some other hypothetical situation S  that would 
really satisfy the three constraints, and that could thus serve to compel a person like Mr. 
Jonas to adopt the conditional probabilities that DA requires.48 But until such a situation 
is described (or some other argument provided for why he should accept those 
probabilities), this is a loose end that those whose intuitions do not drive them to adopt 
the requisite probabilities without argument may gladly cling to.
L eslie  on  the problem  with the referen ce  c la s s
How does Leslie answer the question o f how the reference class should be determined? 
As a first remark, Leslie suggests that “perhaps nothing too much hangs on it.” (Leslie 
1996, p. 257):
[DA] can give us an important warning even if  we confine our attention to the 
human race’s chances o f surviving for the next few centuries. All the signs are that 
these centuries would be heavily populated if  the race met with no disaster, and 
they are centuries during which there would presumably be little chance o f
4* In order for S to do this, it would have to be the case that the subject decides to retain his initial views 
about S even after it is pointed out to him that those views commit him to accepting the DA-conclusion 
given he accepts Model 2 for God’s Coin Toss. Some might of course prefer to revise their views about a 
situation S which prima facie satisfies the three conditions to changing their mind about DA.
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transferring human thought-processes to machines in a way which would
encourage people to call the machines ‘human’. (Leslie 1996, p. 258)
This clearly not an entirely satisfying reply. First, the premise that there is little 
chance o f  creating machines with human-level and human-like thought processes within 
the next few centuries is something that many o f  those who have thought seriously about 
these things disagree with. Many thinkers in this field think that these developments will 
happen well within the first half o f this century (e.g. Moravec 1989, Moravec 1998, 
Moravec 1999, Drexler 1985, Minsky 1994, Bostrom 1998, Bostrom and et al. 1999, 
Kurzweil 1999). Second, the comment does nothing to allay the suspicion that the 
difficulty o f determining an appropriate reference class might be symptomatic o f an 
underlying ill in DA itself.
Leslie proceeds, however, to offer a positive proposal for how to settle the 
question o f  which reference class to choose.
The first part o f this proposal is best understood by expanding the urn analogy in 
which we first made the acquaintance o f our friend Mr. Jonas. Suppose that the balls in 
the urns come in different colors. And suppose your task is to guess how many red balls 
there are in the left urn. Now, “red” is clearly a vague concept -  what shades o f  pink or 
purple count as red? This vagueness could be seen as corresponding to the vagueness 
about what to classify as an observer for the purposes o f  DA. So, if  some vagueness like 
this is present in the urn example, does that mean that the Bayesian induction used in the 
original example can no longer be made to work?
By no means. The right response in this case is that you have a choice as to how  
you define the reference class. The choice depends on what hypothesis you are interested 
in testing. Suppose that what you are interested in finding out is how many balls there are 
in the urn o f the color light-pink-to-dark-purple. Then all you have to do is to classify the 
random sample you select as being either light-pink-to-dark-purple or not light-pink-to- 
dark-purple. Once you have made this classification, the Bayesian calculation proceeds 
exactly as before. If instead you are interested in knowing how many light-pink-to-light- 
red balls there are, then you classify the sample according to whether it has that property, 
and proceed as before. The Bayesian apparatus is perfectly neutral as to how you define 
the hypotheses. There is not a right or wrong way, just different questions you might be 
interested in asking.
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Applying this idea to DA, Leslie writes:
The moral could seem to be that one’s reference class might be made more or less 
what one liked for doomsday argument purposes. What if  one wanted to count our 
much-modified descendants, perhaps with three arms or with godlike intelligence, 
as ‘genuinely human’? There would be nothing wrong with this. Yet if  w e were 
instead interested in the future only o f two-armed humans, or o f humans with 
intelligence much like that o f humans today, then there would be nothing wrong in 
refusing to count any others. (Leslie 1996, p. 260)
This suggests that if  we are interested in the survival-prospects o f just a special kind o f  
observers, we are entitled to apply DA to this subset o f the reference class. Suppose you 
are Asian and you want to know how many Asians there will have been. Answer: Count 
the number o f Asians that have existed before you and use the DA-style calculation to 
update your prior probabilities (given by ordinary empirical considerations) to take 
account o f the fact that this random sample from the set o f all Asian - y o u  -  turned out to 
be living when just so many Asians had already been born.
How far can one push this mode o f reasoning though, before crashing into 
absurdity? If the reference class is defined to consist o f all those people who were born on 
the same day as me or later, then I should expect doom to strike quite soon. Worse still, 
let’s say I want to know how many people there will have been with the property o f  being 
born either on the tenth o f March in 1973 or being born after the year 2002. Since 10/3/73 
is the day I was born, I will quickly become “improbably early” in this “reference class” 
i f  humans continue to be sired after 2002. Should I therefore have to conclude that 
humankind is very likely to go extinct in the first few weeks o f 2003? Crazy!
How can the doomsayer avoid this conclusion? According to Leslie, by adjusting 
the prior probabilities in a suitable way, a route which he says was suggested to him by 
Carter (Leslie 1996, p. 262). Leslie thinks that defining the reference class as humans- 
born-as-late-as-you-or-later is fine and that ordinary inductive knowledge will make the 
priors so low that no absurd consequences will follow:
No inappropriately frightening doomsday argument will result from narrowing 
your reference class ... provided you adjust your prior probabilities accordingly. 
Imagine that you'd been born knowing all about Bayesian calculations and about
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human history. The prior probability o f the human race ending in the very week  
you were born ought presumably to have struck you as extremely tiny. And that’s 
quite enough to allow us to say the following: that although, if  the human race had 
been going to last for another century, people born in the week in question would 
have been exceptionally early in the class o f those-born-either-in-that-week-or-in- 
the-following-century, this would have been a poor reason for you to expect the 
race to end in that week, instead o f lasting for another century. (Leslie 1996, p. 
262)
I disagree with the claim that the prior inductive improbability is enough to allow 
us to say this. That appealing to the inductive improbability will not do the job o f  
compensating for phony choices o f reference class follows logically from the fact that the 
inductive evidence (for the hypothesis that humankind will end in a given time interval, 
say within a week from now) is constant no matter how we define the reference class, 
whereas the reference class could be defined in arbitrarily many ways, thereby varying 
the strength o f the resulting probability shift. The inductive evidence could “compensate” 
for at most one strength o f the shift, while for all other choices o f reference class, a 
different and incompatible prediction would result.
It is true that we can always choose the values that we plug into the variables 
representing the priors in the Bayesian formula in such a way that w e reproduce the 
posterior probability resulting from the correct choice o f  reference class and priors. But 
these values that we plug in will not in general be prior probabilities. They will be mere 
numbers, chosen ad hoc because when inserted into Bayes' formula they happen to give 
the output we had decided in advance we wanted to get. Instead o f  Bayes’ formula w e  
could have used any function onto the unit interval, or simply not bothered at all.
I conclude that the idea that it doesn’t matter how w e define the reference class 
because we can compensate by adjusting the priors is misconceived. We saw in chapter 4 
that the reference class must not be too wide -  it must not include rocks for example. 
Now we have just seen that it must not be made too narrow either -  for instance, by 
excluding all persons born earlier than yourself.
Between these boundaries there is still plenty o f  space for divergent definitions. 
Does this mean that there are many correct choices o f reference class, and that context
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and what we are interested in predicting may determine which choice is appropriate in a 
given situation? Or should we suppose that there is only one legitimate reference class, 
albeit it has not yet been determined what it is and it might even be quite vague a matter 
at the end o f the day?
The example in which an Asian applies DA to predict how many Asians there will 
have been may at first sight appear to work quite well; it seems no less plausible than 
applying DA to predict the total number o f observers. I think it would be a mistake to take 
this as evidence that the reference class varies depending on what we are trying to predict. 
If the Asian-example works, it is only because one thinks there is no systematic 
relationship between Asians and observers in general. But suppose one thought otherwise. 
For example, suppose you were convinced that a racist madman had engineered and was 
planning to release a virus that will sterilize all Asians while leaving other ethnic groups 
intact. Suppose you thought on ordinary empirical grounds that the madman had a fifty 
percent chance o f succeeding. Let’s also suppose that you were convinced that his success 
or failure would not have any significant effect on the total number o f  observers that will 
ever have lived (maybe other races would breed more to compensate for the loss o f  Asian 
fertility). Applying DA to this situation would not increase your probability that the 
madman would succeed, since his deed makes no difference to the total number o f  
observers. If as an Asian you defined a reference class consisting o f all Asians, and 
applied a DA-style inference scheme to that, you would get the result that the madman’s 
success was more likely than fifty percent. This prediction conflicts with the predictions 
from a straightforward application o f DA, so at least one o f them has to be wrong. The 
definition o f  the reference class, even omitting extreme measures such as including rocks 
or defining it with reference to the day you were born, cannot be arbitrary. For i f  DA is 
correct, it does not make inconsistent predictions.
Alternative c o n c lu sio n s  of the D oom sd ay  argum ent
It should be pointed out that even if  DA is basically correct, there is still vast scope for 
alternative interpretations o f the result other than that humankind is likely to go extinct 
soon. For example, one may think that:
• The priors are so low that even after a substantial probability shift in favor o f
earlier doom, we are still likely to survive for quite a while.
• The size o f the human population will decrease in the future; this reconciles DA
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with even extremely long survival o f the human species.
• Humans evolve (or reengineer ourselves using advanced technology) into entities, 
posthumans, that belong in a different reference class than humans. All that DA  
would show in this case is that the posthuman transition is likely to happen before 
there have been vastly more humans than have lived to date.
• There are extraterrestrial civilizations, in which case the no-outsider requirement 
is not satisfied (more on this in the next chapter). Since we wouldn’t know our 
absolute birth ranks on this hypothesis, DA could not be applied.
• Leslie thinks that if  the world is indeterministic, then DA is seriously weakened. (I 
disagree with this but list the suggestion for the sake o f completeness.)
• There are infinitely many observers in total, in which case it is not clear what DA  
says. (In some sense, each observer would be “infinitely early” if  there were a 
countable number o f observers.)
If one thought that DA is correct but also thought that one or more o f  these points
represent realistic possibilities, that would not mean that DA were unimportant. Rather, it
would mean that the correct conclusion would be a disjunction o f possibilities rather than
simply “Doom is likely to strike soon ”. Such a disjunction could be both philosophically
and practically interesting.
So bearing in mind that we are regarding DA here as the general form o f  
reasoning described above, but not necessarily leading to the prediction that doomsday 
will likely strike soon, let us consider some objections that have been raised against it in 
the literature.
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CHAPTER 6: SOM E ATTEM PTED REFU TATIO N S OF  
THE D O O M SD AY ARG U M EN T49
A vast number o f objections have been fielded against DA -  many o f  them mutually 
incompatible.50 Rather than striving for completeness, we shall take aim at and refute in 
some detail five recent objections by Kevin Korb and Jonathan Oliver (Korb and Oliver 
1999), and one other objection based on what we have called the Self-Indication 
Assumption. While these objections are unsuccessful, they do in some instances force us to 
become clearer about what DA does and doesn’t imply.51
O bjection O ne
Korb and Oliver propose a minimalist constraint that any good inductive method must 
satisfy:
Targeting Truth (TT) Principle: No good inductive method should— in this 
world— provide no more guidance to the truth than does flipping a coin. (p. 404)
DA, they claim, violates this reasonable principle. In support o f their claim they ask us to 
consider
49 This chapter is based on a paper previously published in Mind (1999, Vol. 108, No. 431, pp. 539-50) 
(Bostrom 1999).
5,0 I would hardly exaggerate if I said that I have encountered over a hundred objections against DA in 
publications and personal communications. Even merging those refutations that use the same basic idea 
would leave us with dozens of distinct and often incompatible explanations of what is wrong with DA. 
Curiously, the authors of these refutations frequently seem extremely confident that they have discovered 
the true reason why DA fails, at least until an advocate of DA has chance to reply. It is as if DA is so 
counterintuitive or unacceptable that people think that any objection must be right!
51 For some other objections against DA, see e.g. (Dieks 1992, Eckhardt 1992, Eckhardt 1993, Goodman 
1994, Tannsjo 1997, Mackay 1994, Tipler 1994, Delahaye 1996, Smith 1998, Kopf, Krtous et al. 1994, 
Barthaand Hitchcock 1999, Roush 1998, Dieks 1999, Greenberg 1999, Franceschi 1998, Franceschi 1999, 
Caves 2000, Oliver and Korb 1997, Buch 1994), and for replies to some of these, see e.g. (Leslie 1996, 
Leslie 1992, Leslie 1993, Gott 1994).
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a population o f size 1000 (i.e., a population that died out after a total o f  1000 
individuals) and retrospectively apply the Argument to the population when it was 
o f size 1, 2, 3 and so on. Assuming that the Argument supports the conclusion 
that the total population is bounded by two times the sample value ... then 499 
inferences using the Doomsday Argument form are wrong and 501 inferences are 
right, which we submit is a lousy track record for an inductive inference schema. 
Hence, in a perfectly reasonable metainduction we should conclude that there is 
something very wrong with this form o f inference, (p. 405)
But in this purported counterexample to DA, the TT principle is not violated -  501 right 
and 499 wrong guesses is strictly better than what one would expect from a random 
procedure such as flipping a coin. The reason why the track record is only marginally 
better than chance is simply that the above example assumes that the doomsayers bet on 
the most stringent hypothesis that they would be willing to bet on at even odds, i.e. that 
the total population is bounded by two times the sample value. This means, o f  course, that 
their expected gain is minimal. It is not remarkable, then, that in this case a person who 
applies the Doomsday reasoning is only slightly better o ff than one who doesn’t. I f the bet 
were on the proposition not that the total population is bounded by two times the sample 
value but instead that it is bounded by, say, three times the sample value, then the 
doomsayer’s advantage would be more drastic. And the doomsayer can be even more 
certain that the total value will not exceed thirty times the sample value.
Conclusion: Objection One does not show that DA violates the TT principle, nor 
does it show that the Doomsday reasoning at best improves the chances o f  being right 
only slightly.52
52 In attempt to respond to this objection (Korb and Oliver 1999), Korb and Oliver make two comments. 
“(A) The minimal advantage over random guessing in the example can be driven to an arbitrarily small 
level simply by increasing the population in the example.” (p.501). This misses the point, which was that 
the doomsayer’s gain was small because she was assumed to bet at the worst odds on which she is would be 
willing to bet -  which per definition entails that she’d not expect to benefit significantly from the scheme 
but is of course perfectly consistent with her doing much better than someone who doesn’t accept that “DA” 
should be applied to this example.
1 quote the second comment in its entirety:
(B) Dutch book arguments are quite rightly founded on what happens to an incoherent agent who 
accepts any number of “fair” bets. The point in those arguments is not, as some have confusedly 
thought, that making such a series of bets is being assumed always to be rational; rather, it is that the 
subsequent guaranteed losses appear to be attributable only to the initial incoherence. In the case of the 
Doomsday Argument (DA), it matters not if Doomsayers can protect their interests by refraining from 
some bets that their principles advise them are correct, and only accepting bets that appear to give 
them a whopping advantage: the point is that their principles are advising them wrongly, (p. 501)
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O bjection Two
As first noted by the French mathematician Jean-Paul Delahaye in an unpublished 
manuscript (Delahaye 1996) o f 1996, the basic Doomsday argument form can seem to be 
applicable not only to the survival o f the human race but also to your own life span. The 
second o f Korb and Oliver’s objections picks up on this idea:
[I]f you number the minutes o f your life starting from the first minute you were 
aware o f the applicability o f  the Argument to your life span to the last such minute 
and if  you then attempt to estimate the number o f the last minute using your 
current sample of, say, one minute, then according to the Doomsday Argument, 
you should expect to die before you finish reading this article, (fn. 2, p. 405)
However, this claim is incorrect. The Doomsday argument form, applied to your 
own life span, does not imply that you should expect to die before you have finished 
reading the article. DA says that in some cases you can reason as if  you were a sample 
drawn randomly from a certain reference class. Taking into account the information 
conveyed by this random sample, you are to update your beliefs in accordance with 
Bayes’ theorem. This may cause a shift in your probability assignments in favor o f  
hypotheses which imply that your position in the human race will have been fairly typical 
-  say among the middle 98% rather than in the first or the last percentile o f  all humans 
that will ever have been born. DA just says you should make this Bayesian shift in your 
probabilities; it does not by itself determine the absolute probabilities that you end up 
with. As John Leslie has emphasized (e.g. Leslie 1996), what probability assignment you 
end up with depends on your prior, i.e. the probability assignment you started out with 
before taking DA into account. In the case o f the survival o f  the human race your prior 
may be based on your estimates o f the risk that we will be extinguished through nuclear 
war, germ warfare, a disaster involving future self-replicating nanomachines, a meteor 
impact, etc. In the case o f  your own life expectancy, you will want to consider factors 
such as the average human life span, your state o f health, and any physical danger in your 
environment that could cause your demise before you finish the article. Based on such
To the extent that I can make any sense of this objection at all, it fails. Last time I checked, Dutch book 
arguments were supposed to show that the victim is bound to lose money. In Korb and Oliver’s example, 
the “victim” is expected to gain money.
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considerations, the probability that you will die within the next half-hour ought 
presumably to strike you as extremely small. But if  so, then even a considerable 
probability shift due to a DA-like inference should not make you expect to die before 
finishing the article. Hence, contrary to what Korb and Oliver assert, the doomsayer 
would not make the absurd inference that she is likely to perish within half an hour, even 
would she think the Doomsday argument form applicable to her individual life span.53
While this is enough to refute Objection Two, the more fundamental question here 
is whether (and if  so, how) the Doomsday argument form is applicable to individual life 
spans at all. I think we concede too much if  we grant even a modest probability shift in 
this case. I have two reasons for this, which I will only outline here.
First, Korb and Oliver’s application o f the Doomsday argument form to individual 
life spans presupposes a specific solution to the problem o f the reference class. This is the 
problem, remember, o f determining what class o f entities from which one should consider 
oneself a random sample. Korb and Oliver’s objection presupposes a specific solution to 
this problem, namely that the reference class consists o f  exactly those observer-moments 
that are aware o f DA. This may not be the most plausible solution, and Korb and Oliver 
do not seek to justify it in any way.
The second reason for the doomsayer not to grant a probability shift in the above 
example is that the no-outsider requirement is not satisfied. The no-outsider requirement 
states that in order for DA to be applicable in the straightforward way, there must be no 
outsiders -  beings ignored in the reasoning that really belong inside the reference class. 
The issue o f the no-outsider requirement holds some interest independently o f  its bearing 
on Korb and Oliver’s objection, so it is worth explaining it in some detail. John Leslie 
argues against the no-outsider requirement (e.g. (Leslie 1996), pp. 229-30), but I think he 
is mistaken for the reasons given below. (I suspect that Leslie’s thoughts on the no­
outsider requirement are derived from his views on the problem o f  the reference class, 
which we found in the previous chapter to be inconsistent.)
Consider first the original application o f DA (to the survival o f  the human 
species). Suppose you were certain that there is extraterrestrial intelligent life. Let’s 
suppose you know there are a million “small” civilizations that will have contained 200 
billion persons each, and a million “large” civilizations that will have contained 200
53 This application would require SSSA rather than SSA.
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trillion persons each. Suppose you know that the human species is one o f these 
civilizations but you don’t know whether it is small or large.
To calculate the probability that doom will strike soon (i.e. that the human species 
is “Small”) we can proceed in three steps:
Step 1. Estimate the empirical prior Pr{Smalt), i.e. how likely it seems that germ 
warfare etc. will put an end to our species before it gets large. At this stage you 
don’t take into account any form o f the Doomsday argument or anthropic 
reasoning.
Step 2. Now take account o f the fact that most people find themselves in large 
civilizations. Let H  be the proposition “I am a human.” And define the new 
probability function Pr ( . ) = Pr( . | H) obtained by conditionalizing on H. By 
Bayes’ theorem,
Pr* (Small) = P,(Small\H) = ^ W S m a n y ^ ( S m a l l )
A similar expression holds for Small. Assuming you can regard yourself a 
random sample from the set o f all persons, we have
sttici 200 billion ,Vr(H\Small) = -----------------------------------------------------, and
(200 billion + 200 trillion) x 1 million
/ t t\ n i j\ 200 trillionSmall) =
(200 billion + 200 trillion) x 1 million
(If we calculate Pr (<Small) we find that it is very small for any realistic prior. In 
other words, at this stage in the calculation, it looks as if  the human species is very 
likely long-lasting.)
Step 3. Finally we take account o f DA. Let E  be the proposition that you find 
yourself “early”, i.e. that you are among the first 200 billion persons in your 
species. Conditionalizing on this evidence, we get the posterior probability 
function Pr**(. )  = Pr*(. | E). So
Pr**(Small) = Pr*(Small\E) = X Pr* ( W / )
Pr* (E )
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Note that Vv {E \ Small) = 1 and Pr*(E \ -*Small) = 1/1000. By substituting back 
into the above expressions it is then easy to verify that
Pr* *(SmaIl) _  'Pr(Small)
Pr* *(-i Small) Pr(-i Small)
We thus see that we get back the empirical probabilities we started from. The 
Doomsday argument (in Step 3) only served to cancel the effect which w e took into 
account in Step 2, namely that you were more likely to turn out to be in the human species 
given that the human species is one o f the large rather than one o f the small civilizations. 
This shows that if  w e assume we know that there are both “large” and “small” 
extraterrestrial civilizations -  the precise numbers in the above example don’t matter -  
then the right probabilities are the ones given by the naive empirical prior.54 Only if  we 
there are no “outsiders” (extraterrestrial civilizations) does DA work as intended.
Returning to the case where you are supposed to apply DA to your own life span, 
it appears that the no-outsider requirement is not satisfied. True, if  you consider the epoch 
o f your life during which you know about DA, and you partition this epoch into time- 
segments (observer-moments), then you might say that if  you were to survive for a long 
time then the present observer-moment would be extraordinary early in this class o f  
observer-moments. You may thus be tempted to infer that you are likely to die soon 
(ignoring the difficulties pointed out earlier). But even if  DA were applicable in this way, 
this would be a wrong conclusion to draw. For in this case you know for sure that there 
are many “outsiders”. Here, the outsiders would be observer-moments o f other humans. 
Just as the knowledge that there are large and small extraterrestrial civilizations would 
annul the original Doomsday argument, so in the present case does the knowledge that 
there are other short-lived and long-lived humans cancel the probability shift favoring 
impending death. The fact that the present observer-moment belongs to you would 
indicate that you are an individual that will have contained many observer-moments 
rather than few, i.e. that you will be long-lived. And it can be shown (as above) that this 
would counterbalance the fact that the present observer-moment would have been 
extraordinarily early among all your observer-moments were you to be long-lived.
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Conclusion: Objection Two fails to take the prior probabilities into account. These 
would be extremely small for the hypothesis that you will die within the next thirty 
minutes. Therefore, contrary to what Korb and Oliver claim, even if  the doomsayer 
thought DA applied to this case, he would not make the prediction that you would die 
within 30 minutes. However, the doomsayer should not reckon DA applicable in this 
case, for two reasons. First, it presupposes an arguably implausible solution to the 
reference class problem. Second, even if  we accept that only beings who know about DA  
should be in the reference class, and that it is legitimate to run the argument on time- 
segments o f observers, the conclusion will still not follow; for the no-outsider 
requirement is not satisfied.
O bjection T h ree
Korb and Oliver’s third objection starts off with the claim that (in a Bayesian framework) 
a sample size o f one is too small to make a substantial difference to one’s rational beliefs.
The main point ... is quite simple: a sample size o f one is “catastrophically” small. 
That is, whatever the sample evidence in this case may be, the prior distribution 
over population sizes is going to dominate the computation. The only way around 
this problem is to impose extreme artificial constraints on the hypothesis space, (p. 
406)
They follow this assertion by conceding that in a case where the hypothesis space 
contains only two hypotheses, a substantial shift can occur:
If we consider the two urn case described by Bostrom, we can readily see that he 
is right about the probabilities, (p. 406)
The probability in the example they refer to shifted from 50% to 99.999%, which is surely 
“substantial”, and a similar result would be obtained for a broad range o f distributions o f  
prior probabilities. But Korb and Oliver seem to think that such a substantial shift can 
only occur if  we “impose extreme artificial constraints on the hypothesis space” by
54 This was first pointed out by Dieks (Dieks 1992, and more explicitly in Dieks 1999) and was later 
demonstrated by Kopf et al. (Kopf, Krtous et al. 1994). It appears to have been independently discovered by
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considering only two rival hypotheses rather than many more.
It is easy to see that this is false. Let {hi, h2, ...hn) be an hypothesis space and let 
P be any probability function that assigns a non-zero prior probability to all these 
hypotheses. Let /?, be the least likely o f these hypotheses. Let e be the outcome o f  a single 
random sampling. Then it is easy to see, just by inspecting Bayes’ formula, that the 
posterior probability o f P(/?, | e), can be made arbitrarily big (<  1) by an appropriate
choice o f  e:
P ih,\e )=
£ ( / > ( # , )  x />(/,,))■
\< j<N
Choosing e such that P(e\hj) is small for j  *  i , we have
/> (# ,) xP(A, )
Indeed, we get P(hj\e) = 1 if  w e choose e such that P(e|hj) = 0 for j  *  / .  This would for 
example correspond to the case where you discover that you have a birth rank o f 200 
billion and immediately give probability zero to all hypotheses according to which there 
would be less than 200 billion persons.
Conclusion: Korb and Oliver are wrong when they claim that the prior distribution 
is always going to dominate over any computation based on a sample size o f  one.
O bjection Four
By increasing the number o f hypotheses about the ultimate size o f the human species that 
we choose to consider, we can, according to Korb and Oliver, make the probability shift 
that DA induces arbitrarily small55:
Bartha and Hitchcock (Bartha and Hitchcock 1999).
55 A similar objection had been made earlier by Dennis Dieks (Dieks 1992), and independently by John 
Eastmond (personal communication).
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In any case, if  an expected population size for homo sapiens ... seems 
uncomfortably small, we can push the size up, and so the date o f our collective 
extermination back, to an arbitrary degree simply by considering larger hypothesis 
spaces, (p. 408)
The argument is that if  we use a uniform prior over the chosen hypothesis space {hj, h2, 
..., hn], where hi is the hypothesis that there will have existed a total o f i humans, then the 
expected number o f humans that will have lived will depend on n: the greater the value 
we give to n, the greater the expected future population. Korb and Oliver compute the 
expected size o f the human population for some different values o f n and find that the 
result does indeed vary.
Notice first o f all that nowhere in this is there a reference to DA. If this argument 
were right it would work equally against any way o f making predictions about how long 
the human species will survive. For example, if  during the Cuba missile crisis you feared 
-  based on obvious empirical factors -  that humankind might soon go extinct, you really 
needn’t have worried. You could just have considered a larger hypothesis space and you 
would thereby have reached an arbitrarily high degree o f confidence that doom was not 
impending. If only making the world safer were that easy.
What, then, is the right prior to use for DA? All we can say about this from a 
general philosophical point o f  view is that it is the same as the prior for people who don’t 
believe in DA. The doomsayer does not face a special problem here. The only legitimate 
way o f providing the prior is through an empirical assessment o f  the potential threats to 
human survival. You need to base it on your best guesstimates about the hazards o f  germ 
warfare, nuclear warfare, weapons based on nanotechnology, asteroids or meteors striking 
the Earth, a runaway greenhouse effect, future high-energy physics experiments, and 
other dangers as yet unimagined.56
On a charitable reading, Korb and Oliver could perhaps be interpreted as saying 
not that DA fails because the prior is arbitrary, but rather that the uniform prior (with 
some big but finite cut-off point) is as reasonable as any other prior, and that with such a
56 A survey of these and other risks makes up a large part of John Leslie’s monograph (Leslie 1996) on the 
Doomsday argument. He estimates the prior probability, based on these considerations, of humankind going
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prior DA will not show that doom is likely to strike very soon. If this is all they mean then 
they are not saying something that the doomsayer could not agree with. The doomsayer 
(i.e. a person who believes DA is sound) is not committed to the view that doom is likely 
to strike soon57, only to the view that the risk that doom will strike soon is greater than 
was thought before we understood the probabilistic implications o f our having relatively 
low birth ranks. DA (if sound) shows that we have systematically underestimated the risk 
o f doom soon, but it doesn’t directly imply anything about the absolute magnitude o f  the 
probability o f  that hypothesis. (For example, John Leslie, who strongly believes in DA, 
still thinks there is a 70% chance that we will colonize the galaxy.) Even with a uniform 
prior probability, there will still be a shift in our probability function in favor o f earlier 
doom.
But don’t Korb and Oliver’s calculations at least show that this probability shift in 
favor o f earlier doom is in reality quite small, so that DA isn’t such a big deal after all? 
No, their calculations do not show that, for two reasons.
The first reason is that as already mentioned, their calculations rest on the 
assumption o f a uniform prior. Not only is this assumption gratuitous -  no attempt is 
made to justify it -  but it is also, I believe, highly implausible even as an approximation 
o f the real empirical prior. Personally I think it is fairly obvious that given what I know 
(and before considering DA), the probability that there will exist between 100 billion and 
500 billion humans is much greater than the probability that there will exist between 1020 
and (1020 + 500 billion) humans.
Second, even granting the uniform prior, it turns out that the probability shift is 
actually quite big. Korb and Oliver assume a uniform distribution over the hypothesis 
space {hi, h2, h2i04s) (where again hi is the hypothesis that there will have been a total
o f / billion humans) and they assume that you are the 60 billionth human. Then the
expected size o f the human population before considering DA is x 109 = 994
billion. And Korb and Oliver’s calculations show that after applying DA the expected 
population is 562 billion. The expected human population has been reduced by over 43%
extinct within 200 years to be something like 5%. For a discussion of the empirical hazards involved and 
some suggestions for what could be done to reduce them, see (Bostrom and et al. 1999).
5/ To get the conclusion that doom is likely to happen soon (say within 200 years) you need to make 
additional assumptions about future population figures and the future risk profile for humankind.
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in their own example.
Conclusion: Objection Four fails. Korb and Oliver’s argument about being able to 
get an arbitrarily large expected population by assuming a uniform prior and making the 
hypothesis space sufficiently big is misguided; if  correct, this objection would work 
equally well against predictions that do not use DA. For the doomsayer and the non- 
doomsayer use the same prior probability, the one determined by ordinary empirical 
considerations. Moreover, the doomsayer is not committed to the view that doom will 
likely strike soon, only that the risk has been systematically underestimated. Korb and 
Oliver have not showed that the risk has been only slightly underestimated. On the 
contrary, in Korb and Oliver’s own example DA cuts the expected population by nearly 
one half.
O bjection Five
Towards the end o f their paper, Korb and Oliver hint at a fifth objection: that we 
shouldn’t regard ourselves as random samples from the human species (or the human 
species cum its intelligent robot descendants) because there is a systematic correlation 
between our genetic makeup and our personal identity:
... the notion that anyone is uniformly randomly selected from among the total 
population o f the species is beyond far fetched. The bodies that w e are, or 
supervene upon, have a nearly fixed position in the evolutionary order; for 
example, given what we know of evolution it is silly to suppose that someone’s 
DNA could precede that o f her or his ancestors, (p. 408)
The doomsayer will grant all this. But even if  the exact birth order o f  all humans 
could be inferred from a list o f their genomes, the only thing that would show is that there 
is more than one way o f  finding out about somebody’s birth rank. In addition to the usual 
way -  observing what year it is and combining that information with our knowledge o f  
past population figures -there would now be an additional method o f obtaining the same 
number: by analyzing somebody’s DNA and consulting a table correlating DNA  with 
birth rank.
The same holds for other correlations that may obtain. For example, the fact that I 
am wearing contact lenses indicates that I am living after the year 1900 A.D. This gives
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me a way o f  estimating my birth rank— check whether I have contact lenses and, if  so, 
draw the conclusion that it is past the year 1900 A.D. Comparing this with past population 
figures then tells me something about my birth rank. But none o f these correlations add 
anything new once you have found at least one way o f determining your birth rank.
Conclusion: It is true that there is a systematic correlation between one’s genetic 
makeup and one’s birth rank. The presence o f such a correlation gives us an alternative 
(though impractical) way o f ascertaining one’s birth rank but it does not affect the 
evidential relation between having this birth rank and any general hypothesis about 
humankind’s future. That you can indeed legitimately regard yourself as in some sense 
randomly selected from a group o f people even in cases where these people have different 
genes can be argued for in various ways, as we saw in chapter 4. (Unfortunately, Korb 
and Oliver do not attempt to criticize or discuss any o f the arguments for the randomness 
assumption). Thus, the fifth objection fails to refute DA.
T h e Self-Indication A ssum ption
We now turn to an objection that is not made by Korb and Oliver but which can be 
spotted lurking in the background o f many other attacks on DA. This objection is based 
on the Self-Indication Assumption (SIA), which we encountered briefly in chapter 4. 
Framed as an attack on DA, the idea is that the probability shift in favor o f Doom Soon 
that DA leads us to make is offset by another probability shift -  which is overlooked by 
DA proponents -  in favor o f Doom Late. When both these probability shifts are taken into 
account, the net effect is that we end up with the naive probability estimates that w e made 
before we learnt about either DA or SIA. According to this objection, the more observers 
that will ever have existed, the more “slots” would there be that you could have been 
“born into”. Your existence is more probable if  there are many observers than if  there are 
few. Since you do in fact exist, the Bayesian rule has to be applied and the posterior 
probability o f hypotheses which imply that many observers exist must be increased 
accordingly. The nifty thing is that the effects o f SIA and DA cancel each other precisely,
<o
as can be seen through a trivial calculation :
58 Something like using SIA as an objection against DA was first done -  albeit not very transparently -  by 
Dennis Dieks in 1992 (Dieks 1992; see also his more recent paper Dieks 1999). That SIA and DA exactly 
cancel each other was first showed by Kopf et al. in 1994 (Kopf, Krtous et al. 1994). The objection seems to 
have been independently discovered by P. Bartha and C. Hitchcock (Bartha and Hitchcock 1999), Sherri
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Let Pr(/z.) be the naive prior for the hypothesis that in total i observers will have
existed, and assume that Pr(/r) = 0 for / greater than some finite N. (This
restriction allows us to set aside the problem o f infinities.) Then we can formalize 
SIA as saying that
Pr' (/z,) = Pr(/zJ I am an observer) = od Pr(/z,)
where a  is a normalization constant. Let r(x) be the rank o f x, and let “I” denote a 
random sample from a uniform probability distribution over the set o f  all 
observers. By SSA, we have
Consider two hypotheses hn and hm. We can assume that r (I )  < min(n,m) . (If not, 
then the example simplifies to the trivial case where one o f  the hypotheses is 
conclusively refuted regardless o f whether SIA is accepted.) Using Bayes’ 
formula, we expand the quotient between these two hypotheses:
Pr'(r (J) = k\hm)Pr'(hm) j
Pr j h j r ( l )  = k) Pr'(/'(/)  = k) - a m P r j h J  Pr(^ )
Pr'(h„\r(I) = k) Pr'(r(I) = k\h„)?r‘( h j  }_
Pr '(r{I) = k) n
an  Pr(hn) Pr(K)
We see that after we have applied both SIA and  DA, we are back to the naive 
probabilities that we started with.
Why accept SIA? The fact that SIA has the virtue o f leading to a complete 
cancellation o f DA may well be the most positive thing that can be said on its behalf. As 
an objection against DA, this argument would be unabashedly question-begging. It could 
still carry some weight if  DA were sufficiently unacceptable and if  there were no other 
coherent way o f avoiding its conclusion. However, that is not the case. We shall examine 
another coherent way o f resisting DA in chapter 9. Even if  the choice were between SIA
Roush (Roush 1998), and in variously cloaked forms by several other people (personal communications).
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and the DA-conclusion, I would still lean towards the latter alternative as the lesser o f  two 
evils.
We saw in chapter 2 why, owing to observational selection effects, it would be a 
mistake to use the fine-tuning o f our universe as an argument for hypotheses that imply a 
greater number o f observer-containing universes. If two competing general hypotheses 
each imply that there is at least one observer-containing universe, but one o f the 
hypotheses implies a greater number o f observer-containing universes than the other, then 
fine-tuning is not typically a reason to favor the former. This reasoning can be adapted to 
argue that your own existence is not in general a ground for thinking that hypotheses are 
more likely to be true if  they imply a greater total number o f  observers in existence. The 
datum o f your existence tends to disconfirm hypotheses on which it would be unlikely 
that even a single observer should exist, but that’s as far as it goes.59 And the reason for 
this is that the sample at hand -  yourself -  should not be regarded as randomly selected 
from the class o f  all possible observers but only from the class o f observers that will 
actually have existed. It is, so to speak, not a coincidence that the sample you are 
considering is one which actually exists; rather, that’s a logical consequence from the fact 
that only actual observers actually view  themselves as samples from anything at all.
Further reasons for rejecting SIA are generated when we consider what accepting 
it would entail that we should believe in circumstances where we are ignorant o f  our birth 
ranks so that the counterbalancing probability shift due to DA does not take place. In 
these cases, SIA entails a uniform a priori bias in favor o f worlds with many observers. It 
is easy to see that in order for SIA always to be able to cancel DA, you would have to 
subscribe to the principle that, other things equal, a hypothesis which implies that there 
are 2N observers should be assigned twice the credence o f a hypothesis which implies 
that there are only N observers. In the case o f  the God’s Coin Toss gedanken, this means 
that before learning about the color o f your beard, you should think it likely that the coin 
fell heads (so that two observers rather than just one were created). If we modify the 
gedanken so that heads would lead to the creation o f a million observers, you would have
John Leslie argues against SIA in (Leslie 1996, pp. 224-8).
59 Of course, just as if our universe is found to have “special” properties this can be legitimate reason to use 
its existence as an argument for there existing a great many observer-containing universes, so likewise if 
you have certain special properties then that could be an argument in favor of there being vast numbers of 
observers. But these arguments are powered by the universe or yourself having those special properties; it is 
not your existence (or the existence of a fine-tuned universe) per se that legitimates the inference.
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to be virtually certain -  before knowing anything directly about the outcomes and before 
learning about your beard-color -  that the coin fell heads, even if  you knew that it had a 
ten thousand to one bias in favor o f tails. This seems wrong.
Nor is it only in fictional toy examples, which we know will not actually obtain, 
that we would get counterintuitive results from accepting SIA. For as a matter fact, we 
may well be radically ignorant o f our birth ranks (namely if  there are extraterrestrial 
species). Consider the following gedanken:
The presumptuous philosopher
It is the year 2100 and physicists have narrowed down the search for a theory o f  
everything to only two remaining plausible candidate theories, T1 and T2 (using 
considerations from super-duper symmetry). According to T1 the world is very, 
very big but finite, and there are a total o f a trillion trillion observers in the 
cosmos. According to T2, the world is very, very, very big but finite, and there are 
a trillion trillion trillion observers. The super-duper symmetry considerations seem 
to be roughly indifferent between these two theories. The physicists are planning 
on carrying out a simple experiment that will falsify one o f the theories. Enter the 
presumptuous philosopher: “Hey guys, it is completely unnecessary for you to do 
the experiment, because I can already show to you that T2 is about a trillion times 
more likely to be true than T1 (whereupon the philosopher runs the God’s Coin 
Toss thought experiment and explains Model 3)!”
One suspects the Nobel Prize committee to be a bit hesitant about awarding the 
presumptuous philosopher the big one for this contribution.
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CHAPTER 7: OBSERVER-RELATIVE CHANCES IN  
AN TH R O P IC  RE ASON IN G?60
This chapter examines an argument by John Leslie (Leslie 1997) purporting to show that 
anthropic reasoning gives rise to paradoxical “observer-relative chances” 61. I show that 
the argument trades on the sense/reference ambiguity and is fallacious. I then describe a 
related case where chances are observer-relative in an interesting way. But not in a 
paradoxical way. The result can be generalized: At least for a very wide range o f  cases, 
SSA does not engender paradoxical observer-relative chances.
L e slie ’s  argum ent and w hy it fails
The conclusion that Leslie seeks to establish is that:
Estimated probabilities can be observer-relative in a somewhat disconcerting way: 
a way not depending on the fact that, obviously, various observers often are 
unaware o f truths which other observers know. (p. 435)
Leslie does not regard this as a reductio o f anthropic reasoning but rather suggests bullet- 
biting as the correct response: “Any air o f paradox must not prevent us from accepting 
these things.” (p. 428).
Leslie’s argument takes the form o f a gedanken. Suppose w e start with a batch o f  
one hundred women and divide them randomly into two groups, one with ninety-five and
60 This chapter is adapted from a paper previously published in Erkenntnis (2000, Vol. 52, pp. 93-108) 
(Bostrom 2000).
61 Leslie uses “chances” as synonymous with “epistemic probabilities”. I will follow his usage in this 
chapter and in later passages that refer to the conclusions obtained here. Elsewhere in the dissertation, I 
reserve the word “cliance” for objective probabilities. For instance, a fair coin toss has an objective 
probability of heads equal to one half, and this is compatible with some people having subjective 
probabilities, credences, of heads equal to some other value, say 2/3. It is also compatible with these people 
being perfectly rational to have those subjective probabilities -  they might for example have been told, 
falsely as it happens, by a person they trust that the coin was thus biased. It should be clear from the context 
which sort of probability is used. Nothing essential in this thesis hinges on specific doctrines about the 
nature of “objective” probabilities, chances.
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one with five women. By flipping a fair coin, we then assign the name ‘the Heads group’ 
randomly to one o f these groups and the name ‘the Tails group’ to the other. According to 
Leslie it is now the case that an external observer, i.e. a person not in either o f  the two 
groups, ought to derive radically different conclusions than an insider:
All these persons -  the women in the Heads group, those in the Tails group, and 
the external observer -  are fully aware that there are two groups, and that each 
woman has a ninety-five per cent chance o f  having entered the larger. Yet the 
conclusions they ought to derive differ radically. The external observer ought to 
conclude that the probability is fifty per cent that the Heads group is the larger o f  
the two. Any woman actually in [either the Heads or the Tails group], however, 
ought to judge the odds ninety-five to five that her group, identified as ‘the group I 
am in’, is the larger, regardless o f whether she has been informed o f  its name. (p. 
428)
Even without knowing her group’s name, a woman could still appreciate that the 
external observer estimated its chance o f being the larger one as only fifty per cent 
-  this being what his evidence led him to estimate in the cases o f  both groups. The 
paradox is that she herself would then have to say: ‘In view o f my evidence o f  
being in one o f the groups, ninety-five per cent is what I estimate.’ (p. 429)
Somewhere within these two paragraphs a mistake has been made. It’s not hard to 
locate the error if we look at the structure o f the reasoning. Let’s say there is a woman in 
the larger group who is called Chris. The “paradox” then takes the following form:
(1) Prchris (“The group that Chris is in is the larger group”) = 95%
(2) The group that Chris is in = the Heads group
(3) Therefore: Prchris (“The Heads group is the larger group”) - 9 5 %
(4) But PrExiernai observer (“The Heads group is the larger group”) = 50%
(5) Hence chances are observer-relative.
Where it goes wrong is in step (3). The group that Chris is in is indeed identical to the
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Heads group, but Chris doesn’t know that. PrChris (“The Heads group is the larger group”) 
= 50%, not 95% as claimed in step (3). There is nothing paradoxical or surprising about 
this, at least not any longer after Frege’s discussion o f  Hesperus and Phosphorus. One 
need not have rational grounds for assigning probability one to the proposition “Hesperus 
= Phosphorus”, even though as a matter o f fact Hesperus = Phosphorus. For one might 
not know that Hesperus = Phosphorus. The expressions ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ 
present their denotata under different modes o f presentation: they denote the same object 
while connoting different concepts. There is disagreement over exactly how to describe 
this difference and what general lesson to learn from it; but the basic observation that you 
can learn something from being told “a = b ” (even if  a = b) is neither new nor has it very 
much in particular to do with SSA.
Let’s see if  there is some way we could rescue Leslie’s conclusion by modifying 
the thought experiment.
Suppose that we change the example so that Chris now knows that the sentence 
“Chris is in the Heads group” is true. Then step (3) will be correct. However, we will now  
run into trouble when we try to take step (5). It will no longer be true that Chris and the 
external observer know about the same facts. Chris’s information set now contains the 
sentence “Chris is in the Heads group”. The external observer’s information set doesn’t 
contain this piece o f information. So no interesting form o f observer-relative chances has 
been established.
What if  we change the example again and assume that the external observer, too, 
knows that Chris is in the Heads group? Well, if  Chris and the external observer agreed 
on the chance that the Heads group is the large group before they both learnt that Chris is 
in the Heads group, then they will continue to be in agreement about this chance after 
they have received that information -  provided  they agree about the conditional 
probability Pr (The Heads group is the larger group | Chris is in the Heads group.). This, 
then, is what we have to examine to see if any paradoxical conclusion can be wrung from 
Leslie’s set-up: we have to check whether Chris and the outside observer agree on this 
conditional probability.
First look at it from Chris’ point o f view. Let’s go along with Leslie and assume 
that she should think o f herself as a random sample from the batch o f one hundred 
women. Suppose she knows that her name is Chris (and that she’s the only woman in the
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batch with that name). Then, before she learns that she is in the Heads group, she should 
think that the probability o f  that being the case is 50%. (Recall that what group should be 
called ‘the Heads group’ was determined by tossing o f a fair coin.) She should think that 
the chance o f the sentence “Chris is in the larger group” is 95%, since ninety-five out o f  
the hundred women are in the larger group, and she can regard herself as a random 
sample from these hundred women. When learning that she is in the Heads group, the 
chance o f her being in the larger group remains 95%. ( ‘the Heads group’ and ‘the Tails 
group’ are just arbitrary labels at this point; randomly calling one group the Heads group 
doesn’t change the likelihood that it is the big group.) Hence the probability she should 
give to the sentence “The Heads group is the larger group” is now 95%. Therefore the 
conditional probability which we were looking for is Prchris (“The Heads group is the 
larger group” | “Chris is in the Heads group”) = 95%.
Next consider the situation from the external observer’s point o f view. What is the 
probability for the external observer that the Heads group is larger given that Chris is in 
it? Well, what’s the probability that Chris is in the Heads group? In order to answer these 
questions, we need to know something about how this woman Chris was selected.
Suppose that she was selected as a random sample (with uniform sampling 
density) from among all the hundred women in the batch. Then the external observer 
would arrive at the same conclusion as Chris: if the random sample ‘Chris’ is in the 
Heads group then there is a 95% chance that the Heads group is the bigger group.
If we instead suppose that Chris was selected randomly from some subset o f  the 
hundred women, then it might happen that the external observer’s estimate diverges from 
Chris’. For example, if  the external observer randomly selects one individual x  (whose 
name happens to be ‘Chris’) from the large group, then, when he finds that x is in the 
Heads group, he should assign a 100% probability to the sentence “The Heads group is 
the larger group.” This is indeed a different conclusion than the one which the insider 
Chris draws. She thought the conditional probability o f  the Heads group being the larger 
given that Chris is in the Heads group was 95%.
In this case, however, we have to question whether Chris and the external observer 
know about the same evidence. (If they don’t, then the disparity in their conclusions 
doesn’t signify that chances are observer-relative in any paradoxical sense.) But it is clear 
that their information sets do  differ in a relevant way. For suppose Chris got to know what
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the external observer is stipulated to already know: that Chris had been selected by the 
external observer through some random sampling process from among a certain subset o f  
the hundred women. That implies that Chris is a member o f that subset. This information 
would change her probability estimate so that it once again becomes identical to the 
external observer’s. In the above case, for instance, the external observer selected a 
woman randomly from the large group. Now, evidently, if  Chris gets this extra piece o f  
information, that she has been selected as a random sample from the large group, then she 
knows with certainty that she is in that group; so her conditional probability that the 
Heads group is the larger group given that Chris is in the Heads group should then be 
100%, the same as what the outside observer should believe.
We see that as soon as we give the two people access to the same evidence, their 
disagreement vanishes. There are no paradoxical observer-relative chances in this thought 
experiment.62
62 The only way, it seems, of maintaining that there are observer-relative chances in a strong, nontrivial 
sense in Leslie's example is on pain of opening oneself up to systematic exploitation, at least if  one is 
prepared to put one's money where one’s mouth is. Suppose there is someone who insists that the odds are 
different for an insider than they are for an outsider, and not only because the insider and the outsider don’t 
know about the same facts. Let’s call this hypothetical person Mr. L. (John Leslie would not, I hope, take 
this line of defence.)
At the next major philosophy conference that Mr. L attends we select a group of one hundred 
philosophers and divide them into two subgroups which we name by means of a coin toss, just as in Leslie’s 
example. We let Mr. L observe this event. Then we ask him what is the probability -  for him as an external 
observer, one not in the selected group -  that the large group is the Heads group. Let’s say he claims this 
probability is p. We then repeat the experiment, but this time with Mr. L as one of the hundred philosophers 
in the batch. Again we ask him what he thinks the probability is, now from his point of view as an insider, 
that the large group is the Heads group. (Mr. L doesn’t know at this point whether he is in the Heads group 
or the Tails group. If he did, he would know about a fact that the outsiders do not know about, and hence 
the chances involved would not be observer-relative in any paradoxical sense.) Say he answers p
If either p  or p  ’ is anything other than 50% then we can make money out of him by repeating the 
experiment many times with Mr. L either in the batch or as an external observer, depending on whether it is 
p o r p ’ that differs from 50%. For example, if p  ’ is greater than 50%, we repeat the experiment with Mr. L 
in the batch, and we keep offering him the same bet, namely that the Heads group is not  the larger group, 
and Mr. L will happily bet against us at odds determined by p *  = (50% + /?’) /  2 (the intermediary odds 
between what Mr. L thinks are fair odds and what we think are fair odds). If, on the other hand, p  ’ < 50%, 
we bet (at odds determined by p * )  that the Head’s group is  the larger group. Again Mr. L should willingly 
bet against us.
In the long run (with probability asymptotically approaching one), the Heads group will be the larger 
group approximately half the time. So we will win approximately half of the bets. Yet it is easy to verify 
that the odds to which Mr. L has agreed are such that this will earn us more money than we need pay out. 
We will be making a net gain.
It seems indisputable that chances cannot be observer-relative in th is way. Somebody who thought 
otherwise would quickly go bankrupt in the proposed game.
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O bserver-relative ch a n ces: another try
In this section I shall give an example where chances could actually be said to be 
observer-relative in an interesting -  though by no means paradoxical -  sense. What 
philosophical lessons we should or shouldn’t learn from this phenomenon will be 
discussed in the next section.
Here is the example:
Suppose the following takes place in an otherwise empty world. A fair coin is 
flipped by an automaton and if  it falls heads, ten humans are created; if  it falls 
tails, one human is created. Suppose that in addition to these people there is 
one additional human that is created independently o f how the coin falls. This 
latter human we call the bookie. The people created as a result o f  the coin toss 
we call the group. Everybody knows these facts. Furthermore, the bookie 
knows that she is the bookie and the people in the group know that they are in 
the group.
The question is what are the fair odds if  the people in the group want to bet 
against the bookie on how the coin fell? One could think that everybody should agree 
that the chance o f it having fallen heads is fifty-fifty, since it was a fair coin. That 
overlooks the fact that the bookie obtains information from finding that she is the 
bookie rather than one o f  the people in the group. This information is relevant to her 
estimate o f how the coin fell. It is more likely that she should find herself being the 
bookie if  one out o f two is a bookie than if  the ratio is one out o f eleven. So finding 
herself being the bookie, she obtains reason to believe that the coin probably fell tails, 
leading to the creation o f only one other human. In a similar way, the people in the 
group, by observing that they are in the group, obtain some evidence that the coin fell 
heads, resulting in a large fraction o f all observers observing that they are in the 
group.
It is a simple exercise to use Bayes’ theorem to calculate what the posterior 
probabilities are after this information has been taken into account.
Since the coin is fair, we have Pr (Heads) = Pr (Tails) = V2 .
By SSA, Pr (I am bookie | Heads) = Xi and Pr (I am bookie | Tails) = V2 .
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Hence,
Pr (I am bookie)
= Pr (I am bookie | Heads) ■ Pr (Heads) + Pr (I am bookie | Tails) • Pr 
(Tails)
= x .  • + - ,/ 2 = % .
From Bayes’ theorem we then get:
Pr (Heads 11 am bookie)
= Pr (I am bookie | Heads) • Pr (Heads) /  Pr (I am bookie)
_  XA\ x Yi _  2/
-  713 -13/
/ 444
In exactly the same way we get the odds for the people in the group:
Pr (I am in the group | Heads) = %
Pr (I am in the group | Tails) = Vi.
Pr (I am in the group) = %  • Vz +  Vz • Vz = %  .
Pr (Heads | I am in the group) = Pr (I am in the group | Heads) • Pr
(Heads) / Pr (I am in the group)
=  %  X ^  =  2 0 /
3 1 /  / 3 1 '
/4 4
We see that the bookie should think there is a % chance that the coin was
heads while the people in the group should think that the chance is % .  This is a
consequence o f  SSA.
D isc u ssio n
While it might be slightly noteworthy that the bookie and the people in the group are 
rationally required to disagree in the above scenario, it isn’t the least bit paradoxical. 
Their information sets are not identical. For instance, the bookie knows that “I am the 
bookie.”. That is clearly a different proposition from the corresponding one -  “I am 
in the group.” -  known by the people in the group. So chances have not been shown
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to be observer-relative in the sense that people with the same information can be 
rationally required to disagree. And if  we were to try to modify the example so as to 
make the participants’ information sets identical, we would see that their 
disagreement disappears; as it did when we attempted various twists o f the Leslie 
gedanken.
There is a sense, though, in which the chances in the present example can be 
said to be observer-relative. The information sets o f the bookie and the people in the 
group, while not identical, are quite similar. They differ only in regard to such
63  •indexical facts as “I am the bookie.” or “I am in the group.”. We could say that the 
example demonstrates, in an interesting way, that chances can be relative to observers 
in the sense that: people with information sets that are identical up to indexical fa c ts  
can be rationally required to disagree about non-indexical facts.
This kind o f observer-relativity is not particularly counterintuitive and it 
should not be taken to cast doubt on SSA from which it was derived. That indexical 
facts can have implications for what we should believe about nonindexical facts 
shouldn’t surprise us. It can be shown by a very simple example: from “I have steel- 
blue eyes.” it follows that somebody has steel-blue eyes.
The rational odds in the example above being different for the bookie than for 
the punters in the group, we might begin to wonder whether it is possible to formulate 
some kind o f bet for which all parties would calculate a positive expected payoff? 
This would not necessarily be an unacceptable consequence since the bettors have 
different information. Still, it could seem a bit peculiar if  we had a situation where 
purely by applying SSA rational people were led to start placing bets against one 
another.
So it is worth calculating the odds to see if  there are cases where they do
63 The metaphysics of indexical facts is not our topic here, but a good starting point for studying that is 
chapter 10 in (Lewis 1986). David Lewis argues that one can know which possible world is actual and still 
learn something new when one discovers which person one is in that world. Lewis, borrowing an example 
from John Perry (Perry 1977) (who in turn is indebted to Castaneda (Castaneda 1966, Castandeda 1968)) 
discusses the case of the amnesiacs in the Stanford library. We can imagine (changing the example slightly) 
that two amnesiacs are lost in the library on the first and second floor respectively. From reading the books 
they have learn precisely which possible world is actual -  in particular they know that two amnesiacs are 
lost in the Stanford library. Nonetheless, when one of the amnesiacs sees a map of the library saying “You 
are here” with an arrow pointing to the second floor, he learns something he didn’t know despite knowing 
all non-indexical facts.
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indeed favour betting. This is done in an appendix. The result turns out to be negative 
-  no betting. In the quite general class o f cases considered, there is no combination o f  
parameter values for which a bet is possible in which both parties would rationally 
expect a positive non-zero payoff.64
This result is reassuring for the anthropic theorizer. Yet we are still left with 
the fact that there are cases where observers come to disagree with each other just 
because o f applying SSA. While it is true that these disagreeing observers will have 
different indexical information, and while there are trivial examples in which a 
difference in indexical information implies a difference in non-indexical information, 
it might nonetheless be seen as objectionable that anthropic reasoning should lead to 
this kind o f disagreements. Does not that require that we ascribe some mysterious 
quality to the things we call “observers”, some property o f  an observer’s mind that 
cannot be reduced to objective observer-independent facts?
The best way to resolve this scruple is to show how the above example, where 
the “observer-relative” chances appeared, can be restated in purely physicalistic 
terms:
A coin is tossed and either one or ten human brains are created. These brains 
make up ‘the group’. Apart from these there is only one other brain, the 
‘bookie’. All the brains are informed about the procedure that has taken place. 
Suppose Alpha is one o f the brains that have been created and that Alpha 
remembers recently having been in the brain states Aj, A 2, ..., A„. (I.e. Alpha 
recognizes the descriptions “A j”, “A j \  “A„” descriptions o f these states,
and Alpha knows “this brain was recently in states Aj, A 2, ..., A „” is true. Cf. 
Perry (1979).)
64 One could also worry about another thing: doesn’t the doctrine defended here commit one to the view 
that observational reports couched in the first person should be evaluated according different rules from 
those pertaining to third person reports of what is apparently the same evidence? My answer is that the 
evaluation rule is the same in both cases. However, third-person reports (by which we here mean statements 
about some other person’s observations) can become evidence for somebody only by first coming to her 
know ledge. While you may know your own observations directly, there is an additional step that other 
people’s observations must go through before they become evidence for you: they must somehow be 
communicated to you. That extra step may involve additional selection effects that are not present in the 
first-person case. This accounts for the apparent evidential difference between first- and third-person 
reports. For example, what conclusions you can draw from the third-person report “Mr. Smith observers a 
red room.” depends on what your beliefs are about how this report came to be known (as true) to you -  why 
you didn’t find out about Mr. Kruger instead, say, who observes a green room. By contrast, there is no 
analogous underspecification of the first-person report “I observe a red room.”. There is no relevant story to 
be told about how' it came about thatyow got to know about the observation that you are making.
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At this stage, Alpha should obviously think the probability that the coin fell 
heads is 50%, since it was a fair coin. But now suppose that Alpha is 
informed that he is the bookie, i.e. that the brain that has recently been in the 
states Aj, A 2, A„ is the brain that is labeled ‘the bookie’. Then Alpha will 
reason as follows:
“Let A be the brain that was recently in states Aj, A 2, A n. The conditional 
probability that A is labeled ‘the bookie’ given that A is one o f  two existing 
brains is greater than the conditional probability that A is the brain labeled 
‘the bookie’ given that A is one out o f eleven brains. Hence, since A does 
indeed turn out to be the brain labeled ‘the bookie’, there is a greater than 
50% chance that the coin fell tails, creating only one brain.”
A parallel line o f reasoning can be pursued by a brain labeled ‘a brain in the group’. 
The argument can be quantified in the same way as in the earlier example and will 
result in the same “observer-relative” chances. This shows that anthropic reasoning 
can be understood in a purely physicalistic framework.
The observer-relative chances in this example too are explained by the fact 
that the brains have access to different evidence. Alpha, for example, knows that 
( P A lph a '.) the hrain that has recently been in the states A j, A 2, A„ is the brain that is 
labeled  ‘the bookie'. A brain, Beta, who comes to disagree with Alpha about the 
probability o f heads, will have a different information set. Beta might for instance 
rather know that (PBeta') the brain that has recently been in the states Bj, B 2, ■■■, B„ is 
a brain that, is labeled (a member o f  the group'. PAlpha is clearly not equivalent to 
P Beta-
It is instructive to see what happens if  we take a step further and eliminates 
from the example not only all non-physicalistic terms but also its ingredient o f  
indexicality:
In the previous example we assumed that the proposition (PAlpha) which Alpha 
knows but Beta does not know was a proposition concerning the brain states 
Aj, A 2, A n o f Alpha itself. Suppose now instead that Alpha does not know  
what label the brain Alpha has (whether it is ‘the bookie’ or ‘a brain in the 
group’) but that Alpha has been informed that there are some recent brain 
states Gj, G2, G„ o f  some other existing brain, Gamma, and that Gamma is 
labeled ‘the bookie’.
At this stage, what conclusion Alpha should draw from this piece o f  
information is underdetermined by the specifications w e have given. It would
144
depend on what Alpha would b low  or guess about how this other brain 
Gamma had been selected to come to A lpha’s notice. Suppose we specify the 
thought experiment further by stipulating that, as far as Alpha’s knowledge 
goes, Gamma can be regarded as a random sample from the set o f  all existing 
brains. Alpha may know, say, that one ball for each existing brain was put in 
an urn and that one o f these balls was drawn at random and it turned out to be 
the one corresponding to Gamma. Reasoning from this information, Alpha 
will arrive at the same conclusion as if  Alpha had learnt that Alpha was 
labeled ‘the bookie’ as was the case in the previous version o f the thought 
experiment. Similarly, Beta may know about another random sample, 
Epsilon, that is labeled ‘a brain in the group’. This will lead Alpha and Beta to 
differ in their probability estimates, just as before. In this version o f  the 
thought experiment no indexical evidence is involved. Yet Alpha’s 
probabilities differ from Beta’s.
What we have here is hardly distinct from any humdrum situation where John 
and Mary know different things and therefore estimate probabilities differently. The 
only difference between the present example and a commonplace urn game is that 
here we are dealing in brains whereas there we are dealing in raffle tickets -  surely 
not philosophically relevant.
But what exactly did change when we removed the indexical element? I f  we 
compare the two last examples we see that the essential disparity is in how the 
random samples were produced.
In the second o f the two examples there was a physical selection mechanism 
that generated the randomness. We said that Alpha knew that there was one ball for 
each brain in existence, that these balls had been put in an urn, and that one o f  these 
balls had then been selected randomly and had turned out to correspond to a brain 
that was labeled ‘the bookie’.
In the other example, by contrast, there was no such physical mechanism. 
Instead, there the randomness did somehow arise from  each observer considering 
herself as a  random sample from  the set o f all observers. Alpha and Beta observed 
their own states o f mind (i.e. their own brain states). Combining this information with 
other, non-indexical, information allowed them to draw conclusions about non- 
indexical states o f affairs that they could not draw without the indexical information 
obtained from observing their own states o f mind. But there was no physical 
randomization mechanism at work analogous to selecting a ball from an urn.
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Now, it is may indeed be problematic how such reasoning can be justified or 
explained -  that is after all the subject matter o f this dissertation. However, SSA is 
preci sely what is used to get anthropic reasoning off the ground in the first place. So the 
discovery that SSA leads to “observer-relative” chances, and that these chances arise 
without an identifiable randomization mechanism, is not something that should add new 
scruples. It merely amounts to a restatement o f the assumption from which we started.
C on clu sion
Leslie’s argument that there are cases where anthropic reasoning gives rise to 
paradoxical observer-relative chances does not hold up to scrutiny. We argued that it 
rests on a sense/reference ambiguity and that when this ambiguity is resolved then the 
purported observer-relativity disappears. Several ways in which one could try to 
salvage Leslie’s conclusion were explored and it turned out that none o f them would 
work.
We then considered an example where observers applying SSA end up 
disagreeing about the outcome o f a coin toss. The observers’ disagreement depends 
on a difference in their information sets and is not o f a paradoxical nature; there are 
completely trivial examples o f the same kind o f phenomenon. We also showed that 
(at least for a wide range o f cases) this disparity in beliefs cannot be marshaled into a 
betting arrangement where all parties involved would expect to make a gain.
This example was given a physicalistic reformulation showing that the 
observers’ disagreement does not imply some mysterious irreducible role for the 
observers’ consciousness. What does need to be presupposed, however, unless the 
situation be utterly trivialized, is SSA. This is not a finding that should be taken to 
cast doubt on anthropic reasoning. Rather, it simply elucidates one aspect o f what 
SSA really means. The absence the sort o f paradoxical observer-relative chances that 
Leslie claimed to have found could even be taken to give some indirect support for 
SSA.
A p pend ix
In this appendix it is shown for a quite general set o f cases that adopting and applying 
SSA does not lead rational agents to bet against one another.
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Consider again the case where a fair coin is tossed and a different number o f  
observers are created depending on how the coin falls. The people created as a result 
o f the coin toss make up ‘the group’. In addition to these there exists a set o f  people 
we call the ‘bookies’. Together, the people in the group and the bookies make up the 
set o f people who are said to be ‘in the experiment’. To make the example more
general, we also allow there to be (a possibly empty) set o f observers who are not in
the experiment (i.e. who are not bookies and are not in the group); we call these 
observers ‘outsiders’.
We introduce the following abbreviations:
Number o f people in the group if  coin falls heads = h
Number o f people in the group if  coin falls tails = t
Number o f  bookies = b
Number o f  oirtsiders = u
For “The coin fe ll heads. ”, write H
For ” The coin fell tails. ”, write ~^ H
For ‘7 am in the group. ”, write G
For ‘7  am a bookie. ”, write B
For ‘7 am in the experiment (i.e. I ’m either a  bookie or in the group) ”, write
E
First we want to calculate Pr(//|G&£) and Pi(H\B&E), the probabilities that 
the groupies and the bookies, respectively, should assign to the proposition that the 
coin fell heads. Since G implies E , and B  implies E , we have Pr(H\G8cE) =  Pr(7/|G) 
and Pr(H\B&E) = Pr(//|i?). We can derive Pr(//|G) from the following equations:
Pr(//|G) = Pr(G|/f) Pr(H) / Pr(G) (Bayes’ theorem)
Pv(G\H) = h / (h + b + u) (SSA)
Pr(G| - / / )  = t / ( t  + b + u) (SSA)
Pr(H) = Pr(—•//) = Vt (Fair coin)
Pr(G) = Pr(G|77) Pr(H) + Pr(G|-G7) P r(-tf) (Theorem)
This gives us
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Vt(H\G8cE) = —  ---------^ ^ ----------  .
h '{t + b + uj + / • (/z + b + w}
In an analogous fashion, using Pr(i?|/f) = b / (h + b + u) and Pr(i?|^//) = b / ( t  + b +
w), we get
P r(//|£& £) = t  /- ~ h ~ u--------
(h + b + u) + (t + b + u)
We see that Vr(H\B8cE) is not in general equal to Pr(H\G&E). The bookies 
and the people in the group will arrive at different estimates o f the probability that the 
coin was heads. For instance, if  we have the parameter values {h = 10, t = 1, b = 1, u 
= 10} we get Pr(H\G&E) « 85% and Pr(H\B&E) »  36%. In the limiting case when 
the number o f outsiders is zero, {h = 10, / = 1, b = 1, u = 0}, we have Pr(//|G& £) »  
65% and Vi{H\B8cE) » 15% (which coincides with the result in section 3). In the 
opposite limiting case, when the number o f outsiders is large, {/? = 10, t = 1, b = 1, 
u —>• oo}, we get Pr(//|G&£) * 91% and Pr(H\B8lE) = 50%. In general, we should 
expect the bookies and the groupies to disagree about the outcome o f the coin toss.
N ow  that we know the probabilities can check whether a bet occurs. There are 
two types o f bet that we will consider. In a typel bet a bookie bets against the group 
as a whole, and the group members bet against the set o f bookies as a whole. In a
type 2 bet an individual bookie bets against an individual group member.
Let’s look at the type 1 bet first. The maximal amount $x that a person in the 
group is willing to pay to each bookie if  the coin fell heads in order to get $1 from 
each bookie if  it was tails is given by
?r(H\G)(-x)b + ?r(rH \G )b = 0.
When calculating the rational odds for a bookie we have to take into account the fact 
that depending on the outcome o f the coin toss, the bookie will turn out to have
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betted against a greater or smaller number o f group members. Keeping this in mind, 
we can write down a condition for the minimum amount $y that a bookie has to 
receive (from every group member) if  the coin fell heads in order to be willing to pay 
$1 (to every group member) if  it fell tails:
that nobody expects to win from a bet o f this kind.
Turning now to the type 2 bet, where individual bookies and individuals in the 
group bet directly against each other, we have to take into account an additional 
factor. To simplify things, we assume that it is assured that all o f  the bookies get to 
make a type 2 bet and that no person in the group bets against more than one bookie. 
This implies that the number o f bookies isn’t greater than the smallest number o f  
group members that could have resulted from the coin toss; for otherwise there would 
be no guarantee that all bookies could bet against a unique group member. But this 
means that if  the coin toss generated more than the smallest possible number o f  group 
members then a selection has to be made as to which o f the group members get to bet 
against a bookie. Consequently, a group member who finds that she has been selected 
obtains reason for thinking that the coin fell in such a way as to maximize the 
proportion o f group members that get selected to bet against a bookie. (The bookies’ 
probabilities remain the same as in the previous example.)
Let’s say that it is the tails outcome that produces the smallest group. Let s  
denote the number o f group members that are selected. We require that s  < t . We 
want to calculate the probability for the selected people in the group that the coin was
heads, i.e. Vr(H\G8cE8cS). Since S  implies both G and E, we have Vi(H\G8cE8cS) = 
Pr(H\S). Using
Solving these two fairness equations we find that x = y  = —----------- -
h(t + b + zv)
, which means
Pr(//|.S) = Pr(S|fl) Pr(H) / Pr(S) 
Pr(S\H) = s / ( h  + b + u) 
Pr(S\~^H) = s / ( t  + b + u)
(Bayes’ theorem) 
(SSA)
(SSA)
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Pr(H) = Pr(~1/ / )  = 1/2 (Fair coin)
P r ©  = Pr(S\H)?r(H) + ?r(S\^H)Pr(-H) (Theorem)
we get
fr(H\G&E&S) l + h + u
(t + b + u) + (h + b + u)
Comparing this to the result in the previous example, we see that ? t(H\G&E&S) = 
Vr(H\B&E). This means that the bookies and the group members that are selected 
now agree about the odds. So there is no possible bet between them for which both 
parties would calculate a positive non-zero expected payoff.
We conclude that adopting SSA does not lead observers to place bets against 
each other. Whatever the number o f outsiders, bookies, group members and selected 
group members, there are no bets, either o f type 1 or o f type 2, from which all parties 
should expect to gain.
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CHAPTER 8: PARADOXES OF THE SELF-SAM PLING  
ASSU M PTIO N 65
While chapter 7 sent a rather reassuring message about SSA, this chapter exposes some 
problematic consequences that seem to flow from SSA. These are uncovered with the 
help o f four thought experiments. Among the prim a facie  results are that SSA implies that 
it is reasonable to believe in backward causation and paranormal causation, such as 
psychokinesis, and that SSA recommends actions that seem radically foolish. The rest o f  
the chapter attempts to determine which if  any o f  these prima facie implications are 
genuine, and if so, to assess how strongly they count against SSA. To anticipate the 
outcome, it will be shown that none o f  the most paradoxical implications obtain. 
However, some counterintuitive consequences are genuine. They could be taken as 
reasons for rejecting or modifying SSA. In the next chapter we will consider this option 
further.
Four g ed a n k en  w herein  S S A  y ield s counterintuitive resu lts
The thought experiments we shall conduct here all variations on the same theme. They 
put different problematic aspects o f SSA into focus.
Experiment #1: What the snake said to Eve
Eve and Adam, the first two persons, knew that if  they had sex Eve might have a 
child, and if  she did, they would be driven out from Eden and would go on to have 
billions o f progeny that would fill the Earth with misery. One day a snake sneaked 
up to Eve and said to her: “Pssst, listen! If you have sex with Adam, then either 
you will have a child or you won’t. If you have child then you will have been 
among the first two out o f billions o f people. You would have had an 
extraordinarily early position in the human race. If, one the other hand, you don’t 
become pregnant then you and Adam will turn out to have very typical positions. 
By Bayes’ theorem, the risk that you will have a child is less than one in a billion.
(’5 An ancestor of this chapter was presented at a conference by the London School o f Advanced Study on the 
Doomsday argument (London, Nov. 6, 1998). I’m grateful for comments from the participants there.
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So there is no need to worry about the consequences.”66
Given SSA and the stated assumptions, it is easy to see that the snake’s argument 
is sound. We have Pr(7? < 2 |N  = 2) = 1 and using SSA, ?r(R  < 2\N  > 2 • 109) < 1(T9 . We 
can assume that the prior probability o f  getting pregnant (based on ordinary empirical 
considerations) after sex is very roughly one half, Pr(N  = 2) «  Pr(7V > 2 • 109) « .5 . Thus, 
according to Bayes’ theorem, we have
P r ( A > 2 1 0 9|^ < 2 )
 _____________ Pr(R < 2 \ N  > 2 ' \ 0 9) P t( N  > 2 -109)_____________
“ ? t(R < 2 \ N > 2 • 109) Pr(A > 2 • 109) + ?r(R < 2 \ N  = 2 ) ?r ( N  = 2)
<1(T9
Eve consequently has to conclude that the risk o f her getting pregnant is negligible.
This result seems quite counterintuitive. Most people’s intuition, at least at first 
glance, is that it would be irrational for Eve to think that the risk is that low. It seems 
foolish o f  her to act as if  she were extremely unlikely to get pregnant -  it seems contrary 
to empirical data. And we can assume she knows these data. We can assume that she has 
access to a huge pool o f statistics, maybe based on some population o f  lobotomized 
human drones (lobotomized so that they don’t belong to the reference class, the class 
from which Eve should consider herself a random sample). Yet all this knowledge, 
combined with everything there is to know about the human reproductive system, would 
not change the fact that it would be irrational for Eve to believe that the risk o f her getting 
pregnant is anything other than effectively nil. This is a strange result, but it follows from 
SSA.67
Experiment #2: Hunting with willpower
66 Adam and Eve know that they are the first two persons and that their birth ranks will not be affected by 
their actions. The probabilities referred to below are epistemic probabilities, more specifically they are what 
SSA recommends that Eve and Adam should believe.
67 John Leslie accepts the result, though for reasons that need not be discussed here he thinks it holds only 
to the extent to which our world is deterministic (personal communication). Compare also Leslie Leslie 
1996, pp. 255-6.
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Our next example pushes the reasoning a little further and derives a consequence o f an 
even greater degree o f initial counterintuitiveness:
Assume as before that Adam and Eve were once the only people that existed, and 
that they know for certain that if  they have a child they will be driven out o f  Eden 
and will proceed to have billions o f offspring. But this time they have a foolproof 
way o f generating a child (perhaps by advanced in vitro fertilization). Adam is 
tired o f getting up every morning to go hunting. Together with Eve, he invents the 
following scheme: They form  the firm  intention that unless a  wounded deer limps 
by their cave then they will have a child. They can then sit back and rationally 
expect with near certainty that a wounded dear -  an easy target for Adam’s spear -  
will stroll by.
You can verify this result the same way as above, choosing appropriate values for 
the prior probabilities. The prior probability o f a wounded deer limping by their cave that 
morning is one in ten thousand, say.
In the first experiment we had an example o f what looked like anomalous 
precognition. Here we also have (more clearly than in the previous case) the appearance 
o f psychokinesis. If the example works, which it does if  we assume SSA, it almost seems 
as if  Adam is causing a wounded deer to walk by. For how else could one explain the 
coincidence? Adam knows that he can repeat the procedure morning after morning and 
that he should expect a deer to appear each time. Some mornings he may not form the 
relevant intention and on those mornings no deer turns up. It seems too good to be mere 
coincidence; Adam is tempted to think he has magical causal powers.
Experiment #3: E v e ’s card trick
One morning, Adam shuffles a deck o f cards. At noon, Eve, having had no contact 
with the cards, decides to use her willpower to retroactively choose what card lies 
top. She decides that it shall have been the dame o f spades. In order to ordain this 
outcome, Eve and Adam form the firm intention to have a child unless the dame 
o f spades is top. They can then be virtually certain that when they look at the first 
card they will indeed find the dame o f spades.
Here it looks as if  the couple is in one and the same act performing both 
psychokinesis and backward causation -  no mean feat before breakfast.
Experiment #4: The World Government
It is the year 2100 A.D. and certain technological advances have enabled the 
formation o f an all-powerful and extremely stable world government, UN++. Any
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decision about human action taken by the UN++ will certainly be implemented. 
However, the world government does not have complete control over natural 
phenomena. In particular, there are signs that a series o f n violent gamma ray 
bursts is about to take place at uncomfortably close distances in the near future, 
threatening to damage (but not completely destroy) human settlements. For each 
hypothetical gamma ray burst in this series, astronomical observations give a 90% 
chance that it will happen. In order to avert the crises, UN++ makes the following 
plan: It will create a list o f hypothetical gamma ray bursts, and for each entry on 
this list it decides that if  the it the burst happens, it will build more space colonies 
so as to increase the total number o f humans that will ever have lived by a factor 
of m. By arguments analogous to those in the earlier thought experiments, U N ++ 
can then be confident that the gamma ray burst will not happen, provided m is 
sufficiently great relative to n.
The main new feature o f  this experiment is that it depicts a situation that we can 
potentially actually bring about. Creating UN++ might be practically difficult, and there is 
no guarantee that other preconditions are satisfied (that there are no extraterrestrials, for 
example); yet it is the sort o f undertaking that could quite conceivably be accomplished 
though conventional non-magical means. This will be o f relevance later when w e discuss 
what SSA implies about our actual causal powers.
These four gedanken seem to show that SSA has some highly counterintuitive 
consequences: strange coincidences, precognition, psychokinesis and backward causation 
in situations where we would not expect such phenomena. If these consequences are 
genuine, they must surely count very heavily against the unrestricted version o f  SSA, with 
ramifications for DA and other applications forms o f anthropic reasoning that rely on that 
principle.
However, we shall now see that such an interpretation misreads the experiments. 
A careful look at the situation reveals a different lesson: SSA, in interesting but rather 
subtle ways, avoids the worst o f the purported implications.
D isc u ss io n  of Experim ent # 2
In this section we will discuss Experiment 2. I think that the first and the third 
experiments can be analyzed along similar lines. Experiment 4 involves some additional 
complications which we will address in the next section.
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Adam can repeat Experiment 2 many mornings.68 And the experiment seems 
prim a facie  to show that, given SSA, there will be a series o f remarkable coincidences 
between Adam’s procreational intentions and appearances o f wounded deer. It was 
suggested that such a series o f coincidences could be a ground for attributing paranormal 
causal powers to Adam.
The inference from a long series o f coincidences to an underlying causal link can 
be disputed. Whether such an inference is legitimate would depend on how long is the 
series o f coincidences, what are the circumstances, and also on what theory o f  causation 
one adopts. If the series were sufficiently long and the coincidences sufficiently 
remarkable, intuitive pressure would mount to give the phenomenon a causal 
interpretation; and one can fix the thought experiment so that these conditions are 
satisfied. For the sake o f argument, we may assume the worst case for SSA, namely that if  
the series o f  coincidences occur then Adam will have anomalous causal powers. I will 
argue that even if  we accept SSA, we should still think that neither strange coincidences 
nor anomalous causal powers would have existed if the experiment had been carried out.
We need to be careful when stating what is implied by the argument given in the 
thought experiment. All that was shown is that Adam would have reason to believe that 
his forming the intentions will have the desired outcome. The argument can be extended 
to show that Adam would have reason to believe that the procedure can be repeated; 
provided he keeps forming the right intentions, he should think that morning after 
morning, a wounded deer will turn up. If he doesn’t form the intention on some mornings, 
then on those mornings he should expect deer not to turn up. Adam thus has reason to 
think that wounded deer turn up on those and only on those mornings for which he 
formed the relevant intention. In other words, Adam has reason to believe there will be a 
coincidence. However, we cannot jump from this to the conclusion that there will actually 
be a coincidence. Adam could be mistaken. And he could be mistaken even though he is 
(as the argument in Experiment 2 showed, assuming SSA) perfectly rational.
Imagine for a moment that you are looking at the situation from an external point 
o f view. That is, suppose (per impossible ?) that you are an intelligent observer who is not 
a member o f the reference class. Suppose you know the same non-indexical facts as
68 Note that if he intends to repeat the experiment then the number of offspring that he would have to intend 
to create increases. If the prior probability of the outcome of a deer appearing is one in ten thousand and if  
the trials are independent, then if he wants to do the experiment twice he would have to intend to create at
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Adam; that is, you know the same things as he does except such things as that “I am 
Adam” or “I am among the first two humans” etc. Then the probability you should assign 
to the proposition that a deer will limp by Adam’s cave one specific morning conditional 
on Adam having formed the relevant intention earlier that morning is the same as what we 
called Adam’s prior probability o f deer walking by -  one in ten thousand. As an external 
observer you would consequently not have reason to believe that there were to be a 
coincidence.69
Adam and the external observer, both being rational but having different 
information, make different predictions. At least one o f them must be mistaken (although 
both are “right” in the sense o f  doing the best they can with the evidence available to 
them). In order to determine who was in fact mistaken, we should have to decide whether 
there would be a coincidence or not. Nothing said so far settles this question. There are 
possible worlds where a deer does turn up on precisely those mornings when Adam forms 
the intention, and there are other possible worlds with no such coincidence. The 
description o f the thought experiment does not specify which o f  these two kinds o f  
possible worlds we are referring to; it is underdetermined in this respect.
So far so good, but we want to be able to say something stronger. Let’s pretend 
there actually once existed these two first people, Eve and Adam, and that they had the 
reproductive capacities described in the experiment. We would want to say that if  the 
experiment had actually been done (i.e. if Adam had formed the relevant intentions on 
certain mornings) then almost certainly he would have found no coincidence. Almost 
certainly, no wounded deer would have turned up. That much seems common sense. If  
SSA forced us to relinquish that conviction, it would count quite strongly as a reason for 
rejecting SSA.
We therefore have to evaluate the counterfactual: I f  Adam had form ed the relevant 
intentions, would there have been a coincidence? To answer this, we need a theory o f  
conditionals. I will use a simplified version o f David Lewis’ theory70 but I think what I 
will say generalizes to other accounts o f conditionals. Let w denote the actual world. (We
least on the order of ten million offspring. If he wants to repeat it ten times he would have to intend to 
create about 1040 offspring to get the odds work out in his favor.
69 The reason why there is a discrepancy between what Adam should believe and what the external observer 
should believe is of course that they have different information. If they had the same information they 
would agree. Cmp. chapter 7.
70 The parts of Lewis’ theory that are relevant to the discussion here can be found in chapters 19 and 21 of 
(Lewis 1986).
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are pretending that Adam and Eve actually existed and that they had the appropriate 
reproductive abilities etc.) To determine what would have happened had Adam formed 
the relevant intentions, we look at the closest71 possible world w ’ where he did do the 
experiment. Let t be the time when Adam would have formed the intentions. When 
comparing worlds for closeness to w, we are to disregard features o f them that exclusively 
concern what happens after t. Thus we seek to find a world in which Adam forms the 
intentions and which is maximally similar to w in two respects: first, in its history up to t\ 
and, second, in its laws. Is the closest world (w ’) to w  on these accounts and where Adam 
forms the intentions a world where deer turn up accordingly, or is it a world where there 
is no Adam-deer correlation?
The answer is quite clearly that there is no Adam-deer correlation in w  \  For such 
a w* can be more similar to w on both accounts than can any world containing the 
correlation. Regarding the first account, whether there is a coincidence or not in a world 
presumably makes little difference as to how similar it can be to w with respect to its 
history up to /. But what difference it makes is in favor o f no coincidence. This is so 
because in the absence o f  a correlation the positions and states o f  the deer in the 
neighborhood, at or shortly before t, could be exactly as in w  (where none happened to 
stroll past Adam’s cave on the mornings when he did the experiment). The presence o f a 
correlation, on the other hand, would entail a world that would be somewhat different 
regarding the initial states o f the deer.
Perhaps more decisively, a world with no Adam-deer correlation would tend to 
win out on the second account as well, w  doesn’t (as far as we know) contain any 
instances o f anomalous causation. The laws o f w do not support anomalous causation. 
The laws o f  any world containing an Adam-deer correlation, at least if  the correlation 
were o f  the sort that would prompt us to ascribe it to an underlying causal connection, 
would contain laws supporting anomalous causation. By contrast, the laws o f  a world 
lacking the Adam-deer correlation could easily have laws exactly as in w. Similarity o f  
laws would therefore also favor a w ’ with no correlation.
Since there is no correlation in w ’, the following statement is true: “If Adam had 
formed the intentions, he would have found no correlation”. Although Adam would have
71 I’m simplifying in some ways, for instance by disregarding certain features of Lewis’ analysis designed 
to deal with cases where there is no closest possible world, but perhaps an infinite sequence of possible 
worlds, each closer to the actual world than the preceding ones in the sequence. This and other 
complications are not relevant to the present discussion.
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reason to think that there would be a coincidence, he would find he was mistaken.
One might wonder: if we know all this, why can’t Adam reason in the same way? 
Couldn’t he too figure out that there will be no coincidence? -  He couldn’t, and the 
reason is that he is lacking some knowledge you and I have. Adam has no knowledge o f  
the future that will show that his creative hunting technique will fail. If he does his 
experiment and deer do turn up on precisely those mornings he forms the intention, then it 
could (especially if  the experiment were successfully repeated many times) be the case 
that the effect should be ascribed to a genuine psychokinetic capacity. If he does the 
experiment and no deer turns up, then o f course he has no such capacity. But he has no 
means o f knowing that no deer turns up. The evidence available to him strongly favors 
the hypothesis that there will be a coincidence. So although Adam may understand the 
line o f reasoning that we have been pursuing here, it will not lead him to the conclusion 
we arrived at, because he lacks a crucial premiss.
There is a puzzling point here that needs be addressed. Adam knows that if  he 
forms the intentions then he will very likely witness a coincidence. But he also knows that 
if  he doesn’t form the intentions then it will be the case that he will live in a world like w , 
where it is true that had he done the experiment he would most likely not have witnessed 
a coincidence. That looks paradoxical. Adam’s forming (or not forming) the conditional 
procreational intentions gives him relevant information. Yet, the only information he gets 
is about what choice he made. If that information makes a difference as to whether he 
should expect to see a coincidence, isn’t that just to say that his choice affects whether 
there will be a coincidence or not? If so, it would seem he has got paranormal powers 
after all.
A more careful analysis reveals that this conclusion doesn’t follow. The 
information Adam gets when he forms the intentions is about what choice he made. This 
information has a bearing on whether to expect a coincidence or not, but that doesn’t 
mean that the choice is a cause o f the coincidence. It is simply an indication o f  a 
coincidence. Some things are good indicators o f other things without causing them. Take 
the stock example: the barometer’s falling may be a good indicator o f  impending rain, if  
you knew something about how barometers work, but it is certainly not a cause o f the 
rain. Similarly, there is no need to think o f Adam’s decision to procreate if  and only i f  no 
wounded deer limps by as a cause o f that event, although it will lead Adam to rationally
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believe that that event will happen.
One may feel that an air o f mystery lingers on. Maybe we can put words to it as 
follows: Let E  be the proposition that Adam forms the reproductive intention at time t = 1, 
let C stand for the proposition that there is a coincidence at time t = 2 (i.e. that a deer 
turns up). It would seem that the above discussion commits one to the view that at t =  0 
Adam knows (probabilistically) the following:
(1) If £  then C.
(2) If ~^ E then^C.
(3) If - £  then “if  E  then it would have been the case that - ,C”.
And there seems to be a conflict between (1) and (3).
I suggest that the appearance o f a conflict is due to an equivocation in (3). To 
bring some light into this, we can paraphrase (1) and (2) as:
(1 ’) ProbAdam (C\E) «  1
(2 ’) ProbAdam (~,C|-\E) »  1
But we cannot paraphrase (3) as:
(3’) ProbAdam (_,C|£) « 1
When I said earlier, “If Adam had formed the intentions, he would have found no 
correlation”, I was asserting this on the basis o f  background information that is available 
to us but not to Adam. Our set o f background knowledge differs from Adam’s in respect 
to both non-indexical facts (we have observed the absence o f  any subsequent correlation 
between peoples’ intentions and the behavior o f  deer) and indexical facts (we know that 
we are not among the first two people). Therefore, if  (3) is to have any support in the 
preceding discussion, it should be explicated as:
(3” ) Probwe (- ,QE) * 1
This is not in conflict with (1’). I also asserted that Adam could know this. This gives:
(4 ) ProbAdam (“Probwe (^C\E) * 1”) *  1
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At first sight, it might seem as if there is a conflict between (4) and (1). However, 
appearances in this instance are deceptive.
Let’s first see why it could appear as if  there is a conflict. It has to do with the 
relationship between ProbAdam and Probwe- We have assumed that ProbAdam is a rational 
probability assignment (in the sense: not just logically consistent but “reasonable, 
plausible, intelligent” as well) relative to the set o f background knowledge that Adam has 
at t = 0. And Probwe is a rational probability assignment relative to the set o f  background 
knowledge that we have, say at t = 3. (And o f course we pretend that we know that there 
actually was this fellow Adam at t = 0 and that he had the appropriate reproductive 
abilities etc.) But now, if  we know everything Adam knew, and if  in addition w e have 
some extra knowledge, and if  Adam knows that, then it is irrational o f  him to persist in 
believing what he believes. Instead he ought to adopt our beliefs, which he knows are 
based on more information. At least this follows if  we assume, as we may in this context, 
that our a priori probability function is identical to Adam’s, and that we haven’t made any 
computational error, and that Adam knows all this. That would then imply (3 ’) after all, 
which would contradict (1’).
The fallacy in this argument is that it assumes that Adam knows that w e know 
everything he knows. Adam doesn’t know that, because he doesn ’t know that we exist. He 
may well know that //'we exist then we will know everything (at least every objective -  
non-indexical -  piece o f information) that he knows and then some. But as far as he is 
concerned, we are just hypothetical beings.72 So all that Adam knows is that there is some 
probability function, the one we denoted Probwe, that gives a high conditional probability 
o f ~'C given E. That gets him nowhere. There are infinitely many probability functions, 
and not knowing that w e will actually exist he has no more reason to set his own credence 
equal to our probability function than to any other.
To summarize the results so far, what we have shown is the following: Granting 
SSA, we should think that if  Adam and Eve had carried out the experiment, there would
72 If he did know that we exist, then it would definitely not be the case that he should give a high 
conditional probability to C given E\ Quite the opposite: he would have to set that conditional probability 
equal to zero. This is easy to see: By the definition of the thought experiment, we are here only if Adam has 
a child. Also by stipulation, Adam has a child only if either doesn’t form the intention or he does and no 
deer turns up. It follows that if he forms the intention and we are here, then no deer turns up. So in this case, 
his beliefs would coincide with ours; we too know that if he has in fact formed the intentions then no deer 
turned up.
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almost certainly not have been any strange coincidences. There is thus no reason to 
ascribe anomalous causal powers to Adam. Eve and Adam would rationally think 
otherwise but they would simply be mistaken. Although they can recognize the line o f  
reasoning we have been pursuing they won’t be moved by its conclusion, because it 
hinges on a premiss that we -  but not they -  know is true. Good news for SSA.
One more point needs to be addressed in relation to Experiment 2. We have seen 
that what the thought experiments demonstrate is not strange coincidences or anomalous 
causation but simply that Adam and Eve would be misled. Now, there might be a 
temptation to see this by itself as a ground for rejecting SSA -  if  a principle misleads 
people it is not reliable and should not be adopted. However, this is a temptation to be 
resisted, because there is a good answer available to the proponent o f SSA. Namely, as 
follows: It is in the nature o f probabilistic reasoning that some people using it, if  they are 
in unusual circumstances, will be misled. Eve and Adam were in highly unusual 
circumstances -  they were the first two humans -  so we shouldn’t bee too impressed by 
the fact that the reasoning based on SSA didn’t work for them. For a fair assessment o f  
the reliability o f  SSA we have to look at how it performs not only in exceptional cases but 
in more normal cases as well.
Compare the situation to the story about the Prison in chapter 4. There, remember, 
one hundred people were placed in one Prison and were asked to guess the color o f the 
outside o f  their cell. Ninety cells were blue and ten were red. SSA recommended that a 
person in a cell thinks that with 90% probability she is in a blue cell. If all these people 
bet accordingly, 90% o f them will win their bets. The unfortunate 10% who happen to be 
in red cells lose their bets, but it would be unfair to blame SSA for that. They were simply 
unlucky. Overall, SSA will lead 90% to win, compared to merely 50% if  SSA is rejected 
and people bet at random. This consideration supports SSA.
What about the “overall effect” o f everybody adopting SSA in the three 
experiments we have been pondering above? Here the situation is more complicated 
because Adam and Eve have much more information than the people in the cells. Another 
complication is that we are considering a story where there are two competing hypotheses 
about the total number o f people that will have existed. In both these respects the thought 
experiments are similar to DA and presumably no easier to settle. What we are trying to 
do in this chapter is examine some other features o f SSA that are not salient in DA  -  
namely that it seemed to lead to strange coincidences and anomalous causation.
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D isc u ss io n  of Experim ent # 4
Experiment 4 introduces a new difficulty. For although creating UN++ and persuading it to 
adopt the plan would no doubt be a daunting task, it is the sort o f project that w e could 
quite conceivably carry out with non-magical means. Experiment 4 places us in more or 
less the same situation as Adam and Eve in the other three experiments. This twist 
demands that we carry the investigation one step further.
Let us suppose that if there is a long series o f coincidences (“C”) between items 
on the UN++ list and failed gamma ray bursts then there is anomalous causation (“A C ’). 
This supposition is more problematic than the corresponding assumption when w e were 
discussing Adam and Eve. For the point o f Experiment 4 is that it is claiming some 
degree o f practical possibility, and it is not clear that this supposition could be satisfied in 
the real world. It depends on the details and on what view o f causation one holds, but it 
could well be that the list o f coincidences would have to be quite long before one would 
be inclined to regard it as a manifestation o f an underlying causal link. And since the 
number o f people that UN++ would have to create in case o f failure increases rapidly as 
the list grows longer, it is not clear that such a plan is feasible. But let’s set this scruple to 
one side in order to give the objection to SSA as good a shot as it can hope to have.
A first point is that even if we accept SSA, it doesn’t follow that w e reason believe 
that C  will happen. For we might think that it is unlikely both that UN++ will ever be 
formed and that, if  formed, it will adopt and carry out the relevant sort o f  plan. Without 
the UN++ executing the plan, there is no reason to expect C (and consequently no reason 
to believe that there will be AC).
But there is a more subtle way o f attempting to turn Experiment 4 into an 
objection against SSA. One could argue that we know that we now have the causal 
powers to create UN++ and make it adopt the plan; and w e have good reason (given SSA) 
to think that if we do this then there will be C and hence AC. But if  w e now have the 
ability to bring about AC  then we now, ipso facto, have AC. Since this is absurd w e should 
reject SSA.
This reasoning is fallacious. Our forming UN++ and making it adopt the plan 
would be an indication to us that there is a correlation between the list and gamma ray 
bursts. But it would not cause there to be a correlation unless we do in fact have^lC. If we 
don’t have AC  then forming UN++ and making it adopt the plan (call this event “A ”) has 
no influence whatever on astronomical phenomena, although it misleads us to thinking we
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have. If we do have AC  o f the relevant sort, then o f course the same actions would 
influence astronomical phenomena and cause a correlation. But the point is this: the fact 
that we have the ability to do A does not in any way determine whether we have AC. It 
doesn’t even imply that we have reason to think that we have AC.
In order to be perfectly clear about this point, let me explicitly write down the 
inference I am rejecting. I’m claiming that from the following two premises:
(5) We have strong reasons to think that if  we do A then we will have brought
about C.
(6) We have strong reasons to think that we have the power to do A. 
one cannot legitimately infer:
(7) We have strong reasons to think that we have the power to bring about C.
My reason for rejecting this inference is that one can consistently hold the conjunction o f  
(5) and (6) together with the following:
(8) If we don’t do A then the counterfactual “Had we done A then C would have
occurred” is false.
There might be a temptation to think that the counterfactual in (8) would have 
been true even if  don’t do A. I suggest that this is due to the fact that (granting SSA) our 
conditional probability o f  C given that we do A is large. Let’s abbreviate this conditional 
probability ‘Pr(C\Ay. If Pr(C|/l) is large, doesn’t that mean that C would (probably) have 
happened if  we had done A? Not so. One must not confuse the conditional probability 
Pr(C|;4) with the counterfactual “C would have happened if  A had happened”. For one 
thing, the reason why your conditional probability Pr(C|v4) is large is that you have 
included indexical information (about your birth rank) in the background information. Yet 
one may well choose to exclude indexical information from the set o f facts upon which 
counterfactuals are to supervene. (Especially so if  one intends to use counterfactuals to 
define causality, which should presumably be an objective notion and therefore should 
not depend on indexical facts.)
So, to reiterate, even though Pr(C\A) is large (as stated in (5)) and even though we 
can do A (as stated in (6)), we still know that, given that we d o n ’t do A, C  almost certainly
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does not happen and would not have happened even if we had done A. As a matter o f fact, 
we seem to have fairly good empirical grounds for thinking that w e w on’t do A. 
Experiment 4, therefore, does not show that we have reason to think that there is AC. -  
Again, good news for SSA.
Finally, although it may not be directly relevant to assessing whether SSA is true, it is 
interesting to ask: Would it be rational (given SSA) fo r  UN++ to adopt the plan?13
The UN++ should decrease its credence o f the proposition that a gamma ray burst 
will occur if it decides to adopt the plan. Its conditional credence Pr(Gamma ray burst | 
Plan adopted) is smaller than Pr(Gamma ray burst); this is what the thought experiment 
showed. Provided a gamma ray burst has a sufficiently great negative utility, non-causal 
decision theories would recommend that the plan be adopted.
What about causal decision theories? If a theory o f causation is adopted according 
to which no AC  would be involved even if  C happens, then obviously causal decision 
theories would say that the plan is misguided and shouldn’t be adopted. The case is more 
complicated on a theory o f  causation that says that there is A C  if  C happens. UN++ should 
then believe the following: If it adopts the plan, it will have caused the outcome o f  
averting the gamma ray burst; if it doesn’t adopt the plan, then it is not the case that had it 
adopted the plan it would have averted the gamma ray burst. (This essentially just repeats 
(5) and (8).) The question is whether causal decision theories would in these 
circumstances recommend that UN++ adopt the plan.
The decision that UN++ makes gives it information about whether it has A C  or not. 
Yet, it could be argued that when UN++ deliberates on the decision, it can only take into 
account information available to it prior to the decision, and this information doesn’t 
suffice to determine whether it has AC. UN++ therefore has to make its decision under 
uncertainty. Since on a causal decision theory UN++ should do A only if  it has AC, UN++ 
would have to act on some preliminary guess about how likely it seems that AC; and since 
AC  is strongly correlated with what decision UN++ makes, it would also base its decision, 
implicitly at least, on a guess about what its decision will be. If it thinks it will eventually 
choose to do A, it has reason to think it has AC, and thus it should do A. If it thinks it will
'3 The reason this question doesn’t seem relevant to the evaluation of SSA is that the answer is likely to be 
“spoils to the victor” -  proponents of SSA will say that whatever SSA implies is rational, and its critics may 
dispute this. Both would be guilty of question-begging if they tried to use it as an argument for or against 
SSA.
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eventually choose not to do A, it has reason to think that it hasn’t got ^4C, and should thus 
not do A . UN++ therefore seems to be faced with a somewhat degenerate decision problem 
in which it should choose whatever it preliminary guesses it will come to choose. More 
could no doubt be said about the decision theoretical aspects o f this scenario, but I will 
leave it at that. Interested readers may compare the situation to the partly analogous case 
o f  the super-Newcomb problem presented in an appendix.
C on clu sion
We have examined four gedanken designed to tease out some surprising consequences o f  
SSA. In Experiment 2, it looked as though SSA implied strange coincidences and that 
Adam had psychokinetic powers. On closer analysis it turned out that it implies no such 
thing. It gives us no reason to think that there would have been coincidences or 
anomalous causation if  Adam had carried out the experiment. SSA does lead Adam to 
think otherwise, but he would have been mistaken.
The fact that SSA would have misled Adam is no argument against it. For it is in 
the nature o f probabilistic reasoning that in exceptional circumstances users will be 
mislead, and Adam is precisely such an untypically positioned observer. If we want to 
assess the reliability o f  reasoning based on SSA we have to look not only at the 
exceptional cases were it fails but also at the normal cases where it succeeds. In Prison 
(chapter 4), for example, SSA maximizes the fraction o f all observers who are right.
Experiment 4 shifted the setting to one where we might actually have the potential 
to carry out the actions under investigation. We found that SSA does not give us reason to 
think that there will be strange coincidences or that we (or UN++) have anomalous causal 
powers. However, there are certain (empirically implausible-looking) hypothetical 
circumstances under which it would. I f  we knew for certain that the UN++ existed, and 
that it had the power to create humans in the requisite astronomical numbers and 
possessed the requisite stability to certainly carry out its original intentions, and that the 
other presuppositions behind the thought experiment were also satisfied -  no 
extraterrestrials, all persons created are in the reference class, etc. -  then SSA implies that 
w e should expect to see the strange coincidences (intuitively: because this would make it 
enormously much less remarkable that we should have the birth ranks w e have). But this
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is extremely unlikely.74 Not all those who take the Doomsday argument in stride will roll 
over when faced with this implication.
All this notwithstanding, it is fair to describe the SSA-based recommendation to 
Eve, that she need not worry about getting pregnant, and the recommendation to Adam, 
that he should expect a wounded deer to walk by the cave given that he and Eve form the 
appropriate reproductive intentions, as remarkable and strongly counterintuitive. And yet, 
we seem forced to these conclusion if  we accept the arguments for SSA given in chapter 
4. The next chapter, which is the last chapter o f the dissertation, suggests a way out o f this 
dilemma.
Appendix: A S u p erN ew com b  problem
The following variant o f the Newcomb problem may be compared to the answer to 
question 4 for the case where C  would constitute a causal connection:
A SuperNewcomb problem. There are two boxes in front o f  you and you are asked 
to choose between taking only box B  or taking both box A and B. Box A contains 
$1000. Box B  will contain either nothing or $1,000,000. What B  will contain is (or 
will be) determined by Predictor, who has an excellent track record o f predicting 
your choices. There are two possibilities. Either Predictor has already made his 
move by predicting your choice and putting a million dollars in B  iff he predicted 
that you will take only B (like in the ordinary Newcomb problem); or else 
Predictor has not yet made his move but will wait and observe what box you 
choose and then put a million dollars in B  iff you take only B. In cases like this, 
Predictor makes his move before the subject roughly half o f  the time. However, 
there is a Metapredictor, who has an excellent track record o f  predicting 
Predictor’s choices as well as your own. You know all this. Metapredictor informs 
you o f the following truth functional: Either you choose A and B, and Predictor 
will make his move after you make your choice; or else you choose only B , and 
Predictor has already made his choice. Now, what do you choose?
The added complication for causal decision theorists, compared to the ordinary 
Newcomb problem, is that you don’t know whether your choice will have a causal 
influence on the content o f the box B. If Predictor made his move before you make your 
choice, then (let us assume) your choice doesn't affect what’s in the box. But if  he makes
74 In fact, if we accept SSA we should think this situation astronomically unlikely -  about as unlikely as the 
coincidences would be! (We can see this without going into details. If we ever get to the situation where 
UN++ executes the plan then one out of two things must happen, both of which have an extremely low prior 
probability: a series of strange coincidences, or -  which is even more unlikely given SSA -  we happen to be 
among the very first few out of astronomically large numbers of humans. If Pi implies that either P2 or P3,
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his move after yours, by observing what choice you made, then you certainly do causally 
determine what B contains. In a sense the decision problem presented here is the opposite 
o f the one faced by UN++. There, a preliminary belief about what you will choose would 
be transformed into a reason for making that choice. Here, a preliminary decision would 
seem to undermine itself (given a causal decision theory). If you think you will choose 
two boxes then you have reason to think that your choice will causally influence what’s in 
the boxes, and so it seems you should take only one box. But if  you think you will take 
only one box then you should think that your choice will not influence the contents, and 
thus you would appear to be led back to the decision to take both boxes; and so on.
and if we assign very low probability to both P2 and P3, then we have to assign a low probability to P] as 
well.)
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CHAPTER 9: A THEORY OF OBSERVATIONAL  
SELEC TIO N  EFFECTS
In chapter 2 we established some preliminary conclusions regarding anthropic reasoning 
in cosmology. In chapter 3 we found what seemed to lie at the core o f  such reasoning and 
expressed it in the form o f SSA. Chapter 4 presented arguments for applying SSA to a 
wide range o f cases. Up to this point, it seemed that SSA could serve as the basis for a 
theory o f observational selection effects and that all that remained was to fill in the 
details.
Chapter 5 reviewed and analyzed the Doomsday argument. We identified what 
assumptions are needed in addition to accepting Model 2 for the God’s Coin Toss 
gedanken discussed in chapter 4 in order to derive the intended consequence. We also 
noted that there were a number o f alternative conclusions that one could draw (other than 
that doom will strike soon) even were one persuaded that the basic structure o f the 
argument is sound. That predictions such as those generated by DA should follow from a 
theory o f observational selection effects may be surprising, but perhaps something we 
ought to feel ourselves driven towards -  if  there were no other problems this approach. 
Chapter 6 defended DA against a series o f objections, and chapter 7 showed that SSA did 
not give rise to alleged paradoxical “observer-relative chances”. All this pointed to the 
coherence and plausibility o f basing a theory o f observational selection effects on SSA, 
despite the fact that this would lead, in one small step, to DA.
However, in chapter 8 we uncovered some rather shockingly counterintuitive 
consequences o f an unrestricted use o f SSA. Although a careful analysis revealed that 
these consequences do not include the prima facie implication that we should believe that 
w e have paranormal causal powers, they do include advise to certain specially situated 
hypothetical agents (Adam and Eve, UN++) to behave in ways which may appear to be 
quite foolish. These implications are not impossible to accept; John Leslie, for example, 
seems quite happy to bite the bullets. Yet many o f us, endowed with less hardy epistemic 
teeth and stomachs, will find ingesting this meal o f full metal jacket ammunition a deeply
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unsatisfying experience.
In this chapter we therefore revisit the arguments for SSA given in chapter 4 and 
propose a modified version o f SSA. This revised principle forms the basis o f  a new theory 
o f observational selection effects, which I claim is the first one to meet the full range o f  
success-criteria that we have established in the preceding investigations.
Criteria
Let’s list what some o f these criteria are that any theory o f observational selection effects 
should satisfy:
•  It must enable probabilistic observational consequences to be derived from typical 
cosmological theories. In particular, the theory should work for multiverse models 
and for big-single-universe models containing freak observers in a way that does 
not make a mockery o f current scientific practice.
• It should provide a framework for anthropic inference in other fields, including 
thermodynamics and evolutionary biology.
• It must agree with intuitions in various thought experiments, including Prison, 
Emeralds, and Two Batches, and God’s Coin Toss. (A version o f the God’s Coin 
Toss gedanken will be reassessed below.)
• It should not yield the counterintuitive results we discovered in the four gedanken 
conducted in chapter 8. (If not strictly a success-criterion, this is at least a strong 
desideratum.)
• Ideally, it should not support DA. (This is a weaker desideratum.)
• But in achieving the two previous points, it must not rely on any o f  the objections 
against DA set out in the literature, since those are fallacious.
• In particular, it should not incorporate SIA, or any supposition that amounts to the 
same thing.
• It should account for everyday reasoning that involves observational selection 
effects, such as the example relating to traffic planning that we discussed in 
chapter 4.75
When these specific criteria and desiderata are combined with general theoretical goals -
75 A complete theory of observational selection effects (which is not on offer in this dissertation) would also 
manage the following two feats:
• Solving tire problem of the reference class.
• Handling the infinite case (without making unjustifiable assumptions).
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simplicity, coherence, non-arbitrariness, intuitive plausibility etc. -  we have enough 
constraints that we should be very happy if we can find even one theory that fits them all. 
A theory that does that will, I believe, automatically be seen as attractive, maybe even 
compelling.
This chapter aims to propose such a theory.
T h e outlines of a solution
I suggest that in order to get the right approach to these complex problems, we first have 
to move from SSA to the more general SSSA. That gives us additional analytical 
firepower that will prove useful.
Next, we home in 0 1 1  a key lesson that emerges from the preceding investigations: 
that the critical point, the fountainhead from which all the paradoxical results flow, seems 
to be the contexts where the hypotheses under consideration imply different numbers o f  
observers. We find such contexts in the case o f DA and the various Adam-and-Eve 
gedanken. By contrast, things seem to be working fine as long as the total number o f  
observers is constant. This gives us an important clue. Recall that we found in chapter 4 
that one type o f cases where the definition o f  the reference class is relevant for what 
probability assignments we end up with are those where the total number o f  observers 
vary depending on which hypothesis is true. This suggests that the solution w e’re looking 
for may have something to do with how the reference class is defined.
To focus maximally on the core issue, therefore, let us think about the simplest 
possible case where the number o f observers is a variable that we can use to model the 
reasoning that is at work in DA and the Adam-and Eve gedanken:
G od's Coin Toss, version three (G3). In an otherwise empty world, God tosses a 
fair coin. If it falls heads, He creates a room with one observer at time zero and 
creates an additional observer in the same room one hour later. If it falls tails, He 
creates a room with one observer at time zero but does not add any other observer. 
There is a clock on the wall, so everyone can see what time it is. Everyone knows 
the experimental setup. After two hours the experiment ends, and all observers are 
killed.
To avoid unnecessary complications, we can assume that there is one observer-moment in 
the first hour, and one or two observer-moments (depending on how the coin fell) in the
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second hour. We can depict the situation as follows:
Tails
Heads
Figure 6: God’s Coin Toss, version 3 (G3)
This is similar to the original version o f the God’s Coin Toss (G l) discussed in chapter 4, 
except that here the potential second observer begins to exist only after one hour and 
nobody is ignorant about their beard color.
In chapter 4, we considered three models for how to reason about G l. Rejecting 
Model 1 and Model 3, we were left with Model 2 -  the model which we have 
subsequently seen leads to counterintuitive results. Is it perhaps possible that there is 
some other, better, way of reasoning that we have not yet considered and that could 
withstand the objections we found against Model 1 and Model 3? Let’s consider again, 
this time focusing on G3 (which provides a closer analogy to the problematic cases of 
Adam-and-Eve and DA) what are the probabilities that should be associated with each of 
the observer-moments.
Now, if all these observer-moments would belong to the same reference class, 
then it follows from directly from SSSA that
P(Early | Tails) = 1/2, and 
P(Early | Heads) =1/3.
171
Together with knowledge that the coin toss was fair (P(Heads) = P(Tails) = 1/2)), Bayes’ 
theorem then implies:
P(Tails | Early) = 3/5
P(Heads | Early) = 2/5.
In words, we get a probability shift in favor o f Tails, the hypothesis which would entail 
the smaller number o f additional observer-moments.76 This mirrors the finding that for 
example Adam’s reasoning gives him confidence that the event will happen (a wounded 
deer appearing) that would lead to there being fewer people in addition to Adam (the first 
person). It also mirrors DA, where we are urged to conclude that extinction events are 
more likely than previously thought, because they entail that there would be fewer 
additional people.
This suggests that if  we are unwilling to accept these consequences, then we 
should not place all observer-moments in G3 in the same reference class. Instead, w e may 
segregate early observer-moments from late ones. A possible justification for doing this is 
that the early observer-moments are different from the later ones in ways that are not 
small or arbitrary but central to the problem at hand. The early observer-moments are 
ignorant about how the coin fell and are attempting to figure that out using some form o f  
anthropic reasoning; the late observer-moments know the outcome o f the coin toss and 
are not applying SSSA or anything like it.
If we do place early and late observer-moments in separate reference classes, then 
SSSA entails that early observer-moments should think there is a fifty-fifty probability o f  
Heads. This is because the fraction o f all observer-moments in their reference class who 
are observing what they (the early observer-moments) are observing is the same whether
'6 This may look like a sort of “inverse SIA”, but that would be a misleading interpretation. SIA would 
have you assigns a higher a priori (i.e. conditional only on the fact that you exist) probability to worlds that 
contain greater numbers of observers. But the DA-like probability shift in favor of hypotheses entailing 
fewer observers does not represent a general a priori bias in favor of possible worlds with fewer observers. 
Rather, it reduces the probability of those hypotheses on which there would be many additional observers 
beyond yourself compared to hypotheses on which it was guaranteed that an observer like you would exist 
but not many other observers. Thus, it is because whether or not the human species will last for long, there 
would still have been “early” observers, that finding yourself as one of these “early” observers gives you
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the coin fell heads or tails (namely, 1 in each case). SSSA here is interpreted as saying 
that each observer-moment should reason as if they were a random sample from all 
observer-moments in their reference class. This refinement o f SSSA we can call SSSA-R  
(the “Strong Self-Sampling Assumption with a relativized reference class definition R”). 
We define it formally as follows.
Form alizing the theory: Equation S S S A -R
Let a  be an observer-moment with a prior probability function Pa . Let Q a be the class 
o f  all possible observer-moments that belong to the same reference class as a  (according
7 7to R). Let w a be the possible world in which a  is located. Let e be some evidence o f  
the form “ a  where Q e is a class o f  possible observer-moments. Let h be some
hypothesis, and let Clh be the class o f possible observer-moments about whom h is true. 
(If h ascribes some property to a possible observer-moment then h is true about those and 
only those possible observer-moment that have the property in question; if  h is non- 
indexical, not referring to any particular observer-moment, then h is true about all and 
only those possible observer-moments that live in possible worlds where h holds true.) 
Finally, let O(w) be the class o f observer-moments in the possible world w. W e then 
have
P « m  = -  Z  (SSSA-R)
r , P „ r> n (w „ )|
where y  is a normalization constant given by
r = Z
P. o o
o'.-Q, | o a n n ( > 0 | '
reason, according to DA, to think that there will not be hugely many observers after you. This probability 
shift is a posteriori.
77 Earlier we included only actually existing observer-moments in the reference class. However, it is 
expedient for present purposes to have a concise notation for this broader class which includes possible 
observer-moments, so from now on we use the term “reference class” for this more inclusive notion. This is 
merely a terminological convenience and does not by itself reflect a substantive deviation from our previous 
approach.
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It may be helpful to illustrate the use o f (SSSA-R) on the G3 gedanken described
above.
wj (Heads) w2 (Tails)
Q•h
Figure 7: SSSA-R applied to G3
The possible worlds wj and w2 represent the following possibilities:
wj\ The coin fell heads.
W2 '. The coin fell tails.
We can assume that the observer-moments share the prior P(w;) = P(w2) = 1/2. Let h be 
the hypothesis that the coin fell heads, and e the information available to an early 
observer-moment. If we use a reference class definition R that places early and late 
observer-moments in separate reference classes, we have
As can be seen in the diagram, we have
r ,n (w „ i ) = a 1
174
n £ X w a > )  =  a 3
From this it follows that y  = 1 and Pa? (h\e) = Pa  ^(h\e) = 1 / 2 . That is, the early observer- 
moments are perfectly ignorant as to which way the coin fell.
Non-triviality of the referen ce  c la s s
We thus see how by focusing on observer-moments instead o f observers as wholes, and 
by using non-universal reference classes, we avoid the counterintuitive consequences that 
flow' from applying SSA with an unrestricted reference class in DA, the Adam-and-Eve 
and the UN++ gedanken.
We justified placing some observer-moments in different reference classes in G3 
by appealing to the differences between the observer-moments. For example, the 
difference between a l and a 2 was said to be “not small or arbitrary” but on the contrary 
“central to the problem at hand”. A question that arises naturally at this stage is whether it 
is possible to say something more definite about the criteria for membership in an 
observer-moment’s reference class.
One beguilingly simple idea, which we shall however be forced to reject, is that 
the reference class for a given observer-moment consists o f those and only those 
observer-moments from which it is subjectively indistinguishable:
(V a )f2 r, = { a i : a i is subjectively indistinguishable from or} (R°)
Two observer-moments are subjectively indistinguishable iff they can’t tell which o f  them 
they are. (Being able to say “I am this observer-moment, not that one” does not count as 
being able to tell which observer-moment you are.) To give an example, if  one observer- 
moment has a pain in the toe and another has a pain in the finger, they are not subjectively 
indistinguishable; for they can identify themselves as “this is the observer-moment with 
the pain in the toe” and “this is the observer-moment with the pain in the finger”, 
respectively. By contrast, if  two brains are in the precisely the same state, then -  
assuming epistemic states supervene on brain states -  the two corresponding observer- 
moments will be subjectively indistinguishable. The same holds if  the brains are in
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slightly different states but the differences are imperceptible to the subjects.
If the two early observer-moments a ] and a 3 are subjectively indistinguishable 
in G3, then we can directly apply this definition of the reference class (R°) and get the 
same result as above.
If a ] and a 3 are subjectively distinguishable, we can still get the right answer 
with R°. In order to do that we need to modify the formal representation by considering a 
more fine-grained partition o f the possibilities involved. Thus, to be concrete, suppose 
that the difference between a ,  and a 3 is that they have different pains (in toe vs. finger). 
Since early observer-moments do not know whether the finger-pain occurs in the two- 
person scenario (the coin falls heads) or in the one-person scenario (the coin falls tails), 
we have to consider four possible worlds in order to model the situation:
wj  (Heads&~’F) w2 (Heads&F) w3 (Tails&->F) m’4 (Tails&F)
• a
O = 0  = Q
Figure 8: Modeling God's Coin Toss (G3) using SSSA-R with minimal reference class (R
-  R°)
In this expanded representation, which is necessary if we want to use R°, we can 
explicitly model uncertainty as to whether it is the black-bearded observer or the red- 
bearded observer who has pain in his toe. The possible worlds m>j-W4 represent the 
following possibilities:
Wj\ The coin fell heads and the early observer has no pain  in his finger. 
w2: The coin fell heads and the early observer has a pain  in his finger. 
w3: The coin fell tails and the early observer has no pain  in his finger. 
w4\ The coin fell tails and the early observer has a pain  in his finger.
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We can assume that the observer-moments share the prior P(w,) = 1/4 (for i = 1,2,3,4). Let 
h be the hypothesis that the coin fell heads, and e the information available to an early
observer-moment with a toe-pain (i.e. without a finger-pain). By R°, the reference class
for such an observer-moment is
“ ^a, = ^ « 5 = > a 5 } •
As can be seen in the diagram, we have
o  f — {oc, } .
From this it follows that y  = 1 / 2 and P (h\e) = (h\e) = 1 /2 .  That is, in this version
o f  God’s Coin Toss we get the same result with the minimalistic reference class definition 
R° as we got on the revised approach o f the previous section were we lumped all the early 
observer-moments together in the same reference class (and consequently a different 
result from the one on the original approach which used the maximally wide reference 
class definition where all observer-moments were in the same reference class).
So R° can be made to work in this version o f God’s Coin Toss even if the 
participants are never in subjectively indistinguishable states. This makes R° look 
attractive -  it’s a neat, clear-cut, non-arbitrary definition o f the reference class, and 
applying SSSA-R with this reference class definition expunges all the counterintuitive 
implications stemming from using an unrestricted reference class as in the original 
approach. Unfortunately, there are cases where R° does not work. In particular, recall the 
freak-observer-from-black-hole problem that we discussed in chapter 3 and 4. Suppose T1 
and T2 are two theories that each postulate a big universe with black holes. According to 
77, the vast majority o f all observers observe values o f  physical constants in agreement 
with what we observe in the actual universe, and only a minority o f freak observers are 
deluded and observe the physical constants having different values. According to T2 it is 
the other way around: the normal observers observe physical constants having other 
values than what we observe, and a small minority o f freak observers make observations 
that agree with ours. Intuitively one would clearly want to say that our observations favor
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T1 over 72.78 Yet this is not possible on R°. For according to R°, the reference class to 
which we belong consists o f all and only those observers-moments who make these 
observations that we make -  other observer-moments being subjectively distinguishable. 
If 77 and 72 both imply that the universe is big enough for it to be certain (or very 
probable) that it contains at least some observer making the observations that w e are 
actually making, then on R° our evidence would not favor 77 over T2. We can prove this 
formally as follows:
Consider an observer-moment a , who, in light o f evidence e , considers what 
probability to assign to the mutually exclusive hypotheses hj(  1 < j  < n ) .  By R° we 
have Q a = Q.e 79 SSSA-R0 then gives
P a ( h j \ e )  =  -  X  P - y
r no. 1 0 . ^ 0 0 1
Let {w. }.=v/(/)} be the class o f worlds where h, is true and for which n i l ,  is
non-empty. We can thus write:
Pa(h,\e) = -  £  I  P° M
Y »ffA^ (fy)creQ/^ r'iQl.nQ(vij)
Since hj is true in w, if  i e  M {hj ) ,  we have n (w ,) c  Q hj, giving:
= -
Y i eM (hj)
For each hj which implies the existence o f  at least one observer-moment 
compatible with e80, n ( w . ) n f l e is non-empty for each w, in which hj is true. For 
such a hj we therefore have
78 Consider that this example, or a slightly modified version thereof, may well reflect the actual situation. 
Denying that our observations favor T1 over T2 would have catastrophic consequences for contemporary 
cosmology, as we saw in chapter 4.
79 Q e is the class of all the possible observer-moments whose total evidence is e. Let x be a member of 
Q e . Then x is subjectively indistinguishable from a  since otherwise there would be some evidence that x 
would have that a  lacks -  namely “This observer-moment has FY, where F  is whatever feature 
subjectively distinguishes x from a  ; hence x is a member of too. Conversely, suppose that x is a
member of Q a . Then x is subjectively indistinguishable from a  (given SSSA-R0), and hence x has the 
same total evidence as a  . Therefore, SSSA-R0 implies that Q a = Q e .
80 We say that an observer-moment a  is incompatible with e iff a  £  f l e .
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Forming the ratio between two such hypotheses, hj and hk, we thus find that this is 
unchanged under conditionalization on e,
W « )  p . % )
PA K \e )  P A K ) '
This means that e does not selectively favour any o f the hypotheses hj that implies 
that some observer-moment is compatible with e.
If this consequence is unacceptable, we have to reject R° as a definition o f  the 
reference class. Any workable reference class definition must permit reference classes to 
contain observer-moments that are subjectively distinguishable; the reference class 
definition is in this sense non-trivial.
This shows that observer-moments that are incompatible with e have a role to play 
when working out the credence o f  observer-moments whose total evidence is e. It is 
worth emphasizing this important point further by means o f a concrete example. Consider 
the following gedanken:
Blackbeards and Redbeards. Two theories, T1 and T2, are assigned equal prior 
probabilities. On T1 there three rooms: two o f them contain observers with black 
beards and one contains an observer with red beard. On 72, there is one room with 
a black-bearded observer and two with red-bearded ones. Except for these rooms 
the world is empty, and the observers know what color their beard is (but they 
cannot see what’s in the other rooms). You find yourself in one o f  the rooms as a 
blackbeard. What credence should you give to 77?
Figure 9 depicts this setup.
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77
T2
Figure 9: The Blackbeards and Redbeards thought experiment
By direct analogy to the cosmology case, we know that the answer should be that 
observing that you have a black beard gives you reason to favor 77 over T2. But if  we use 
R° as our definition of the reference class, we do not get that result.
In Figure 10, /7 ,, and a 2 are the blackbeard observer-moments, and e is the
information available to such an observer-moment (“This observer-moment is a 
blackbeard ”). h is the hypothesis that 77 is true. Given SSSA-R0, then the observer- 
moments are divided into two reference classes: the blackbeards and the redbeards 
(assuming that they are not subjectively distinguishable in any other way than via their 
beard color). Thus, for example, a x belongs to the reference class a 2j .
V
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Figure 10: Applying SSSA-R to the Blackbeards and Redbeards thought 
experiment using R = R° (an incorrect reference class definition)
This gives Pa { h \ e ) - \ I 2  ( y  = 1). With R°, therefore, blackbeards’ credence o f T1 is no 
greater than of T2.
A broader definition o f the reference class will give the correct result. Suppose all 
observer-moments in Blackbeards and Redbeards are included in the same reference
class:
This gives P = 2 1 3 .  That is, an observer-moment who observers black beard obtainsO f/, ’
some reason to think that T1 is true.
This establishes boundaries for how the reference class can be defined. The 
reference class to which an observer-moment a  belongs consists o f those and only those 
observer-moments that are relevantly similar to a  . We have just seen that observer-
w] (77 is true) (T2 is true)
Figure 11: Applying SSSA-R to the Blackbeards and Redbeards thought 
experiment with a reference class definition R such that R  ^  R °
8
moments can be relevantly similar even if they are subjectively distinguishable. And we 
saw before that if  we reject the paradoxical recommendations in the Adam-and-Eve and 
UN+" gedanken that follow from an unrestricted use o f SSSA (or SSA), then w e also 
know that not all observer-moments are relevantly similar. We thus have ways o f  testing 
suggestions for how to define the reference class. On the one hand they must not be so 
permissive as to give counterintuitive results in Adam-and-Eve and UN++-type examples 
-  Scylla. On the other hand, they must not be so stringent as to make cosmological 
theorizing impossible because o f the freak-observer problem -  Charybdis. Any approach 
that wishes to steer clear o f paradox must avoid getting too close to either o f  these 
extremes.
If C(RU) is the universal class o f possible observer-moments, and C(R°) is the 
class that only includes those observer-moments that are subjectively indistinguishable 
from a , and if  C( Ra ) is the correct reference class for observer-moment a , then we
have in general: C(R°)  c  C(Ra) c  C (R U) . Moreover, we have argued that there are 
cases in which we have (with strict inclusion):
C (R ° ) c  C(Ra) c  C (R U) (R-bounds)
Between these upper and lower bounds on the inclusively o f the reference class there is 
room for diverging definitions which future investigations may explore, hopefully 
establishing further constraints or pinpointing a unique reference class as the correct 
choice.
S S A  and S S S A  a s  sp ec ia l c a s e s  of S S S A -R
We pointed out in chapter 4 that SSA is a special case o f SSSA: SSA can be applied when 
all observers are similar in all relevant respects, whereas SSSA can be applied even when 
observers differ in regard to the amount o f the relevant sort o f subjective time they 
experience.
SSSA, in turn, can be seen as a special case o f  SSSA-R: SSSA can be applied 
when all possible observer-moments that would exist on some o f the hypotheses under 
consideration are in the same reference class, whereas SSSA-R can be applied even to 
cases with more restrictive reference classes. SSSA thus follows from SSSA-R in those
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cases where have Ra = R u for all observer-moments a  that would exist on any o f  the 
hypothesis h, under consideration (i.e. for which Pa(/z; ) *  0). For with this reference 
class, we have n (w ff) c Q CT for all relevant worlds which means that SSSA-R  
reduces to
p „ m = -  2r Q »nO , P O J I
P M . )
(SSSA-R )
^ = 2
crsQI l ^ o o !
SSSA, which says that each observer-moment a  should reason as if  they were a random 
sample from the class o f all observer-moments, can be formalized using the framework 
developed in this chapter as
pM ) =  z S r 4 -
nA I^ X^ cr )|
(This means that the prior probability o f h is given by assigning all possible observer- 
moments a weight which is the inverse o f the number o f observer-moments in the world 
in which they live, multiplying this with the ordinary prior probability for that world, and 
then summing over all possible observer-moments for whom h is true.) Using YQi\e) = 
P(h&e) i P(e), it’s easy to see that this is identical to SSSA-RU.
A corollary o f this is that any results regarding cases where all observers 
(observer-moments) are relevantly similar obtained using SSA (SSSA) remain valid on 
SSSA-R. This means that if  we are persuaded by the intuitive correctness o f  some o f  
those earlier results, we can use them to calibrate the reference class definition with which 
SSSA-R operates. One could therefore expect that SSSA-R will give at least as plausible 
results as SSA and SSSA when applied to those earlier examples. We will not go over 
again all the earlier examples but we shall look in some detail at the application to 
cosmology. This application is complex enough to illustrate most o f the issues involved.
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S S S A -R  applied  to cosm olog ica l fine-tuning
In chapter 2, we argued (among other things) for three preliminary conclusions regarding 
fine-tuning as evidence for multiverse hypotheses:
(1) Fine-tuning favors (other things equal) hypotheses h+ on which it is likely that one 
or more observer-containing universes exist over hypotheses h_ on which this is 
unlikely.
(2) If two competing general hypotheses each imply that there is at least some 
observer-containing universe, but one o f them implies a greater number o f  
observer-containing universes, then fine-tuning is not a reason to favor the latter 
(other things equal).
(3) Although P(e\hM) may be much closer to zero than to one, it could nonetheless 
easily be large enough for e to favor the multiverse hypothesis.
We can now reexamine these theses in the new light from SSSA-R. To begin with (1), 
let’s determine under what circumstances we will have Pa (h+ \e) > P a(h_\e).
Suppose that
Pa (there is at least one actual observer - moment compatible with e\h+) « 1 .
Since P(^|5) = P(A&B) / P(B), this can be expressed as
i6JW(A+) ^  |
P J .K )  '
Similarly, if  we suppose that
Pa (there is at least one actual observer - moment compatible with e\h_) »  0 , 
we get
IX w
i&M(h_ )________q
Pa {h.)
If the hypotheses in question have about equal prior probability, Pa (h+ ) »  Pa (h_ ) ,  
this implies that
I X  ( '* « ) »  2 X 0 *,) (s)
izM(h+) iaM(h_)
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which is equivalent81 to
y  PM ') y  PM ') ($$)
no, ln , n(W' )| <x<Au no, |« . Q(W' )|
Now, according to SSSA-R, Pa (h+ \e) > Pa (h_\e) is equivalent to
y  pM ' )  y  pa(w ' )  ^
« £ !» . n o ,  |0 „  <"> 0 ( w „  ) |  n O , |0 „  ^  %  ) |
We may thus tell under what circumstances e will preferentially support h+ over h. by 
considering what is required for ($$) to yield (£). And from this we can learn three 
lessons:
• If Q e = £la for each cr e  Q e n  (Q h ^>Qh ) then (£) follows from ($$). This
means that if  all the observer-moments that the hypotheses say may exist and 
which are compatible with our evidence e are in the same reference class (H e) 
then a hypothesis h+ on which it is likely that one or more observer-moments 
compatible with e exist is supported vis-a-vis a hypothesis h. on which that is 
unlikely.
• In principle, it is possible for a hypothesis h. which makes it less likely that there 
should be some observer-moment compatible with e to get preferential support 
from e vis-a-vis a hypothesis h+ which makes that more likely. For example, if  h+ 
makes it likely that there should be one observer-moment compatible with e but at 
the same time makes it very likely that there are very many other observer- 
moments in our reference class which are not compatible with e, then h+ may be 
disfavored by e compared to a hypothesis h. on which it is quite unlikely that there 
should be any observer-moment compatible with e but on which also it is highly 
unlikely that there should be a substantial number o f observer-moments in our 
reference class which are not compatible with e.
• In practice (i.e. regarding (3)), if  we think o f h+ as a multiverse theory and h. as a 
single-universe theory, it seems that the concrete details will sometimes be such 
that (£) follows from ($$) together with the facts about these concrete details. This 
is the case when h+ entails a higher probability than does h. to there being some 
actual observer-moment that is compatible with e while at the same time the
81 To see this, consider the worlds over which the sums range in ($): these worlds all have at least one 
observer-moment in Q e and are such that h +  (or h . )  is true in them; and P a  (w, ) appears in the sum once 
for every such world. In the second inequality ($$), the sum again includes only terms corresponding to 
worlds that have at least one observer-moment in Q e and are such that h +  (or h . )  is true in them. The 
difference is that terms relating to such worlds occur multiple times in ($$): a term P a  (w ff) occurs once 
for every such observer-moment cr in each such world. Thus after dividing each term P a  (w ct) with the 
number of such observer-moments ( |Q e r \  n ( w CT ) | ), the sum is the same as in ($).
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expected ratio between the number o f actual observer-moments that are 
compatible with e that are in our reference class and the number o f  actual 
observer-moments that are in our reference class that are incompatible with e is 
about the same on h+ as on h. (or greater on h+ than on /?_). Crudely put: it is ok to 
infer a bigger cosmos in order to make it probable that at least some observer- 
moment compatible with e exists, but only if this can be done without sacrificing 
too much o f  the desideratum o f making it probable that a large fraction o f the 
actual observer-moments that are in our reference class are compatible with e.
W e’ll continue the discussion o f (3) in a moment, but first let’s direct the spotlight on the
second preliminary thesis. The analysis o f (2) follows path parallel to that o f (1).
Suppose that
Pa (there are many actual observer - moments compatible with e\h++) »1  
Pa (there is at least one actual observer - moment compatible with e\h+) »1
Since the first expression implies that
Pa (there is at least one actual observer - moment compatible with e\h++) »  1
we get, in a similar way as above,
y *  P g ( W a )  y  i W a ) ($$*)
| n .  n  n ( W„ )| ~  |£2, n  Cl(w„ )|aeQ
Meanwhile, by SSSA-R, Pa (/z++ \e) «  Pa (h+ \e) is equivalent to
y  (W<r) w y  Pg(Wa)
)| o*aK no, ri n (w a )|
Again we can compare ($$*) to (£*) to see under what circumstances the former implies 
the latter. We find that
• Like before, if  Q e = Q a for each a  e Q e r^(Qh+ u f l h ) then (£*) follows from
($$*). This means that if  the observer-moments that are compatible with e and 
with at least one o f the hypotheses h++ and h+ are all in the same reference class 
{ Q e) then a hypothesis h++ on which it is likely that there are a great many 
observer-moments compatible with e is not preferentially supported vis-a-vis a 
hypothesis h+ on which it is likely that there are relatively few observer-moments 
compatible with e.
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• Generally speaking, e will fail to distinguish between h++ and h+ if, for those 
observer-moments that are in our reference class, both hypotheses imply a similar 
expected ratio between the number o f  ones compatible with e and the number o f  
ones incompatible with e. This means that ceteris paribus there is no reason to 
prefer a hypothesis which implies a greater number o f  observer-moments, beyond 
what is required to make it likely that there should be at least one actual observer- 
moment that is compatible with e.
Armed with these results, we can address (3). Let’s suppose for the moment that 
there are no freak observers.
First, consider a single-universe theory hu on which our universe is fine-tuned, so 
that conditional on hu there was only a very small probability that an observer-containing 
universe should exist. If we compare hu with a multiverse theory hu, on which it was 
quite likely that an observer-containing universe should exist, we find that if  hu and hM 
had similar prior probabilities, then there are prima facie grounds for thinking hm to be 
more probable than hu given the evidence we have. Whether these prima facie grounds 
hold up on closer scrutiny depends on the distributions o f observer-moments that hu and 
hu  make probable. Supposing that the nature o f the observer-moments that would tend to 
exist on hu (if there were any observer-moments at all, which would improbable on hu) 
are similar to the observer-moments that (most likely) exist on hM, then we do in fact have 
such grounds.
The precise sense o f the proviso that our evidence e may favor hM over hu only if  
the observer-moments most likely to exist on either hypothesis are o f  a similar nature is 
specified by SSSA-R and the lessons we derived from it above. But we can say at least 
something in intuitive terms about what sorts o f single-universe and multiverse theories 
for which this will be the case. For example, we can consider the case where there is a 
single relevant physical parameter, A . Suppose the prior probability distribution over 
possible values o f A that a universe could have is smeared our over a broad interval 
(representing a priori ignorance about A and absence o f any general grounds such as 
considerations o f simplicity or theoretical elegance for expecting that A should have 
taken on a value within a more narrow range). In the archetypal case o f  fine-tuning, there 
is only a very small range o f  A -values that give rise to a universe that contains observers. 
Then the conditional probability o f  e given hu is very small. By contrast, the conditional 
probability o f e given hM can be quite large, since there will most likely be observers
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given hM and these observer-moments will all be living in universes where X has a value 
within the small region o f fine-tuned (observer-generating) values. In this situation, hM 
would be preferentially supported by e.
N ow  consider a different case which doesn’t involve fine-tuning but merely “ad 
hoc” setting o f a free parameter. This is the case when observers can exist over the whole 
range o f possible values o f X (or a fairly large part thereof). The conditional probability 
o f e given hu is the same as before (i.e. very small), but in this case the conditional 
probability o f  e given hM is about equally small. For although hM makes it likely that there 
should be some observers, and even that there should be some observers compatible with 
e , h y  also makes it highly likely that there should be very many other observers that are 
not compatible with e. These are the observers that live in other universes in the 
multiverse, universes where X takes a different value than the one we have observed (and 
hence incompatible with e). If these other observers are in the same reference class as us 
(and there is no clear reason why they shouldn’t be, at least if  the sort o f  observers living 
in universes with different X are not too dissimilar to ourselves), then this means that the 
conditional probability o f e given hM is very small. If enough other- X universes contain 
substantial quantities o f observers that are in the same reference class as us, then hM will 
not get significant preferential support from e compared to hu.
We see here the sense in which fine-tuning suggests a multiverse in a way that 
mere free parameters do not. In the former case, hM tends to be strongly supported by the 
evidence we have (given comparable priors), in the latter case not.
On this story, how does one fit in the scenario where we discover a simple single­
universe theory hu* that accounts for the evidence? Well, if  hu* is elegant and simple, 
then we would assign it a relatively high prior probability. Since hu by assumption 
implies or at least gives a rather high probability to e, the conditional probability o f  hu 
given e would thus be high. This would be support for the single-universe hypothesis and 
against the multiverse hypothesis.
One kind o f candidate for such a single-universe theory are theories involving a 
creator who chose to create only one universe. I f  one assigned one such theory he a 
reasonably high prior probability, and i f  it could be shown to give a high probability to 
there being one universe precisely like the one we observe and no other universes, then 
one would have support for he*. Creator-hypotheses on which the creator creates a whole
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ensemble o f observer-containing universes would be less supported than he*. However, if  
our universe is not o f the sort that one might have suspected a creator to create if  he 
created only one universe (if our universe is not the nicest possible one in any sense, for 
example), then the conditional probability o f e on any creator-hypothesis involving the 
creation o f only one universe might well so slim that even if  one assigned such a creator- 
hypothesis a high prior probability it would still not be tenable in light o f e if  there were 
some plausible alternative theory giving a high conditional probability to e (e.g. a 
multiverse theory successfully riding on fme-tuning and its concomitant selection effects, 
or a still-to-be-discovered simple and elegant single-universe theory that fits the facts). If 
there were no such plausible alternative theory, then one may believe either a fine-tuned 
single-universe theory, a multiverse-theory not benefiting from observational selection 
effects, or a creator hypothesis (either o f the single-universe or the multiverse kind) -  
these would be roughly on a par regarding how well they’d fit with the evidence (quite 
poorly for all o f  them) and the choice between them would be determined mainly by 
one’s prior probability function.
In chapter 2 we also touched on the case where our universe is discovered to have 
some “special feature” F. One example of this is if  we were to find inscriptions saying 
“God created this universe and it’s the only one he created.” in places where it seems only 
a diving being would have made them (and we thought that there was a significant chance 
that the creator was being honest). Another example is if  we find specific evidence that 
favors on ordinary' (non-anthropic) grounds some physical theory that either implies a 
single-universe world or a multiverse. Such new evidence e ’ would be conjoined with the 
evidence e we already have. What we should believe in the light o f this depends on what 
conditional probability various hypotheses give to e&e ’ and on the prior probabilities we 
give to these hypotheses. With e ’ involving special features, e&e ’ might well be such as 
to preferentially favor hypotheses that specifically accounts for the special features, and 
this favoring may be strong enough to dominate any o f  the considerations mentioned 
above. For example, if  we find all those inscriptions, that would make the creator- 
hypothesis seem very attractive even if  one assigned it a low prior probability and even if  
the conditional probability o f there being a single universe with F  given the creator- 
hypotheses would be small; for other plausible hypotheses would presumably give very 
much smaller conditional probabilities to our finding that our universe has F. (On hu, it 
would be extremely unlikely that there would be any universe with F. On hu, it might be
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likely that there should be some universe with F, but it would nonetheless be extremely 
unlikely that we should be in that universe, since on any plausible multiverse theory not 
involving a creator it would seem that if  it were likely that there should be one universe 
with F  then it would also be most likely that there are a great many other universes not 
having F  and in which the observers, although many o f them would be in the same 
reference class as us, would thus not be compatible with the evidence we have.) Similar 
considerations hold if  F  is not divine-looking inscriptions but something more o f the 
nature o f  ordinary physical evidence for some particular physical theory.
Finally, we have to tackle the question o f how the existence o f  freak observers 
affects the story. The answer is: hardly at all. Although once we take account o f  freak 
observers there will presumably be a broad class o f single-universe theories that make 
probable that some observers compatible with e should exist, this doesn’t help the case for 
such theories. For freak observers are random -  whether they are generated by Hawking 
radiation or by thermal fluctuations or some other phenomena o f a similar kind, these 
freak observers would not be preferentially generated to be compatible with e. Only an 
extremely minute fraction o f all freak observers would be compatible with e. The case 
would therefore be essentially the same as if  we have a multiverse where many universes 
contain observers (that are in our reference class) but only a tiny fraction o f them contain 
observers that are compatible with e. Just as e didn’t especially favor such multiverse- 
theories over ad hoc single-universe theories, so likewise e is not given a sufficiently high 
probability by the there-is-a-single-universe-sufficiently-big-to-contain-all-kinds-of-freak 
observers theory (hp) to make such a theory supported by our evidence. In fact, the case 
for hp is much worse than the case for such a multiverse theory. For the multiverse theory, 
even if  not getting any assistance from fine-tuning, would at least have a bias towards 
observers that have evolved (i.e. most observers would be o f that kind). Evolved 
observers would tend to be in epistemic states that to some degree reflect the nature o f  the 
universe they are living in. Thus if  not every logically possible universe is instantiated 
(with equal frequency) in the multiverse but instead the universes it contains tend to share 
at least some basic features with our actual universe, then a much greater fraction o f  the 
observers existing in the multiverse would be compatible with e than o f  the observers 
existing given hp. On hp the observers would be distributed roughly evenly over all
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logically possible epistemic states (of a given complexity)82 whereas on the multiverse 
theory they’d be distributed over the smaller space o f epistemic states that are likely to be 
instantiated in observers evolving in universes that share at least some basic features 
(maybe physical laws, or some physical laws, depending on the particular multiverse 
theory) with our universe. So Hf is strongly disfavored by e.
Freak observers, therefore, cannot rescue an otherwise flawed theory. At the same 
time, the existence o f  freak observers would not prevent a theory which is otherwise 
supported by our evidence from still being supported once the freak observers are taken 
into account -  provided that the freak observers make up a small fraction o f  all the 
observers that the theory says exist. In the universe we are actually living in, for example, 
it seems that there may well be vast numbers o f freak observers (if only it is sufficiently 
big). Yet these freak observers would be in an astronomically small minority83 compared 
to the regular observers that trace their origin to life that evolved by normal pathways on 
some planet. For every observer that pops out o f a black hole, there are countless 
civilizations o f regular observers. Freak observers can thus, on SSSA-R, be ignored for all 
practical purposes.
H ow th e  observation  theory b a se d  on S S S A -R  m e a su r e s  up a g a in st d esid era ta
The theory o f reasoning under observational selection effects (an “observation theory” for 
short) that we have developed here builds on the ideas discovered in previous chapters. 
After establishing what an observation theory has to be able to do -  the forms o f  
reasoning that it must systematize and the sorts o f considerations that it must be 
consistent with -  and after analyzing how the simpler preliminary theory based on SSA 
works and the cases where it breaks down, we were led to propose the theory developed 
in the present chapter. This involved reassessing the earlier conclusions about the God’s 
Coin Toss gedanken by looking at it in a framework where observer-moments rather than 
observers are the basic entities. We argued that contrary to appearances, a model could be 
constructed in this framework that does not conflict with Bayesian kinematics, that rejects
82 If you were to generate lumps of matter at random and wait until a brain in a conscious state emerged, 
you’d most likely find that the first conscious brain-state was some totally weird psychedelic one, but at any 
rate not one consistent with the highly specific and orderly set of knowledge embodied in e.
83 Again, we are disregarding the infinite case which the current version of the theory advanced here is not 
designed to deal with. It seems that in order to handle the infinite case one would have to strengthen SSSA-
191
SIA, and that does not give rise to the sort o f probability shift that leads to D A  and the 
paradoxes discovered in chapter 8. This model involves placing certain observer-moments 
in different reference classes, and some arguments were given for why this was a 
legitimate procedure (although the main motivation is that it avoids the paradoxes o f  
chapter 8). The ideas underlying this solution were generalized and given a 
mathematically precise expression in equation SSSA-R, which forms a centerpiece o f  the 
theory. Upper and lower bounds on the inclusively o f the reference class were established 
(R-bounds), showing that the reference class is non-trivial.
It was shown in some detail how this theory resolves the range o f conundrums 
related cosmological theorizing and anthropic reasoning. The preliminary results derived 
in chapter 2 about the evidential relations between our evidence, single-universe and 
multiverse hypotheses, fine-tuning, and cosmic design hypotheses were confirmed, 
extended and made more precise using the new observation theory’s conceptual and 
formal resources. The theory permits probabilistic observational consequences to be 
derived in intuitive ways from both multiverse-models and big-single universe models 
and works fine even in the presence freak observers. Some reasons were given for why 
the theory will also work for the other applications o f  anthropic reasoning we have 
studied, although these cases were not explicitly analyzed in terms o f SSSA-R.
The observation theory undercuts DA by affording an alternative way o f  
conceptualizing the God’s Coin Toss gedanken (G3), which is the common denominator 
o f DA and the paradoxes o f chapter 8. It provides a simple, uniform framework for 
drawing conclusions from data that have been subjected to observational selection effects. 
And it enables us to formulate specific further research objectives, including (but not 
limited to): explaining how to extend the theory to cover infinite cases; pinpoint and 
justify the correct definition o f  the reference class; applying it in detailed analyses in 
concrete scientific settings, especially multiverse cosmology and evolutionary biology; 
applying it to game theoretic problems involving imperfect recall; drawing out its 
philosophical implications for Lewis’ modal realism, the many-worlds and many-minds 
interpretations o f quantum physics, physicist Max Tegmark’s speculative ideas for a 
theory o f  everything, hypotheses about intelligent extraterrestrial life and our own long-
R with something that is formulated in terms of spatial densities of observer-moments rather than classes of 
observer-moments. But that is beyond the scope of this investigation.
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term future, and in general for theories about the large-scale structure o f the world and the 
distribution o f observers within it.
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